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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Background of Indo-Paki stan Tensions
South Asia contains a tremendous assortment of racial groups
and subgroups, their distribution appearing to bear little relation to
present national boundaries. The whole region is the cluster of dif-
ferent countries, different in culture, traditions and languages, but
sharing a common past; an historical experience of colonial rule.
The region is comprised of Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Nepal,
Sikkim, Bhutan
,
Bangladesh
,
and, according to some, even Burma and Af-
ghanistan. Indeed some of the countries in the area have serious
inter-racial problems within themselves, but the majority of the people
of South Asia can be broadly divided into four major groups: the Mon-
goloid races which spread southwards from China; Aryans, who first en-
tered India from the northwest and spread southwards and eastwards;
the Dravidians, whom the Aryans displaced and drove southwards.^
The history of the area has been one of continuous social move-
ment and conquest, the general tendency having been for northern races
to spread farther and farther southwards. The Aryan conquerors carried
the Hindu religion from the Hindu Kush to Indo-China and Malaysia.
Buddhism spread southwards and eastwards from India, and later Islam
^ Angus Maude, South Asia: A Background Book (London: The Bodley
Head Ltd., 1966), pp. 12-16.
1
2swept into India, Malaysia and Indonesia, with the voyages of Arab and
Indian traders. Finally Christianity entered the region, with the
Catholic Portuguese and French, together with the Protestant English,
Scots and Dutch.
South Asia has seen the rise and fall of many great empires.
India came under various i nvasions—Greek
,
Persian, Mongol, Turkish,
Afghan, and more recently British. The Chinese in the early fifteenth
century sent naval expeditions throughout Asia, exacting tribute from
Ceylon and Malaysia and reaching even to the Persian Gulf.
In the specific case of the South Asian countries many circum-
stances have combined to make their present-day mutual relations feeble.
Perhaps the strongest thread that binds them is the historical experi-
ence they have shared and its subsequent effects on their view of poli-
tical problems and process. The periods of colonial rule, though of
varying length, were of such duration and intensity as to leave a de-
finite imprint on almost every aspect of their existence. The recent
liberation of these countries has been of great importance to their en-
tire national life. But in all of them independence was brought about
2by members of the small articulate el i te groups within the "educated."
Initially all these countries declared their intentions to build
their constitutional and civic structure on the lines of Parliamentary
democracy, based on free elections and adult suffrage for men and women.
But in none of the South Asian countries has the experiment with the
ultra-modern political democracy been anything like a complete success;
2
In the special sense, the term in South comprises only a small
percentage of the total population.
3many of them have come under authoritarian rule of one shape or another.
South Asian countries are similar in their basic economic con-
ditions. The majority of the people are poor. Social and economic
inequalities are their common feature; the reason being a long period
of economic stagnation.^
The first major breach in the walls of colonial domination came
with the peaceful ending of British rule in India in 1947 and the
creation of the Union of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
as successor states. Political independence of Burma and Ceylon fol-
lowed in 1948. Indonesia did not achieve full independence until 1949.
Malaysia became independent in 1957 and Singapore in 1959.
In retrospect it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
dissolution of colonial rule in South Asia was inevitable. But in the
colonies, the arrival of independence was a traumatic experience and
one that justifies the common description of it as a political revolu-
tion. All of the new states had to face the fact that independence
did not automatically bring about a condition of national consolidation.
Instead, each new state faced the immediate task of asserting its
authority over its territorial inheritance.
The Subconti nent--rol e of religion . The Indian subcontinent is full of
variety and contrast. Within its vast area are all types of terrain.
In the north are the Himalayas, with their perennial snowcapped peaks
and desolate, never-ending ranges of the mountains that form the roof-
3
Gunnar Myrdal
,
Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of
Nations (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), pp. 20-27.
4top of the world. In the west are the barren Rajasthan and Baluchistani
deserts, with their biting winter cold and ferocious summer heat. In
the west, above the Rajasthan desert, are the fertile wheat-growing
plains of the land of the five rivers, the Punjab. Also in the north,
from the Punjab in the west to Bengal in the east, stretches the Indo-
Gangetic plain, hundreds of miles of flat farmland. It was here, be-
side the Ganges, that early kingdoms flourished. Hinduism developed
here and later Muslim culture put down its roots and adapted itself to
the new Indian environment.
The people of this vast subcontinent are as diverse as its
topography. Each part, each region, has a distinctive flavor of its
own. Not only does the north differ from the south and the east from
the west, but so do regions adjacent to one another. Each has its own
regional language, its own set of customs, food habits and dress and
each has its own separate regional history with its local heroes and
moments of triumph, just as each is also a part of the overall history
of the subcontinent and of its wider historical processes.
Indian society is particularly complex, and can be viewed from
many angles. Religion is one of them. It provided a rationale of
social organization; it bound individuals together in certain ways,
identified them in distinct groups and set them apart from other in-
dividuals. It is responsible for bringing into existence certain kinds
of social groups and determining their relationships with others. By
the nineteenth century there were two main religions on the subconti-
nent, Hinduism and Islam.
Islam first came to India about the eighth century and for some
5time was limited to the area around the Indus River. The establish-
ment of a Muslim Kingdom in the north around Delhi in the eleventh
century brought this religion into the heart of the subcontinent. By
the end of the eighteenth century Islam had become established as the
second largest religion in the area. On a country-wide basis, Muslims
were outnumbered by Hindus roughly in the proportion of five to one.
In some regions, however, they were in a majority--in Bengal, in Sind,
and in the northwest frontier province. In the Punjab they constituted
the largest community followed by Hindus and Sikhs.
It is argued that the Muslims of India as a whole were a dis-
tinct community, that they possessed a sense of identity resulting from
their corunon religion which not only set them apart from Hindus, but
gave them a positive identification with one another as Muslims. The
fact that they were all followers of Muhammad was used in the twen-
tieth century in an attempt to bring them together on one political
platform as one community. As the formation of Pakistan demonstrates,
the attempt to emphasize an Islamic rather than an Indian nationality
proved successful
.
The breakup of the Mughal empire and the defeat of the Marahtas,
who had hoped to fall heirs to it, happened to coincide with the emer-
gence of the British as the unchallenged European trading power in
India. By the end of the seventeenth century, the East India Company
was established in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, and was becoming not
only a trading corporation but a military power in its own right.
6The pre-independen c e background of Hi ndu-MusI 1m tension
. T.W. Wall bank
describes the plural society of India as the basic factor involved in
the process of partition.^ J.S. Furnivall views it as "a society com-
prising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side,
yet without mingling in one political unit."^
Wallbank adds that a shared history normally calls for in-
creasing cooperation and even for forms of integration between differ-
ent political units, but the contemporary world, he says, presents
disturbing evidence of a contrary tendency, various societies and poli-
tical units have been or are being torn apart by rival groups made an-
tagonistic by their differences. The Indian subcontinent is the most
outstanding case of that sort of plural society, which has failed to
compose ethnic and cultural differences. The partition of the politi-
cal unit created under British rule is one of the most significant
events in the twentieth century Asian history. This division was fol-
lowed by violent strife in which thousands of Muslims, Sikhs, and
Hindus lost their lives. Between India and Pakistan it created a con-
stantly burning fire of hatred and discord symbolized by the Kashmir
i ssue
.
In the centuries that mark Indian history from its earliest
civilization in the Indus valley (2500 to 1500 B.C.) up to the Gupta
empire, the subcontinent experienced numerous invasions. The intruders,
"^T.W. Wallbank, ed.. The Partition of India: Causes and Re -
spons ibi 1 i ties (Boston: D.C. Heath & Company, 1966), p. 1.
^J.S. Furnivall, Indi a
,
quoted in Ibid., p. 446 (England:
Cambridge University Press, 1939).
7however, were usually absorbed by Hinduism and had no difficulty in
finding a place for themselves in the Hindu caste system. There was,
however, one group of invaders who were not absorbed. The various
Muslim people who entered India remained a distinct entity in the
social and political fabric of Indian life. They worshipped God, and
accepted Muhammad as his prophet; their bonds with one another were
closer than those with Hindus. Socially, this was reinforced by a range
of customs and practices which marked off the adherents of one religion
from the other.
During the nineteenth century, Muslims began to develop the
political sense of being a separate community, distinct from the Hindus.
The Hindus quickly responded to the Western impact that brought new op-
portunities in business, the professions, and government service. Mus-
lims had not recovered from their loss of political power when they
were supplanted as rulers of the subcontinent by the British and they
lived in the past, in a nostalgic world of former glories. They were
hence predisposed not to accept the alien ideas, methods, and language
of the new government. While Hindus were taking to some aspects of
modernization, Muslims were not. For several decades after the War of
Independence of 1857, they remained apathetic, falling behind the
Hindus in the new India that was emerging.
After the War of Independence of 1857, the position of Muslims
worsened. They were held responsible for the outbreak and the British,
as a result, discriminated against them.^ The overall picture presented
^Wallbank, pp. 5-20; see also Jim Masselos, Nationalism on the
Indian Subcontinent (Australia: Thomas Nelson, 1972), pp. 10-40.
8was of a community in decay, economically backward and deprived of ac-
cess to positions in government service by a rival Hindu community.
Not only were Muslims demoralized, they were becoming increasingly
impoverished. It became evident even before 1857 when English re-
placed Persian as the official language of the bureaucracy and the
law courts. Consequently, Muslims were gradually replaced by Hindus
who were quicker to learn English.
The 1870s witnessed movements for the promotion of Western
education among Muslims. The most significant personality of this time
was Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan (1817-98). In the 1860s, he opposed the re-
placement of Urdu by Hindi in the U.P. He became convinced that the
interests of Hindus and Muslims were opposed and that they were vir-
tually two separate nations. He was a great modernizer among Muslims,
an educationalist, who founded the Muslim university at Aligarh, and a
social reformer who waged war against non-rational dogma.
Emergence of nationalism: Formation of the Congress . The Indian scene
from 1857 to 1912 was characterized by the expansion of modern com-
munications, the growth of English, the establishment of Western educa-
tion and the rise of a professional and business middle class. These
trends helped to stir a spirit of nationalism which appeared by the
founding of the National Congress in 1885.
In theory a truly national and secular party, the Congress was
actually much more a Hindu than a Muslim organization in its member-
ship. A Hindu religious and ideological renaissance that tended to
be anti-Muslim as well as anti-British and which was closely tied with
9the rise of political nationalism, represented by the Congress, alien-
ated many Muslims, including Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan. By the 1890s, such
Muslim support as the Congress enjoyed was diminishing. At the 1894
Madras session, there were only 23 Muslim delegates as against 1163
Hindus and at Poona in 1895, the comparative numbers were 25 and 1584.^
Comr^nal differences between Hindus and Muslims and formation of the
—
-
lim League
. In various parts of the country, Muslims and Hindus were
gradually being divided and antagonized. The process was intensified
in the 'nineties with the growth of Hindu militancy, the emergence of
cow protection movements, and the outbreak of a rash of Hindu-Muslim
riots. The other side of the coin was the development of a Muslim cul-
tural revivalist movement in the north after the early 1880s. The ef-
fect of all these factors was to promote the idea of a separate Muslim
community. Increasingly, the religious community was being viewed as
a social and political entity, one which could undertake activity in its
own right as a distinct unit. It is often maintained that Muslim
separation was engineered by interfering British officials who were ap-
plying a policy of divide and rule in an attempt to set one community
against the other. In any case, the sum effect was to intensify com-
munal awareness and to segregate further the two communities. Out of
such an environment emerged the All -India Muslim League. As it appeared
that representative and democratic institutions might advance in India,
the Muslims, fearful that they would be overwhelmed by the much larger
Hindu majority in a democratic political system, demanded safeguards
^Masselos, pp. 99-104.
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and a system of separate communal representation in legislative bodies.
On October 1, 1906, a Muslim deputation called on the Viceroy, Lord
Minto, and made these demands. Minto proved unexpectedly sympathetic;
he acknowledged their aspirations and assured the delegation that their
political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded by
any administrative organization with which I am concerned."^
The "Minto-Morley Reforms" in 1909 included a provision for
separate Muslim electorates. The rights of the Muslims as a distinct
community were recognized and guaranteed. This recognition institu-
tionalized Muslim separatism. Leaders of the newly formed Muslim League
increasingly spoke of the two separate nations in India (the Hindus and
the Muslims), claimed to represent the Muslim nation, and challenged the
Congress Party's claim to represent all of India. From now on, two,
not one, nationalisms began to develop in Indian politics and this
tendency would intensify in the years to come and culminate in a Muslim
demand for a separate homeland to be called Pakistan.
During and following World War I, Hindu and Muslim leaders co-
operated briefly. In the "Lucknow Pact" of 1916 between the Congress
and the League, the former accepted separate electorates for Muslims.
At the end of the war, Indian-Musl ims were greatly disturbed over the
danger to the institution of "Khilafat" (Caliphate) in Turkey following
that nation's defeat in the war and loss of territory. The Congress
under Gandhi's leadership, launched a civil disobedience movement to
press the British to give India independence and to support the Muslim
®R.C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India (Cal-
cutta, 1963), p. 223.
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demand that the Allies treat Turkey fairly at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence. But soon the movement became violent. Besides, there were ter-
rible Hindu-Muslim riots in Kerala and elsewhere. And, thus, a brief
attempt to forge Hindu-Muslim unity ended in failure.
^win g Muslim dissatisfaction and demand for a separate homeland for
• Relations between the Congress and the Muslim League went
from bad to worse. The Congress won legislative majorities in most pro-
vincial elections held in 1937 under the Government of India Act, 1935.
The resulting Congress governments in these provinces were seen by Mus-
lims as suppressing Muslim language (Urdu), culture, and religion in
areas under their control. Muslims became convinced, more than ever
before, that their cultural and religious identity would be destroyed in
a united independent India ruled by the permanent Hindu majority. In a
meeting in Lahore in March 1940 the Muslim League passed a resolution
demanding the partition of India and the constitution of contiguous
Muslim majority areas in the northwestern and eastern parts of India
as independent Muslim states. This is known as the "Pakistan Resolu-
tion. "
Initially the Congress and the British both denounced the
demand for Pakistan as absurd. But the legislative elections to the
central and provincial legislatures in 1945 and 1946 showed the Muslim
League, which was contesting on the Pakistan platform, win virtually
all Muslim constituencies. The Muslim League victory was a victory for
the demand for Pakistan. The demand became so irresistible that ul-
timately both the British and the Congress accepted it. On August 14,
12
1947, India was partitioned and Pakistan came into being. But it did
not happen without a great deal of bloodshed and a massive transfer of
populations.
chapter II
MAJOR DISPUTES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Pakistan came into existence under quite unfavorable conditions.
Geographically awkward, it remained as a unique example of dual boun-
daries, composed of two wings divided by hostile India for a thousand
miles. As the background of the partition reveals the deep-rooted ill
feelings of the two nations, it wasn't unexpected that born in bloodshed
and strife Pakistan would not be tolerated easily by its immediate
neighbor, India, as it had spoiled the Indian dream of an independent
and united subcontinent.
Circumstances that created the feelings of mistrust between
India and Pakistan were mostly due to the events which took place im-
mediately after the partition. India's attitude towards Pakistan re-
mained harsh and unsympathetic. They not only withheld Pakistan's
share of military supplies, but also denied Pakistan its share of cash
balances.^ The latter was released when Gandhi threatened to go on an
2indefinite fast.
Another immediate and most explosive problem Pakistan faced
was related to the question of sharing the waters of the Indus basin.
India cut off the supply of water from the two head works under its
^At the beginning of December 1947, India and Pakistan mutually
came to an agreement that Pakistan would get RS.750 as her share.
2
S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 13.
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control in April 1948 when a joint committee of the officials failed
to settle the questions relating to the division of joint assets. A
Pakistani delegation had to rush to Delhi and sign an agreement at In-
dia s bidding before the flow was resumed. Both the governments agreed
to negotiate in order to find the solution of the problem in 1952, but
the negotiations were not finalized until September 19, 1960, when
President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Nehru signed the Indus Waters
Treaty.
^
Relations between India and Pakistan became tense in 1949
when following the devaluation of the British pound sterling vis-a-vis
the American dollar, India similarly devalued her rupee and Pakistan
did not. India was shocked with this decision of Pakistan and refused
to pay the 30 percent higher price for Pakistani jute, cotton and food
grains. Along with that the urgently needed supply of coal to Pakis-
tan was stopped by India. Thus, by the end of 1949, trade between India
and Pakistan reached an almost complete standstill. Later on Pakistan
started trading with China, which bought cotton from Pakistan and sup-
plied coal which was badly needed for running the railways.^
"A recurring pattern in the relations between Asian states can
be found in their acceptance or rejection of borders and frontier zones
5
initially drawn up by the former colonial powers." The tensions which
grow out of disputed boundaries have played a major part in the life of
^Ibid., pp. 11-12.
^Ibid.
, pp. 14-1 5.
^Rene Peritz, Changing Politics of Modern Asia (New York: D. Van
Nostrand Co., 1973), p. 4.
15
nearly every nation, especially where a nation's frontier area in-
cludes people of different customs, social structure and ethnic back-
ground. Wherever boundaries have been arbitrarily demarcated by out-
side powers decades or centuries ago, deep-rooted national resentments
and distrust continue to simmer and affect present-day national atti-
tudes
.
Along with some other di sputes on the Western frontiers of
India and Pakistan, the problems on the Eastern borders were largely
due to the unnatural Radcliffe Boundary Award. Conflicts also arose
due to the confusion about the names of rivers or changes in their
courses. The enclaves posed another problem which came under the
category of boundary disputes. The enclave of Berubari union situated
on the Rangpur (East Pakistan) and Jalpaiguri (West Bengal) was one of
them. In September 1958, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India,
Firoze Khan Noon and Jawaharlal Nehru, signed an agreement whereby
India agreed to cede the Berubari enclave. But the agreement became
an issue of constitutional controversy in India and the subject of a
tussle between the central government of India and the provincial
government of West Bengal. In its ruling of March 1960, the Supreme
Court of India declared the agreement illegal, thus the Noon-Nehru
agreement was never implemented.
The Farakka Barrage dispute^ was also a matter of profound con-
g
For the details, see Mujtaba Razvi
,
The Frontiers of Pakistan :
A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Karachi:
National Publishing House LTD., 1971), pp. 45-60.
^Burke, pp. 381-384; also Ibid., pp. 60-69.
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cern for Pakistan. India decided to construct Farakka Barrage in West
Bengal, about eleven miles from East Pakistan's border. This would
stop between a third and a half of the peak flow of the Ganges into
East Pakistan and divert it into the Hoogly-an Indian river-in order
to improve navigation in the Calcutta port. This would, among other
things, cause a serious shortage of water for irrigation in East Pakis-
tan. The dispute remained unsettled until recently, when Bangladesh
3nd Indid rGachGd an agpGGniGnt.
Many of thG contGmporary issuGS dividing thG Asian nations por-
tain to boundariGS and frontiGrs bGtwGGn nGighboring statGS. DisputGS
initially arising from torritorial quGStions ofton tond to transcGnd
thoir spGcific focus and assumo idoologica! dimonsions as dotorminod by
a nation's gonoral diplomacy with others. The quarrel between India
and Pakistan over political and legal control of Kashmir represents a
major obstacle to South Asian regional cooperation efforts.
Kashm ir Dispute and the First War in Kashmir,
1948-1949
Of all the issues dividing India and Pakistan, the Kashmir dis-
pute has proved to be the most tenacious. "Plebiscite partition, inter-
nationalization, political settlement: all the textbook solutions for a
territorial dispute have been proposed for Kashmir and all have been
8fruitless." Kashmir has prompted three wars between the two countries
and still remains the major obstacle to a peace settlement in the sub-
g
G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India (Meerut:
Meenakashi Prakashan, 1971 )
,
p. 103.
17
conti nent.
When Pakistan and India achieved their freedom under the Inde-
pendence Act of India in 1947, many of the subcontinent's variously
located princely states became technically independent as well. The
rulers of these states could choose, under the terms of the statute,
whether to join India or Pakistan. The most difficult case was that
of the states of Jammu and Kashmir, predomi nantly Muslim, but with a
Hindu ruler. The Maharaja vacillated in his decision to join either
of the two states. His motives remain a matter of speculation. It is
not clear whether he initially wished Kashmir to remain independent
from both India and Pakistan or wanted to accede to India.
It may be said that geographically Kashmir would seem rather to
belong with Pakistan than with India, since its rivers and its trade
flowed mainly towards Pakistan. Moreover, its inhabitants were mainly
Muslims. It is not, however, surprising that the Hindu ruler should
have felt that his own personal position would be seriously weakened if
his state were incorporated in a Muslim country. Although he hoped to
retain some measure of independence, he nevertheless recognized the
natural orientation of Kashmir towards Pakistan, and concluded a "Stand-
Q
Still Agreement" with it. The situation in Kashmir became more and
more difficult as the infection of communal disorders spread from the
Punjab. The ruling family had never been particularly popular with
its Muslim subjects, and these now began to demonstrate in favor of im-
9
"Paki stan-Kashmi r Standstill Agreement," August 1947, repro-
duced in The Kashmir Question
,
ed. K. Sarwar Hassan and Zubeida Hassan
(Karachi; Pakistan Institute of Internal Affairs, 1966), p. 43.
18
mediate accession to Pakistan.
Unfortunately, at this stage in October 1947, large numbers of
tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) began to
stream into Kashmir. It is doubtful whether this incursion was de-
liberately encouraged or organized by the government of Pakistan in
the first instance; but the tribesmen certainly came from the territory
which was under its control, and it made no apparent move to check
them.
The Maharaja then appealed to the Indian government for help
and protection, but this was refused unless he signified the accession
of Jammu and Kashmir to India.
In this atmosphere of civil strife and considerable political
turbulence, the Maharaja acceded the area under his jurisdiction to In-
dia on October 27, under less than clear condi tions
. After the
Maharaja agreed to join India, the Indian Army entered Kashmiri terri-
tory. The Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, informed Mr. Attlee (the
British Prime Minister) that India's action in Kashmir had been forced
upon her by circumstances and by the "imminent grave danger" to Srina-
gar; and that India had no desire to intervene in Kashmiri affairs once
the state had been cleared of raiders and law and order established.
Pakistan, however, denounced this action of India and stated that "the
accession of Kashmir to India is based on fraud and violence and such
cannot be recognized. ^ When the Indian troops began to gain the upper
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 55-57.
1
1
"Press Communique" by the Pakistan Government on October 30,
1947, cited in Keesing's Report
,
p. 45.
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hand, Pakistan started to aid the tribesmen, finally entering the field
with regular Pakistani forces. During 1947, the Indian forces in
Kashmir, supported by the Royal Indian Air Force, were in operation
against the tribesmen from time to time in a number of areas. By the
end of the year the tribesmen's advance towards Srinagar had been ef-
fectively halted and by the end of 1948 Indian forces were in control
of the greater part of Kashmir.
After the Indian government had announced in December 1947 that
it would place its dispute with Pakistan before the U.N. Security Coun-
cil the latter considered the question between January 15 and April 22,
1948, when it adopted a resolution against Pakistani objections and
with the Soviet Union abstaining. The resolution provided for the with-
drawal of Pakistani forces from Kashmir; for a progressive reduction
of Indian forces, once ceasefire arrangements were effective, to the
minimum required "for the support of the civil power in the maintenance
of law and order"; and for the holding of a plebiscite to determine
1
2
Kashmir's future. The U.N. arranged a tenuous ceasefire between the
belligerents, but by that time the territory of Kashmir had in fact been
divided into Indian and Paki stani -control led portions.
India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared that once
order had been restored to the territory, India would be willing to un-
dertake a plebiscite in Kashmir in order to ascertain the political
wishes of the people. He also agreed that New Delhi would abide by the
results. This statement was subsequently approved by the Kashmiri
leader Sheikh Muhaiiuiiad Abdullah. Moreover, the essence of the plebis-
^^Ibid.
, pp. 55-57.
20
citary commitment was also i ncorporated in a United Nations resolution
of August 13. 1948. More specifically, this resolution was supplemented
by a later one of January 5, 1949, which provided for a ceasefire ar-
rangement between the contending Pakistani and the Indians to be fol-
lowed by a true demarcation line, an agreement to demilitarize Kashmir,
and a decision to hold a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted
by a United Nations appointed administrator.^^
There is very little agreement by Pakistanis and Indians as
to the meaning or even intent of the various United Nations resolutions.
In defending their version of the United Nations' del iberations and deci-
sions both India and Pakistan tend to stress different parts of the
relevant 1948-1949 documents. Since the resolutions commit both nations
on specific matters, various conditions have to be met by both of the
interested parties before the conflict can be settled.
Importance of Kashmir for both India and Pakistan . The interest of
Pakistan in Kashmir is not only ideological. It has other interests
too, one of which is economic. In 1947, Pakistan looked at Kashmir in
view of its ideological perspective, according to the basis of the two-
nation theory. Kashmir with its Muslim majority should have become a
part of Pakistan, but for India, Kashmir has become the symbol of
secularism and unity.
Economically speaking, Pakistan depends on the waters of the
Indus for its irrigation. The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers flow
^^Text of the resolutions may be found in The Kashmir Question ,
ed. K. Sarwar Hassan and Zubeida Hassan, pp. 180-183 and 212-215.
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through Kashmiri territory before entering the Punjab. It has been a
constant fear to Pakistani leaders that India would exploit this poten-
tial and their fears were confirmed in the times of crisis in 1948 and
1965. Religious and cultural affinity is also one of the factors that
has injected a strong feeling of emotionalism among the people.
Another equally important factor is the strategic position of
Kashmir for Pakistan in its relations with India, Afghanistan and China.
During the first war in Kashmir, Pakistan fought desperately to retain
the northern areas in order to prevent India from gaining territory
which would provide a link with Afghanistan.
The Chinese title to Kashmir's remote section of eastern Ladakh
has centered on the acquisition of Aksai Chin crucial to China's
strategic needs for an all-weather military road linking Sinkiang to
Tibet. Despite the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the Chinese have kept
this territory.^^ In this conflict, the United States supported the
Indian position. This move was to have regional repercussions. Pakis-
tan, disturbed by its ally's attitude, which was acting in opposition
to her national interests, began to change her national policies in
favor of China. Fearing that both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S would sup-
port India's political and military needs while undermining her own,
Pakistan recognized Chinese claims to northern Ladakh. In return, she
received from China the acknowledgment that the other parts of Kashmir
rightfully belonged to Pakistan.
A comprehensive and formal settlement between Pakistan and China
14
For China's Indian hostilities and Chinese gains in Kashmir,
see Ference A. Val i , Politics of Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of
Powe r (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 88-91.
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secured transfer of a part of Paki stani
-control led Kashmir to Peking
and a part of the territory under Chinese control to Pakistan. The set-
tlement enabled the Chinese to reach the vital approaches to the Kara
Koram pass. However, neither Chinese nor Pakistani rights to any
parts of Kashmir have been formally accepted by the Indian government.
Thus political forces within and outside of India, Pakistan
and the United Nations have made any legal or political settlement of
the manifold Kashmir dispute even more difficult to realize. No less
than three major wars (1947, 1965, 1971) involving Kashmir and innumer-
able skirmishes and ceasefire violations have kept alive the Pakistani-
Indian hostilities. India and Pakistan have tried to settle the dis-
pute through negotiations but these failed, too.
Rann of Kutch Dispute
The Indo-Paki Stan War of 1965 was preceded by various inci-
dents in April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch, on the frontier between the
Indian state of Gujrat and West Pakistan, and continued at intervals
until the end of the month. The Rann (desert), which covers an area of
about 8,400 square miles, is a vast expanse of tidal mud flats, flooded
during the monsoon season. Uninhabited, it has some slight economic
value as a source of salt, and it provides some areas of rather poor
grazing. In British times, the status of the Rann was unsettled. At
that time, the Rann was the bone of contention between the princely
1
5
For the detailed study on the Chinese interests in the region
and its border agreements with Pakistan, see Anwar Syed, China and
Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale (Amherst, Mass.: University
of Massachusetts, 1974).
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State of Kutch and the British Indian Province of Sind. The majority
of British maps showed the Kutch-Sind border as running along the edge
of the Thar desert, though towards the end of the British period such
maps also indicate that this boundary was "disputed." The border along
the edge of the Thar desert, of course, was never intended to serve as
an international border.'® At the time of partition. India and Pakistan
inherited the dispute as Sind became part of Pakistan and Kutch was
joined to India.
The Indian government claimed that the whole of the Rann for-
merly belonged to Kutch, and hence became part of India when the state
acceded to the Indian union in 1947. The Pakistan government, on the
other hand, claimed that about 3,500 square miles of the Rann lying
north of the 24th parallel were formerly under the control and ad-
ministration of Sind. It also contended that the Rann was a landlocked
sea or boundary lake, and that under international law the boundary
must run through the middle of the area; this argument was rejected
by India, on the grounds that the British Government of India formally
decided in 1906 that it was more correct to define the Rann as a marsh
rather than a lake. ^
^
To solve the dispute, moves were started by exchanging diploma-
tic notes in 1948. But it did not prove successful as both countries
stuck to their previous positions. After four months armed clashes
^^Alastair Lamb, The Asian Frontiers (London: Pall Mall Press,
1968), p. 109.
^^For more details on the Rann of Kutch dispute, see D.C. Jha,
Indo-Paki Stan Relations (1960-1965) (Patna: Bharti Bhawan, 1972), pp.
187-190.
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took place on February 17, 19, and 25, and March 2, 1956, at border
pocket-posts of Chad Bet. The Pakistan government proposed to the
Indian government that "the Indian forces should be withdrawn immedi-
ately from Chad Bet, Nara Bet and the status quo restored pending
final settlement of the dispute."''^ Nothing happened after that, only
the matter cooled down a little, as no other armed clash took place for
a time.
The matter was again taken up and discussed at the diplomatic
level. It was agreed that "all outstanding boundary disputes, raised
so far by either country, should, if not settled by negotiations, be
referred to an impartial tribunal for settlement.
However, the situation took a serious turn in 1965 as border
incidents became very frequent and the relations between India and
Pakistan became tense. Fights broke out on a large scale on April 9,
1965, and as usual each side blamed the other for provoking the clash.
The fight continued until the end of April when a ceasefire came into
effect. Before that it seemed that the clashes might develop into full-
fledged conflagration. Indian Prime Minister Shastri said on April 29
that, if fighting continued, "the army will decide its own strategy and
deploy its manpower and equipment in the way it deems best." It was
interpreted to mean that India might attack Lahore. Due to this tense
situation, the need for mediation was expressed by many Western coun-
^^Pakistani note of April 9, 1956, quoted in Ibid., p. 188.
1
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Joint communique of October 23, 1956 in India.
^^
Hindu Weekly
,
May 3, 1965.
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tries. President Johnson expressed his anxiety over the trouble and
stressed the need for a peaceful settlement But the U.S. could not
offer its good offices to mediate due to the embarrassing decision by
President Johnson to cancel visits to Washington of Indian and Pakis-
tani leaders. Moscow was also trying to be neutral in the matter but
she also showed her concern and appealed to both the countries to find
a peaceful solution to the problem. Britain, however, undertook the
task of direct mediation between India and Pakistan. It was due to the
British efforts that a ceasefire was agreed upon on April 30, 1965.
After that, while attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference,
President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri were persuaded by Prime
Minister Harold Wilson to sign an agreement on June 30, 1965 to resolve
the dispute peacefully.
In the agreement India and Pakistan agreed to refer the matter
to a tribunal if they could not reach any agreement through bilateral
discussions. They also agreed further that the decision of the tribunal
"shall be binding" on both governments, and that the tribunal shall re-
22
main in force until its findings have been implemented in full.
In solving this matter, both Pakistan and India showed their
utmost sincerity, though their relations have deteriorated so much that
they entered into a full-fledged war in September 1965, but both faith-
fully acted according to the terms of the June 30, 1965, agreement. The
meeting between the Foreign Ministers to be held at Delhi in August was
^^
New York Times
,
April 25, 1965, and April 28, 1965.
22
Text of the agreement in Pakistan Horizon , third quarter, 1965.
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cancelled due to the tension, and the matter was automatically referred
to a tribunal. Pakistan nominated Nasrullah Entezam, an Iranian diplo-
mat. and India nominated Alex Bebler, a Yugoslav judge. Gunnar Lager-
gem of Sweden was the chairman of this tribunal.
The tribunal worked seriously to solve the dispute, and its
verdict came on February 19, 1969. As a result, about 350 square miles
in the northern part of the disputed territory was awarded to Pakistan,
and the rest went to India. India's share was much larger but it was
mostly sea-marsh, often under water, while Pakistan's included some
crucial elevation points. Neither side got what it actually wanted,
and this decision came under severe criticism by some Indian factions.^
The end of the dispute came by the signing of the Rann of Kutch Agree-
ment at Islamabad on July 4, 1969 by Indian and Pakistani representa-
ti ves .
Before we conclude this topic, another interesting point worth
noticing is about the weapons used by both sides. Though India was
more vocal about her complaint against the American weapons used by
Pakistan during the clash, the New Delhi correspondent of the New York
Times pointed out that both sides had used the American-supplied war
material against each other.
The War of 1965
After the agreement in June 1965 that the Kutch dispute would
^^Burke, pp. 325-326.
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be settled by negotiations or arbitration, hopes were expressed that
this might be a precedent which would direct the future relationship
of the two countries. President Ayub Khan described the agreement
"a turning point" in the future relations of India and Pakistan. But
all these high hopes proved to be short-lived as tension increased im-
mediately after that and took the shape of an all-out war, started on
September 6, 1965.
In the armed clash in Rann of Kutch, India was certainly out-
26fought by Pakistan, something that most Indians were unwilling to ac-
cept. Nehru's successor Lai Bahadur Shastri
,
came under increasing
pressure to redress the Kutch defeat. The Times of India warned about
the situation, and urged India to be cautious as after testing her
strength in Rann of Kutch, Pakistan would try to repeat the same thing
27
in Kashmir.
On the other hand, Pakistan emphasized the importance of find-
ing a solution to the Kashmir problem. After the conclusion of the
agreement, while explaining the futility of a war over Kutch, Pakistan's
Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, told Pakistan's National Assembly that
if Pakistan were to fight, "then it is not in Dharmsala or Chad Bet or
Biarbet that we have to fight, we have to fight where the problem lies,
i.e., in Jammu and Kashmir," and that Pakistan "can never be complete
^^"Text of the President's Statement," Dawn
,
July 1, 1965.
2 6
'^Jhon G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (New York: St.
Martin's Press, Inc., 1974), p. 155.
^^The Times of India, July 18, 1965.
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without the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
The number of clashes between the Indians and Pakistanis on
the ceasefire line in Kashmir had greatly increased during 1964, and
still more during the first half of 1965. Finally, a serious crisis
in Indo-Pakistani relations, resulting in large-scale fighting between
their armed forces, was precipitated when on August 5, 1965, armed in-
filtrators from Azad Kashmir began entering India-held Kashmir in an
unsuccessful attempt to foment revolt. The U.N. observers attributed
the responsibility to both sides. Exchange of fire all along the
ceasefire line became increasingly frequent after August 8, and on
August 16, Indian troops crossed the line and occupied some Pakistani
posts. These moves from both sides were expected as Ayub Khan, over-
confident due to Pakistani successes in Rann of Kutch, tried to repeat
the action in Kashmir. India, embarrassed by the defeat inflicted on
her by China in 1962, was no more ready to take another defeat--especi
-
al ly from Pakistan.
On September 5, the Indian Defense Ministry announced that
Pakistani aircraft had attacked an Indian Air Force ground unit near
Ami tsar, without causing any damage; the operation was the first re-
ported to have occurred outside Kashmir. On the following day, Indian
troops, without a declaration of war, launched an offensive across the
Punjab frontier into West Pakistan. The Indian Defense Minister claimed
that the Indian attack had been launched in order to forestall an attack
po
"Speech in the National Assembly, July 13, 1965," published by
The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi
,
1966, p. 45.
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,
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by Pakistan on Indian Punjab.^O But actually this Indian move was to
reduce and halt the Pakistani advance into southern Kashmir; Pakistani
forces had advanced so rapidly that they threatened the vital road link
ing Srinagar with the plains of India. If Pakistan captured this road,
Indian forces in Kashmir would be encircled. Thus India was left with
the choice of yielding or expanding the war. Slie decided to escalate
the war.
Fighting continued on three fronts until September 23, both
sides having fought each other to a virtual standstill. The U.N.
Security Council adopted early on September 20 a draft demanding a
ceasefire and subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the
positions held by them before August 5, 1965.^^
At Pakistan's request a special meeting of the Security Council
was held on September 22, at which Mr. Bhutto announced Pakistan's
decision to order a ceasefire but warned the council that "if it did
not bring about a settlement of the Kashmir question within a limited
time Pakistan would leave the United Nations.
The ceasefire came into effect as ordered, but was jeopardized
from the outset by a series of violations by both sides and by their
refusal to withdraw from the positions which they held in each other's
territories. The Indian government alleged that after the ceasefire
30
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"The U.N. Security Council's Resolution," reproduced in Dawn,
September 21
,
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"Mr. Bhutto's Address to the Security Council," Dawn, Septem-
ber 23, 1965.
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strong Pakistani forces had intruded into both the Fazilka area and
many border areas of Rajasthan which they had not previously occupied. ^3
In an emergency meeting, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution
demanding that both India and Pakistan should "urgently honor their com-
mitments to the council," and called upon them "promptly to withdraw
all armed personnel
.
In a note on October 1, the Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran
Singh, told the U.N. Secretary General that "India was not prepared to
link the ceasefire or withdrawal of forces with any political question,
as Kashmir was an integral part of India and therefore not negotiable.
The arguments were finally ended through the efforts of Premier
Aleksei Kosygin of the Soviet Union, who invited both parties to come
to Tashkent to settle their differences. Reasoning that a continued
conflict between India and Pakistan would probably benefit China, the
Soviet leader decided to assume the role of a peacemaker.
And so the world was treated to the strange spectacle of a
Convnunist state successfully fashioning a truce between two bourgeois
nations. The Kashmir problem was not resolved, of course. Both sides
merely set forth their "respective positions" on the issue. Nor were
the deeper animosities removed, or even mitigated. Tashkent merely
signified a pause in a protracted conflict that, so far, had proved in-
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^^"Swaran Singh Informs U. Thant," The Statesman
,
October 2, 1965.
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conclusive. The decisive encounter was to come half a decade later when
the flames of war burst forth once more with terrible ferocity.
The "1971" War and the Disintegration of Pakistan
Pakistan differs from most other Asian states which attained
independence after the Second World War in that it is not merely a
colonial successor state but the portion of a colonial successor state.
Other countries, like India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia inherited the
whole apparatus of government and had a continuity of thought and tradi-
tions, In the case of Pakistan, it was torn from the colonial succes-
sor state, and launched with little administrative or official inheri-
tance. It was born in fact from wtiat was really a revolutionary move-
ment within the state. Its strength had therefore to come from the in-
ner dynamic or consciousness of that movement at the time of its birth.
Unique in the regions of modern Asia, rather in the whole world, its
limits were defined explicitly by religious criteria. Britain's Indian
Empire was partitioned in such a way that the Muslim majority areas in
and contiguous to Punjab and Bengal v^ere joined together in one politi-
cal entity, Pakistan. In some ways, this was a strange match. West
Pakistan and East Pakistan, apart from Islam, had very little in common
with each other; as one observer put it, "the only bonds between the
diverse and distant wings of their Moslem nation were the Islamic faith
37
and Pakistan International Airlines," There were major ethnic and
cultural differences between the two regions. "Indeed only modern com-
37
Dan Coggin, "Pakistan: The Ravaging of Golden Bengal," Time
(August 2
, 1971), p. 26.
32
munications, wireless, power-driven ship and aeroplanes had made pos-
sible the political unification of two such widely separated tracts as
the West and East wings of the Islamic state of Pakistan.
Gri^nces of East Pakistan. The union between the two parts was an
uneasy one from the beginning. Unfortunately, the founder of Pakistan,
Mohaiiunad A1 i Jinnah, died one year after the creation of the state,
and his successor, Liaquat A1 i Khan, was killed two years later. The
loss of these two leaders left a serious void and contributed to the
declining popularity of the Muslim League that had provided a semblance
of unity throughout Pakistan.
The East Pakistanis had complaints about the unequal distri-
bution of economic resources between the two wings of Pakistan. They
accused the West Pakistanis of exploitation. The capital of the coun-
try was in the western part. Most government officials came from the
west. The army was made up of West Pakistanis, the major portion com-
prised of the Punjabis. Yet a majority of Pakistanis (55 percent)
lived in the East.
The ci vi 1 -mi 1 i tary bureaucracy and other professions were
dominated by the Punjabis and the migrants from northern and western
India. Though ethnically and linguistically a minority, they became
the national elite of Pakistan from the start. Bengalis found them-
selves left far behind in the process of state building and economic
^^Lamb, p. 94.
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development, and felt that they were not adequately represented.
The language issue came as a blow to the unity of the nation and
deeply alienated East Pakistanis. Proud of their language and its rich
literary heritage, they were greatly shocked when the Pakistani policy
makers initially rejected Bengali's claim for recognition as a national
language and attempted to make Urdu-a minority language-the only na-
tional language. This decision aroused an intense resentment in East
Pakistan. Students came out on the streets and demonstrated against
this decision. There was rioting, police firing, and bloodshed. Sub-
sequently, the government of Pakistan revised its decision and both
Bengali and Urdu were recognized as national languages. But the two
languages hardly gained any substantial acceptance in the other wing.
Economically, West Pakistan appeared better off in comparison
to the eastern part. From the American military and economic aid, the
west remained the main beneficiary. Initially, the Bengali jute and tea
supplied between 50 and 70 percent of the nation's foreign exchange
earnings, but the Bengalis received only 25 to 30 percent of Pakistan's
42total income. The west had a virtual monopoly of Pakistan's power
elite: 85 percent of all government positions were held by West Pakis-
tanis; two-thirds of the nation's industry and four-fifths of its bank-
ing and insurance assets were controlled by West Pakistan.
40.
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Even the religious tie couldn't keep the two parts together.
Not all East Pakistanis were Muslims; about 10 million out of 80 mil-
lion were Hindus. To some extent the two parts of Pakistan were held
together by a common fear of India. But this fear was not so great in
the east. The Bengalis were less concerned with the Kashmir issue;
they seemed more willing to seek a peaceful settlement with India.
In part, Bengalis felt this way because large numbers of ethnically
similar Indian citizens lived across the border from East Pakistan in
the Indian state of Bengal. Sharing language and culture, they found
it hard to see each other as permanent enemies.
Despite these differences, the fragile union continued until
1969 when the government of General Ayub Khan collapsed as a result of
a mass movement seeking his overthrow and restoration of democracy.
Ayub Khan handed over power to another military general, Yahya Khan.
^n^ ral elections in Pakistan
. Yahya Khan got power in a situation in
which he could not maintain the status quo without granting concessions
to the counter elite. For that he had to seek a new political order.
Knowing the mood of the people and sensing the volatile political situa
tion he first tried to placate the angry masses by announcing new educa
tional and wage policies for meeting the demands of students and labor.
He emphasized the transitional nature of his regime and promised the
transfer of power to the people's representatives elected freely and im
partially on the basis of adult franchise. In preparation for the
election, full-scale political activities in Pakistan--including the
44
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lifting of all restrictions on public meetings and processions-were re
Slimed on January 1
.
1970. Vahya Khan returned West Pakistan to Its
former four provinces and decreed that West and East Pakistan would be
represented In the future National Assembly on the basis of population,
thus ensuring East Pakistan's majority. The measure of provincial
autonomy that East Pakistan might have was left for people's representa
tives to decide.
The autonoiTiy Tor the federating units was a very important and
controversial political issue which needed serious consideration as
maximum legislative, administrative and financial powers were demanded
for the provinces. Provinces were promised the maximum legislation,
administrative and financial powers, but the point was made clear that
the federal government also should have adequate powers to discharge
its responsibilities in relation to external affairs and to preserve
the independence and territorial integrity of the country.
The 1970 general elections were the first ever held in Pakistan
on the basis of universal adult franchise. These elections showed that
none of the political parties were popular in both wings of Pakistan.
The Awami League had mass support in East Pakistan and the Pakistan
People s Party had strong support in the west. Both were regional par-
ties. The elections also showed the clear-cut confrontation of the
east and west. In the National Assembly, the Awami League emerged as a
majority party by getting all the seats from East Pakistan and the
45
A presidential order was issued in April dissolving the one-
unit structure in West Pakistan and reviving the four former provinces
of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province.
Under the order, Bahawalpur went to the Punjab, Karachi to Sind, and
Las Bela to Baluchistan.
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Sheij M^uj^ Rahman, the Awami Lea gue, and the National MovPmPnt in
From the very beginning the Awami League had been pre-
dominantly an East Pakistani party in its program, leadership, and base
of support. After Suharwardy’s death, none of its leaders was nation-
ally known and equally acceptable to both the wings. So whatever at-
tempts were made to make it an all
-Pakistan party were not successful.
Its powerful secretary. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was nationally known,
but due to his strong commitment to East Pakistan's autonomy he got
very little sympathy and support in West Pakistan. Besides, the East
Pakistan Awami League had been the champion of the Bengali rights and
advocated full regional autonomy--a goal which the leaders of the party
from West Pakistan could hardly endorse wholeheartedly.
East Pakistani leaders decided against trying to be a national
party and opted to work on a regional level. The 1965 War with India
reinforced this decision as Bengalis saw that they were defenseless
in case India decided to invade East Pakistan. Shortly after the War,
in the spring of 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman launched his famous Six-
Point Movement. The six points were as follows:
1. A federal form of government would be established.
2. The Federal Government would control only defense and foreign
policy, all other subjects being vested in the federating
states
.
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3. Two separate freely convertible currencies would be intro-duced for East and West Pakistan, or if a single currency
was maintained constitutional provisions would be made to
stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan.
There would be a separate banking reserve and a separate
fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan.
4. The states would have exclusive authority to levy taxes,
federal expenses being met from a uniform percentage of
all states' taxes.
5. Separate external trade accounts would be maintained for
each of the states, and foreign exchange earned from exter-
nal trade would be at their disposal. Federal foreign ex-
change requirements would be met by the states on the basis
of an equal percentage rate. Indigenous commodities would
move between tfie states free of taxation or tariffs. The
states would be allowed to maintain trade representatives
abroad and to negotiate trade agreements with other coun-
tries .
6
. A militia or paramilitary force, an ordnance factory, a mili-
tary academy and the Navy headquarters would be set up in
East Pakistan.
The party also advocated nationalization of the banks, insurance
companies, fieavy industries, foreign trade, transport, shipping and
other key industries; development of cooperative enterprise, workers'
participation in the management of industry; exemption from land revenue
tax on holdings up to 8^2 acres; and cancellation of tax arrears on such
holdings. Fundamental rights should be guaranteed by the constitution
and should be limited only in war time. Pakistan should pursue an in-
dependent foreign policy, and should withdraw from SEATO, CENTO and
other military pacts.
This program of the Awami League, which got massive support in
^^The text of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Six Points is reproduced in
Kessing's Contemporary Archives (London: Kessing's Publication Ltd.,
Vol. XIII, 1966), p. 23217.
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East Pakistan, was severely criticized by many West Pakistan leaders.
The Awami League thus became completely isolated from other parties
of the West Wing with no hope for any cooperation in the future.
The election results turned out to be an unpleasant surprise
for the military leadership as well as for the other political parties.
Although it had been generally anticipated that the Awami League would
win a majority of the seats in East Pakistan, its success in securing
75 percent of the votes and all but two of the seats was totally unex-
pected. Even greater surprise was caused by the success in West Pakis-
tan of the Pakistan People's Party which had been expected to win at the
most forty seats.
The western leadership found this outcome of the election re-
sults simply unacceptable.^^ It was feared that the Awami League,
with its absolute majority in the National Assembly, would vote itself
50
a program for virtual self-government, thus removing East Pakistan
from the control of the central government. The weeks following the
election were marked by a feverish contest of power that finally
erupted into bloody conflict.
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The East Pakistan The post election period in Pakistan
brought three major powers to the forefront which had to dictate the
course of the events in its history. The Yahya regime, the Awami
League, and the People’s Party were to find a solution of the problem
which became difficult due to the divergent and conflicting nature of
their policies. President Yahya Khan triggered the crisis when he an-
nounced the postponement of the National Assembly's session to be con-
vened in Dacca. The Awami League, perceiving this as a deliberate
attempt to disregard popular mandate for Bengali autonomy, launched a
campaign of civil disobedience.
With the situation in East Pakistan deteriorating. President
Yahya Khan on March 3 invited all the leaders of the parties and groups
represented in the newly elected National Assembly to meet him in Dacca
on March 10. This proposal was promptly rejected by Mujib, who al-
leged that the army was shooting down unarmed Bengalis in the streets
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of Dacca. In response to this pressure, Yahya Khan scheduled the
r o
date of the assembly session for March 26, but at the same time made
arrangements for a massive airlift of West Pakistani troops to East
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Mr. Nurul-Amin, leader of the Pakistan Democratic Party, the only East
Pakistan party, other than the Awami League, with only two seats in the
National Assembly, also declined President Yahya's invitation.
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Pakistan.
Sheikh Mujib at this point was under great pressure from the
radicals of his own party to declare independence.^^ He resisted that
pressure for the time being and decided to adopt a middle course.
He launched a nonviolent non-cooperation movement which gave him the
opportunity to force the regime to accept his terms. But while the re-
gime was offering negotiating terms, violent clashes were going on
between the army and the people in parts of East Pakistan, which made
the acceptance of these terms difficult. Under this situation, Mujib
got complete control of East Pakistan. "The whole of East Pakistani
administration, even the Bengalis serving in central government agencies
and in the civilian branch of the armed forces, complied with Mujib's
56
call for non-cooperation."
Faced with Mujib's de facto assumption of power, Yahya Khan
came to Dacca to talk with him in order to find the solution of the
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the homeland of millions of innocent Pakistanis. It is the duty of
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tion of independence. A pledge of full support for Sheikh Mujib was
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crisis. At this point negotiations were not easy to launch. After
five days of continuous talks, Yahya Khan and the Awami League agreed
on a draft proclamation to be issued by Yahya Khan for an interim ar-
rangement for a transfer of power. The proposed proclamation was ac-
cording to the Mujib's four conditions: the immediate cessation of mar-
tial law and transfer of power to the five provinces, without such a
transfer in the center. It also provided for the division of the Na-
tional Assembly into two committees to draft separate reports on the
basis of which the constitution would be formed. Autonomy was granted
to East Pakistan on the basis of the six points while the amount of
autonomy for the four other provinces was left to mutual agreement.
This was not approved by the People's Party and Bhutto issued very
strong statements against this arrangement and considered it a great
betrayal of West Pakistan.
Bhutto suggested direct negotiations with Sheikh Mujib but
his request did not get any attention from the Awami League which was
now under heavy pressure to declare independence as the non-cooperation
movement had completed its one month. The Awami League pressed the
government for quick acceptance of its draft proposal and warned that
if it was not accepted within forty-eight hours it would be too late
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to bring peace by any other means. Events during the last day or so
of Yahya Khan's stay in Dacca are still not quite known. Each side of-
^^The account of the talks is in Dawn
,
March 16-20, 1970. Also
see Z.A. Bhutto, The Great Tragedy (Karachi, 1971).
^^
Dawn
,
March 20, 1971.
White Paper on the crisis of East Pakistan, pp. 18-20.
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fered different versions of who betrayed whom. On the afternoon of
March 25. President Yahya Khan flew back to West Pakistan. Upon his
return to Islamabad, he denounced Sheikh Mujib's activities as "acts
of treason." He ordered the immediate arrest of Awami League leaders
and directed the army to crush the secessionist movement and restore
full authority to the central government. Thus was begun the civil war
which led to the end of a united Pakistan. On March 26, 1971, a clan-
destine radio broadcast announced the proclamation by Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and the Awami League of the "Sovereign Independent People's
Republic of Bangl adesh.
Deteri oration of the relations between India and Pakistan
. Relations
between India and Pakistan, already tense, escalated sharply as a re-
sult of the civil war in East Pakistan. It started with acrimonious
exchange of notes between the two countries and to numerous charges
and counter-charges by each side. The Indian government's concern at
the events in East Pakistan was first expressed in the Lok Sabha on
March 26, 1971, by Sardar Swaran Singh, the Foreign Minister, and Mrs.
Gandhi, the Prime Minister. Sardar Swaran Singh accused the Pakistani
Army of "suppressing the people of East Pakistan."
The Pakistani government lodged a strong protest describing it
^^Yahya Khan's broadcast to the nation, March 26, 1971.
6
1
On April 11 a clandestine radio broadcast announced the forma-
tion "somewhere in Bangladesh." But its formal proclamation came on
April 17. The Bangladesh "government" set up its headquarters in the
village of Chuadanga, only a few hundred yards from the Indian frontier.
A full report is in The New York Times
,
April 12 and 18, 1971.
^^The Statesman, March 27 and April 1, 1971.
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as "highly exaggerated malicious and provocative stories about the
situation in East Pakistan.
A
Congress Party resolution supporting
the people of East Pakistan^^ caused a lot of resentment in Pakistan
and a strong note of protest was delivered to U.N. Secretary General
U. Thant, charging India with harboring designs to undermine the solidar-
ity and national integrity of Pakistan.
The actual friction between India and Pakistan was heightened
by alleged incidents on their borders and by the defection of the Pakis-
tan Deputy High Commissioner in Calcutta, which was followed by the
closing of the Pakistan Deputy High Commission in that city and of the
Indian Deputy High Commission in Dacca.
The immediate aftermath of the civil war in East Pakistan was a
mass influx of refugees into India from East Pakistan "on a scale un-
precedented in any part of the world since the Second World War."^^
6 3
"Notification of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," published
in Dawn
,
March 28, 1971.
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The Statesman
,
April 5, 1971.
^^
Dawn
,
April 9, 1971.
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On April 18, the Pakistani Deputy High Commissioner in Calcutta,
Mr. M.V. Hussain A1 i
,
announced his allegiance and that of other Bengali
members of his staff to the "Sovereign Democratic Republic of Bangla-
desh," hoisted the Bangladesh flag over the mission, and stated that the
latter would henceforth be known as the "Diplomatic Mission of Bangla-
desh." See New York Times
,
April 19, 1971.
6 7
it was stated in New Delhi that the Government of India had ac-
ceded to demands of Pakistan to close its mission in Dacca with immedi-
ate effect, though an official spokesman "deeply deplored" Pakistan's de-
cision to close her Deputy High Commission in Calcutta and asserted that
this was a "calculated and studied diplomatic escalation on the part of
the Pakistan Government." See The Statesman , April 25, 1971.
^^
Times (London), May 12, 1971.
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This large influx of refugees was one of the reasons that
drew India into the civil conflict and led to the war. India could
not very well have stopped the flow of refugees across its borders
even if it had wanted to, for political as well as sheer physical rea-
sons. But the cost to the Indian government of maintaining these re-
fugees was enormous.'’® The World Bank estimated that it would run at
about $1.2 billion for a full year. The refugees would also use up
India's food reserves and administrative talent would have to be di-
verted to caring for a sudden addition of ten million people.
By mid-July, Mrs. Gandhi had evidence that a war with Pakistan
would be cheaper than the economic burden of coping with the refugee
problem for a single year. This evidence was supplied by the Institute
for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi. The Indians concluded
that the refugees would cost their country $900 million within a year
or more than the cost of the entire Kashmir war with Pakistan in 1965.
This report was widely circulated and resulted in a wave of popular
emotion in favor of war. The Indian leadership had to respond force-
fully in order to alleviate this economic pressure.
India's preparation for war . Facing this situation, the most desirable
foreign policy goal for India was to create a separate state in East
Pakistan. Such a state would be able to take back the millions of re-
fugees, relieving the economic and administrative burden they imposed on
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Mrs. Gandhi's statement on May 24 to the Lok Sabha is reported
in the Statesman
,
May 25, 1971. Mrs. Gandhi told the Lok Sabha that
the estimates on relief alone may exceed Rs. 1,800,000,000 for a period
of six months.
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India. Such a state would have the additional benefit for India by re-
ducing Pakistan's power and thus its ability to threaten Indian secur-
ity.
The goal of a new state of Bangladesh could be achieved in a
number of ways. The Pakistani government itself could grant East Pakis-
tan independence out of enlightened self interest. Failing this, the
Indian government could apply diplomatic pressure. If diplomatic ini-
tiatives failed, the Indians could resort to military action. War was
by no means an unthinkable or irrational policy option for India. The
only constraints were those imposed by the great powers and the United
Nations. With proper preparation the Indians could avoid great power
interference. If the war were swift and decisive, the United Nations
would not have time to act.
India began a series of diplomatic and military moves that by
themselves might have persuaded the Pakistanis to allow Bangladesh its
independence, but, if not, would also serve as preparations for a war
against Pakistan to accomplish the same goal. India improved its ties
with the Soviet Union, going so far as to sign a "friendship treaty.
This twenty-five year treaty had all the signs of a military alliance.
Reflecting the popular mood the Indian Parliament hailed the new "real-
ism" in India's foreign policy and praised Mrs. Gandhi for having "put
^^The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signed on
August 9, 1971, concluded in the first instance for twenty years and was
automatically renewable thereafter for five year periods. Signed by Mr.
Gromyko and Mr. Swaran Singh, the treaty contained clauses which pro-
vided for the immediate consultations between India and the U.S.S.R. in
the event of either country being subject to attack or threat of attack
by a third country. See Th e Statesman , August 10, 1971.
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some meat in our vegetarian diet of non-alignment."^^
Then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi set off on a world tour^^ to
get countries to cut off or reduce aid to Pakistan. By presenting the
case against Pakistan on the issue of the Bengalis, she could make it
easier for these countries to remain neutral if not actually to support
India in the event of war.
India also began military preparations, some of which could be
interpreted as more severe forms of "diplomatic pressure." At the same
time India began to supply arms and training for Mukti Bahini. This
support to 6,000 or 7,000 Mukti Bahini forces was kept hidden from
foreign observers, including U.N. observers. The guerrilla raids^^ pro-
vided provocations to which the Pakistani army responded, providing the
Indian army with excuses for "probes" and "incursions" and "protective
reactions" across the border into Pakistan.
War between India and Pakistan
. Both India and Pakistan made repeated
allegations in September and October that their territory had been
shelled from either side of the East Pakistan border. During October
^^Quoted by Sydney H. Schanberg, "Pact Said to Bury India's
Non-Alignment," The New York Times
,
August 14, 1971.
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Mrs. Gandhi visited the Western capitals of Brussels, Vienna,
London, Washington, Paris, and Bonn. She demanded the release of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which she hoped would result in Bengali autonomy
and the return of the refugees to their former homes.
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For the guerrilla activities by Mukti Bahim, and incidents
on the border between India and Pakistan, see the reports in: The Dawn ,
The Statesman
,
The Times (London), and The Daily Telegraph of July 20
through 26 and August 22; The New York T imes , September 21, 1971; and
The Dawn
,
September 26, October 6 through 12, October 20, and November
1 through 20, 1971
.
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the Indian press claimed that the Pakistan Army was concentrated near
the West Pakistan frontier, that new defense lines were being con-
structed on the border, and that the civilian population had been
evacuated from a 500 mile stretch to the frontier opposite the Indian
State of Rajastan. President Yahya Khan, on the other hand, stated
that a large number of Indian Air Force units and Army formations had
been brought forward towards the West Pakistani border.
The Indian main attack evidently was deliberately delayed until
late fall, when preparations were completed and the winter snow had
closed the Himalayan passes, preventing any Chinese assistance to Pakis-
tan. The fighting on the East Pakistan border was greatly intensified
after November 21. The war itself began on December 3, 1971,^^ and
lasted two weeks until the ceasefire on December 17, 1971. Initially,
India limited the war to the single goal of creating a new state in
East Pakistan. Indian attacks were intended only to defeat the Pakis-
tani Army, but the Indian Army, however, was prepared to take the offen-
sive in Kashmir and West Pakistan if Pakistan decided to widen the war.
On December 4, India launched an integrated ground, air, and naval of-
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President Yahya Khan's broadcast on October 12.
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On November 21, Mukti Bahini launched an offensive against
Jesore, reportedly with Indian support. Western correspondents in the
area agreed that the Indian Army was supporting the guerrillas. Report
by Clare Holingworth in The Daily Telegraph
,
November 29, 1971, and
The Times ' London Report, December 2, 1971.
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Though the state of emergency was proclaimed by President Yahya
Khan on November 23, declaring that "a most critical situation has been
created because Pakistan is faced with external aggression," Army re-
servists were called up on November 24 and Air Force reservists on Novem-
ber 29.
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fensive against East Pakistan. The Indian Army, along with the Mukti
Bahini. entered East Pakistan from five main directions, the aim being
to divide the Pakistani units stationed around the border and to pre-
vent them from uniting in defense of Dacca, which, as the provincial
capital, occupied a strong strategic position. Two days later war came
to West Pakistan also.
Indian recognition of Bangladesh's provisional government came
77
on December 6. The Pakistan government reacted by breaking off
diplomatic relations with India and described India's action as evidence
of its deep hatred" of Pakistan and of its determination to break up
the country.
By this time the situation was entirely in the hands of the
Indian Army. The Indian Army Chief of Staff. General Manekshaw, on
December 7 asked the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan to surrender "be-
fore it was too late." Since East Pakistan was cut off from West Pakis-
tan, there was no way of coniiiunication left for General Niazi, the
Pakistani military cofnmander, to consult or communicate with the high
command in the west wing.
On December 15, as the Indian forces closed in on Dacca from
all sides. General Niazi sent a message to General Manekshaw through
the U.S. Consulate in Dacca, proposing a ceasefire. He asked for
facilities for regrouping his forces with their weapons in designated
areas pending their repatriation to West Pakistan; a guarantee of safety
for the paramilitary forces and for all those who had settled in East
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Mrs. Gandhi's address to the Lok Sabha on December 6, 1971
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Pakistan since 1947, and an assurance that there would be no reprisals
against those who had collaborated with the martial law authorities.
In his reply, however. General Manekshaw insisted on the unconditional
surrender of the Pakistani forces.
Finally, on the morning of December 16, General Niazi accepted
the Indian terms of surrender. Those provided that all Pakistani regu-
lar, paramilitary and civilian armed forces would lay down their arms,
and guaranteed that they would be treated in accordance with the Geneva
Convention, and that foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel
of West Pakistani origin would be protected. In a broadcast on Decem-
ber 16, President Yahya Khan admitted defeat in East Pakistan, though
without mentioning that the Anny had surrendered and declared that the
war would go on. The next day, India declared a unilateral ceasefire
on the western front, which Yahya Khan reciprocated.
Violent demonstrations against the military regime in West
Pakistan, beginning on December 18, led to the resignation of President
Yahya Khan. Thereupon, Mr. Bhutto was sworn in as Pakistan's new Presi-
dent on December 20, 1971.
The war brought complete success for India due to careful
preparation, both diplomatic and military, and favorable circumstances.
India was better armed, getting arms from both Russia and its own arms
industry. Pakistan suffered from a United States embargo on arms that
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General Manekshaw' s reply to General A.A.K. Niazi published in
The Statesman
,
December 16, 1971.
^^For the text of the instrument of surrender signed by General
Aurora and General Niazi, see The New York Times, December 17, 1971.
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had been imposed against both India and Pakistan after their last war
in 1965. Pakistan was getting only limited arms from China and France.
Pakistan fought from a disadvantageous strategic position.
Forces in East Pakistan were cut off and could not be reinforced. The
Indians outnumbered the Pakistanis in the east, 160,000 to 93,000. The
Pakistanis also had to fight in the midst of a hostile population,
including by this time as many as 50,000 Mukti Bahini.
When the fighting began, the United Nations General Assembly
had condemned India by a vote of 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions. But
with Indian victory, world opinion rapidly shifted. No more resolu-
tions were brought before the Assembly condemning India or asking her
to stop. India not only won the war but won the support of the world
for its policy by doing so.
CHAPTER III
ATTITUDE OF BIG POWERS TOWARDS INDIA AND PAKISTAN
After the partition in 1947, the subcontinent was first consi-
dered as an area where British responsibilities and capabilities were
paramount. But soon afterwards the atmosphere of suspicion, quarrel
and conflict between India and Pakistan drew the attention of non-re-
gional countries to these developments. The regional cold war was, of
course, not conducted in a vacuum. Elements of global politcis, par-
ticularly those that related to the three dominant sets of conflict in
the international system--the Sovi et-American
,
the Sino-Soviet and
Si no-American--directly or indirectly interfered in the regional con-
f 1 icts
.
Given the geo-strategic location of the subcontinent bordering
on two of the three great powers, with an outlet into the Indian Ocean
and contiguous to the Persian Gulf, the intrusion of global and extra-
regional conflicts into the subcontinent was perhaps inevitable.^ The
external major powers' involvement in South Asian region was sometimes
related directly to their regional interests in the subcontinent, but
more often they were related to their larger goals of international com-
petition and domination. In this game South Asia became merely another
chessboard on which pawns could be moved one way or another. Their in-
Vor the detailed study of the Big Power interests in the re-
gion, see Ference A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region (New
York: Free Press, 1976).
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terests and related moves were further complicated by Indo-Pakistan re-
lations and often made the regional cold war very bitter and severe.
India's and Pakis tan's Relations with the United Statp<;
After the liquidation of British rule in 1947. India and Pakis-
tan emerged as two independent countries in South Asia. In the begin-
ning both countries got nothing more than a warm greeting from the
United States, as new members of the world community. At that time,
the U.S., like the U.S.S.R., was preoccupied with more urgent problems
in Europe and the Far East. However, things changed due to the devel-
oping cold war. Washington now turned its attention towards South Asia,
which seemed as an ideal region for the implementation of new U.S.
policy. Friendly gestures of good will and modest amounts of economic
aid were first contemplated without any major political and military in-
vol vement
.
Between India and Pakistan the former got greater attention from
Washington, because of its size, popularity of its leaders, like Nehru,
who was quite well known in the Western world and was emerging as the
leader of Afro-Asian countries. But when the United States started
formulating its new policy towards the Middle East and gave serious
thought to regional defense arrangements for the Middle East as well as
South Asia, Pakistan's geographical position gave it a special strate-
gic importance. West Pakistan bordered on the region surrounding the
Persian Gulf and East Pakistan could become an outlet to the countries
of Southeast Asia. From these strategic locations, the United States
could deal with the problem of international Communism from a "position
53
of strength .
"
ILS.:. policy towards the subcontinent (1954-59)
. The real incentive in
this regard came when the West was confronted with the Korean War.
Southeast Asia and the Middle East became strategically and economically
important areas, which needed to be defended from the "threats of ag-
gression" from communists. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State
under the Eisenhower Administration, set out on a fact-finding mission
to countries of the Middle East and South Asia on May 9, 1953, during
which he visited India and Pakistan. Dulles' talks with Nehru were
unsuccessful, the Indian Prime Minister had fundamental differences on
the issue of regional military pacts, and like most Asian and Arab coun-
tries, was not convinced of "any imminent Communist threat." Secondly,
Nehru was not prepared to give up his policy of non-alignment which had
earned for his country high prestige and a favorable image in the Third
Worl d.
^
In Pakistan, the atmosphere was quite different and of course
favorable to the U.S. Pakistan in her quest for security in the face
of unending Indo-Paki stan tensions, was eager to find an ally. The
plans for regional pacts which the U.S. was ready to sponsor had great
attraction for Pakistan. The United States was happy to get the sup-
port of an Asian country, with its significant geo-political location,
at a time when non-alignment was the dominating theme among the Asian
countries. On the other hand, Pakistan was delighted to get the help
2
G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major
Powers (New York; Free Press, 1975), pp. 77-83.
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of a super power to increase her military strength to meet the threats
of aggression from India.
Pakistan became a member of SEATO as well as the Baghdad Pact
(CENTO) after entering into a bilateral military agreement with the
U.S. in 1954 and subsequently an additional one in 1959. ^ India re-
acted violently to the U.S. decision to include Pakistan in her global
strategy; thus Indo-U.S. relations were put to severe strains and
Stresses in the mid-1950s.
New U.S. policy toward
_the subcontinent in the 1960s
. With the coming
of the Kennedy administration in 1961, great changes were brought in
U.S. policy towards the subcontinent. The keynote of the new policy was
favorable to neutralists like India, but it worked to the disadvantage
of allies like Pakistan.'' The Indo-U.S. relation had already taken a
turn for the better during 1959-60 because of the growing tensions be-
tween India and China. President Kennedy wanted to take advantage of
the situation. Other factors like the Soviet-Chinese ideological con-
flict and prospect for an East-West detente also influenced alignment
and non-alignment in the policies of India and Pakistan. The most im-
portant factor affecting U.S. policy towards the subcontinent was the
common objective of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. concerning China in the
1960s and the role that India was expected to play in their global
policy for the containment of China.
3
Ibid., pp. 84-90; see also, Sukhbir Choudhry, Indo-Pak War
and Big Powers (New Delhi: Trimurti Publications, 1972), pp. 1-17.
4
Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (London:
Pall Mall
, 1967), p. 2.
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Kennedy enunciated a "new alliance for progress" in lieu of
military alliances for the developing countries, emphasis being on
economic aid. India was very much delighted with this change in U.S.
policy, whereas Pakistan was worried. Kennedy seemed to make extra-
ordinary efforts to maintain good relations simultaneously with India
and Pakistan. But the task was not easy; rather, it was difficult and
complex like having good relations at the same time with the Arab
countries and Israel. Both Ayub and Nehru were invited to the United
States in 1961. As a result of Kennedy's meetings with the leaders of
India and Pakistan, the U.S. was successful in maintaining a policy of
equal treatment with both India and Pakistan. India, satisfied with
this move, had new hopes and was optimistic.^
But the situation changed when the Indo-China armed conflict
started in October 1962. Due to the hostile attitude then prevailing
towards China, the Western countries reacted in favor of India, which
was supposed to be the victim of "naked aggression" by China. This
was the most appropriate moment for the United States, which showed its
great favor by rushing arms and supplies to India. This continued even
after China's unilateral declaration of a ceasefire.
India embarked upon a huge military build-up with the military
supplies not only from the United States but from the Soviet Union as
well. The Indo-Chinese conflict not only brought India closer to the
United States but also the Sino-Soviet rift was further widened as a
result of the Soviet support to India. So the policy of strengthening
5Choudhury, Chapter 5.
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India's military strength suited the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.^
Pakistan made protests against U.S. policy of arming India which
greatly upset the balance of power in the subcontinent. The United
States tried to remove Pakistan's fears and anxieties over the Indian
arms build-up but it did not help much. Rather, the tension between
India and Pakistan (which had never diminished) increased, which finally
culminated in the Indo-Paki stan War of 1965. At that time the United
States suspended military assistance to both India and Pakistan. Gratis
military supplies to Pakistan were never resumed. Sales were subse-
quently limited to spare parts for weapons already supplied and these
too were treated on a "case-by-case" basis. In the 1970s, a few sales
of whole units, notably fighters, were negotiated but not actually exe-
cuted.
Disheartened by the unfortunate events of the subcontinent, par-
ticularly Indian wars with Pakistan and China, the United States was
convinced that there was no hope of building up India against China in
Asian affairs. In the case of Pakistan, the special relations were for-
mally broken when Pakistan gave notice to close the important U.S.
strategic communication center at Bedaber near Peshawar from where the
U-2 plane had once taken off and was shot down in Russia. During the
Johnson administration, the United States began a process of disengage-
ment from military commitments in the subcontinent. President Johnson
wanted to make it clear to both India and Pakistan that the U.S. mili-
tary assistance to them was not meant for their fighting against each
^Ibid., pp. 108-118.
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other.
The changed attitude of the United States was mostly due to her
military venture in Vietnam. Due to this involvement, Southeast Asia
became a top priority area. At the same time, the United States paid
attention to the Middle East, where the Soviet Union was rapidly ex-
panding her influence by taking advantage of the regional conflicts
between the Arabs and Israel.^
liie U^^^nd_tl2e_^^^ Richard Nixon
became the President of the United States in January 1969, U.S. policy
towards the subcontinent had undergone great changes since the days of
his vice presidency in the mid-1950s. Though President Nixon, due to
the political importance of the subcontinent, could not altogether ig-
nore it while evolving the new U.S. foreign policy, he certainly de-
cided to operate it with a low profile. Nixon was rather anxious to de-
velop better understanding and detente with the two communist major
powers: the U.S.S.R. and China.
A significant development in U.S. policy with regard to the sub-
continent took place when an unexpected assignment was given to Yahya
Khan (then the President of Pakistan) by Nixon to act as a middleman be-
tween Washington and Peking in the context of Nixon's new China policy.
Yahya did this job with utmost secrecy and responsibility and his ser-
vices were greatly appreciated by both countries. Nixon's new China
policy gave Pakistan a good opportunity (which at that time was involved
^For the important factors in changing American foreign policy
in the subcontinent during that period, see Choudhury, Chapter 6.
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in the Bangladesh crisis) of renewing better relations with the United
States, particularly with a sympathetic President at the White House.
The better relationship was dramatized by the U.S. government's deci-
sion to lift the embargo on U.S. military equipment to both India and
Pakistan, which had been banned since the Indo-Paki stan War of 1965.
No doubt, Pakistan was pleased with this decision. It had been the main
loser from the U.S. embargo since India continued to get massive mili-
tary supplies from the Soviet Union, thereby causing a grave threat to
Pakistan s security. During the Bangladesh crisis, Indo-U.S. relations
were correct but not entirely cordial. India was suspicious of Nixon's
personal inclinations towards Pakistan.^
Nixon's policy towards the subcontinent in 1971-72 raised many
angry voices both inside and outside the United States. The world
press had flashed atrocities of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan,
and the Nixon administration was charged with siding with the military
junta in Pakistan. A closer analysis of the U.S. role during the cri-
sis in Bangladesh reveals that President Nixon did not condone the
atrocities of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, and he did not approve
of India's grand and well planned strategy to dismember Pakistan with
Russia's diplomatic and military help. Nixon tried to encourage a
political settlement between the East and West wings of Pakistan, but
had no success in that. As regards India's role, the Nixon administra-
9
tion branded India "as an aggressor in the war."
^Choudhury, pp. 59-101.
9
The New York Times, December 8, 1971.
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After the secession of Bangladesh, Pakistan was desperate to
preserve her territorial integrity in the context of separatist ten-
dencies in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, which
appeared to have the Soviet Union's blessings. Pakistan looked towards
Washington for "protection." It had already revived its interest in
CENTO, a reversal of Bhutto's earlier demands of withdrawal from SEATO^^
and CENTO.
The United States still seemed to be interested in the main-
tenance of Pakistan's territorial integrity. Washington would not like
to see a further dismemberment of Pakistan by the combined Soviet and
Indian moves. But one thing is certain: the heyday of U.S. -Pakistan
relationships of the mid-1950s is over for good. The new relationship
is likely to be merely pragmatic and based on realities in South Asia.
Besides, after the ouster of Mr. Bhutto by a military general, Pakistan
once again is facing a difficult internal crisis. The Carter administra-
tion's attitude has been quite cold--to the extent of ignoring Pakistan.
Carter made a tour of Asia and Africa in the winter of 1978. He visited
India, and showed an interest in the new government led by Morarji
Desai (installed after the defeat of Indira Gandhi and Congress), but
did not visit Pakistan.
Relations of Soviet Russia with India and Pakistan
The Russians often accuse the so-called "imperialist powers,"
and recently China, of exploiting regional tensions to advance their na-
^^Pakistan has withdrawn from SEATO, because after its loss of
the East wing, Pakistan's membership in SEATO would be untenable.
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tional interest. An analysis of the Soviet's policy and actions towards
the subcontinent will, however, show that the Russians, more than any
other power, sought to utilize the tensions between India and Pakistan
in achieving their objectives in South Asia.
India's struggle for power and the Muslim demand for a separate
state based on religion, was denounced and condemned by Russia, "as a
set of new imperialist devices to retain British political, economic
and strategic influence in South Asia."^^ Throughout the Stalin era,
Russian comments on India and Pakistan were harsh and their attitude
remained hostile. Through that early period Soviet Russia showed no in-
clination to establish any friendly relations with India or Pakistan.
But Pandit Nehru, being a great admirer of the social welfare and eco-
nomic development policies of Russia, had felt the necessity of maintain-
ing good relations with the Soviet Union, a neighbor, with whom, he said,
"we shall have to undertake many common tasks and have much to do."^^
Stalin, like Dulles, did not appreciate Nehru's non-alignment,
because he saw the world as sharply divided into two camps and thought
there was no room for the middle-of-the-roaders. Nehru's first trip to
the United States in 1949, at the invitation of President Truman, had
drawn further Soviet criticism, and most of his speeches brought harsh
comments from the Soviet press. He was called an "American Stooge.
^^Choudhury, p. 7.
1
2
In a speech of Nehru in 1946, as the Minister of External Af-
fairs of the Interim Government. Cited by Choudhury, p. 10.
1
3
For Soviet Russia's hard attitude towards India and Pakistan
in the early 1950s, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia: Rela -
tions among China, India, Pakistan, and the USSR (New York: Pegasus,
1970), pp. 41-52.
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The Soviet Union, by sensing Pakistan's discomfort with the Western
power s wooing of Nehru, tried to take advantage of Pakistan's frus-
tration. An invitation to visit Russia was sent to Pakistan's Prime
Minister Liaquat A1 i Khan in 1949. At that stage, Pakistan could not
be influenced by the Soviet Union, because it desperately needed eco-
nomic and military assistance, neither of which the Soviet Union was
in a position to supply. Thus, Pakistan turned down Stalin's invita-
tion and became more friendly with the United States in the mid-1950s.
The Kremlin leaders recognized that the best way to penalize Pakistan
was to support her adversary, India.
During the Korean War, India played her first major role in
international affairs, and her policy was found favorable to Russia.
Nehru's speeches and statements gave the impression that India agreed
more with the Soviet Union than with the United States on matters re-
lated to the Korean War. On another occasion, when the Japanese
Peace Treaty became a controversial matter, India sided with the Soviet
bloc. Nehru's open criticism of the policies of the West began to gain
Stalin's appreciation. Relations between India and the U.S.S.R. showed
some improvement; simultaneously this was the end of Moscow's softer
policy towards Pakistan (manifested by the earlier invitation to
Liaquat)
.
Nehru's condemnation of the Western military pacts in the Third
World brought praises from the Soviet press, and Stalin's successors
valued his independent foreign policy. They tilted towards the Indian
14Choudhury, pp. 9-18.
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government and took advantage of the tensions between India and Pakis-
tan. They saw that antipathy to Pakistan was the pivot of Indian
foreign policy.
The whole decade of 1950 to 1960 and onwards is remarkable in
Indo-Soviet relationships. Moscow and New Delhi entered into numerous
trade agreements from 1953 to 1959 which not only improved their rela-
tionship, but also enhanced the economic development of India. Soviet
Russia helped India in construction and development of heavy industry.
Between 1957 and 1961 the U.S.S.R. extended credit to India totaling
$670 million. At the same time, India obtained large amounts of
economic assistance from both the United States and other Western coun-
tries .
On political issues, India and the Soviet Union supported each
other's position. With respect to the Russian atrocities in Hungary,
India was not at all vocal as compared to her severe condemnation of the
Anglo-French-Israel i action in Egypt. India was the only non-communist
country which voted with the Soviet bloc against a U.N. resolution call-
ing for free elections in Hungary. India's support for the U.S.S.R. was
compensated by Soviet support of India's position on the Kashmir issue.
During 1954-1962, ttie Soviet Union dropped its neutrality on the Kashmir
issue and openly supported India. It not only gave unequivocal support
to India on the matter, but also went to the extent of exercising its
veto when the U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Kashmir were
displeasing to India.
15
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Soviet policy towards I ndia and Pakistan in the 1960s
. After the
Smo-Indian War of 1962, Soviet Russia began to take note of "new
trends" in Pakistan's policy. Pakistan had shown its displeasure with
the American decision to supply arms to India. Along with that, the
Soviet Union also watched with concern Pakistan's growing friendship
and closer links with China. With the twin objectives to exploit
Pakistan s dissatisfaction with the United States and prevent the grow-
ing relationship between China and Pakistan, the Soviet Union began a
new phase of its policy towards the subcontinent. The new policy con-
tinued the special relationship with India but attempts were now made
to cultivate better relationships with Pakistan.
As a result of Russia's new policy, a series of dialogues be-
gan on ambassadorial and then higher official levels. During these
dialogues it was clear that the Soviet Union wanted to discuss secon-
dary issues like a cultural agreement and trade, whereas Pakistan was
eager to discuss the more important issues, such as Soviet support of
India on Kashmir, Afghanistan's stand on "Pakhtoonistan" and Soviet
arms supplies to India which were causing great anxieties in Pakistan.
During President /\yub's visit to the U.S.S.R. in April 1965,
Moscow appeared to press Pakistan to withdraw from the Western spon-
sored pacts, particularly CENTO, and to close the U.S. communication cen-
ter at Bedaber base. Pakistan urged Moscow to modify the Soviet stand
on Kashmir and to reduce arms supplies to India. Neither side showed
any flexibility in their respective positions, however. Keeping aside
^^Ibid., pp. 33-44. See also, S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign
Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).
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these important political is
tural agreement in June 1964
sues, Pakistan had already signed a cul-
,
a civil aviation agreement in 1963, and a
barter trade agreement in 1963.
Since Ayub“s first state visit to the U.S.S.R., the Soviet-
Pakistan relationship had been relaxed considerably though no major
step was taken by either side on important political issues affecting
the relationship. The Soviet Union began to maintain a posture of
neutrality in the Indo-Paki stan dispute. It, however, did not take any
positive step in that direction which would seriously jeopardize its
relations with India. This softness in its attitude was shown only
to weaken Pakistan's old ties with the United States and those emerging
with China. That is how the Soviet Union maintained a facade of neu-
trality in Indo-Paki Stan affairs.
Whatever the motives behind Soviet policy, it was able to bring
some changes in Pakistan's policy. Its first success was seen in 1965,
when after the Indo-Paki stan War in September 1965, Ayub, despite the
warnings of Pakistan s ally China, accepted the Soviet role of media-
tion at the Tashkent Conference in 1966. This conference could achieve
very little, if anything at all, to improve Indo-Pakistan relations.
Yet, for the Soviet Union, it was a great diplomatic achievement as it
played, for the first time, the role of a peacemaker in a major con-
fl ict i n Asian affai rs.
After the 1965 War, the military balance of power was changing
fast to the detriment of Pakistan and favorably for India because the
17
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United States, on which Pakistan depended totally for miiitary sup-
plies. put an embargo on military supplies for both India and Pakistan.
The U.S. embargo did not hit India as hard as it did Pakistan, because
the Soviet Union continued to give massive military aid to India.
Pakistan got military supplies from China, but they were no match for
the Russian weapons pouring into India. Hence Pakistan also tried to
get Soviet arms, of which it received a modest amount after agreeing to
close down the U.S. conimuni cation center at Bedaber.
The Indian reaction to the Soviet's decision to supply arms to
Pakistan was predictable. However, Kosygin's visit to New Delhi, af-
ter a visit to Pakistan, convinced Mrs. Gandhi that the arms sales to
Pakistan neither harmed India's vital national interests nor vitiated
its ties with Moscow. India officially protested the arms sales, but
it seemed to accept the Soviet assurances
.
After the arms sales, Russian pressures were further intensi-
fied, when Pakistan was "advised" to join Kosygin's plan for a regional
economic grouping, comprising Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and
the Soviet Union, and Brezhnev's scheme of an Asian Collective Security
19
arrangement.
Pakistan saw that the Russian motives behind these schemes of
regional cooperation against "imperialist" aggression and "neo-
colonialism" were to contain Chinese influence in the area, and also to
jeopardize its friendship with China on whom it relied heavily in case
1
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of a threat from India. Accordingly, it rejected these various Russian
proposals. It refused to pay the heavy political price for the Russian
arms, uncertain in quantity and poor in quality. Pakistan’s rejection
of the new Soviet proposals in Asia against China put an end to the
short-lived period of so-called friendly relations between Moscow and
Islamabad (1965-70).
Sgvietj^e^fat^^ and Pakistan in the 1970s
. By refusing to
comply with the crude Russian pressures, Pakistan had to pay a heavy
price. Soviet Russia's relations with India grew stronger day by day.
By signing the 20-year treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation in
August 1971 with India, the Soviet Union gave almost a blank check to
20New Delhi. Soviet good will for Pakistan had now evaporated. Fur-
ther
,
Pakistan's role in arranging the Si no-American dialogue was
greatly resented in Moscow.
This was the background of the Soviet attitude to Pakistan at
the beginning of the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971. The Soviet
support for the Bangladesh movement could only be explained in terms of
these developments in the Pakistani -Soviet relationship in the preced-
ing two years, 1969-70. Soviet hostility continued even after East
Pakistan's secession. After becoming President, Mr. Bhutto visited
Moscow in 1972, but the relationship did not improve much. The politi-
cal unrest in the NWFP and Baluchistan provinces was greatly due to
Soviet encouragement. The seizure of Soviet arms smuggled into Pakis-
20
The text of this agreement is in the Kessing's Contemporary
Archi yes (London), (August 21-28, 1971), p. 24773.
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tan through the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, the coup in Afghanistan
and President baud's^' threats to revive the old issue of "Pakhtoonis-
tan" were interpreted ,n Pakistan as indications of continued Soviet
pressure to bring Pakistan into the Asian Collective Security System.
Relati ons of China with Indi a and Pakistan
The other great power that has been interested in the recent
past in the affairs of the subcontinent is China. After the protracted
wars with foreign powers, Mao Tse-tung's China emerged as a united na-
tion, which was to play an important role in Asian affairs. China was
considered by many Asians as a great symbol of Asian nationalism. Its
emergence was enthusiastically greeted by India, because working to-
gether they could form a strong force in the area.
The period from 1949 to 1959 was an era of friendship and co-
operation between the two large countries of Asia: India and China.
India was the second non-communist country after Burma to recognize
the People s Republic of China. After the exchange of ambassadors,
relations between the two improved a great deal. On the other hand,
China's relations with Pakistan were not as warm, one reason being
that Pakistan had shown no special enthusiasm about the new China.
Though the two countries were not close to each other, there was not
any hostility between them, either. Diplomatic missions had been ex-
21
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proclaimed martial law in Afghanistan on April 28, 1978.
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changed and other links were established.^^ When Indo-Paki stan trade
came to a complete stop in 1949, Pakistan in its search for new markets
sold jute and cotton to China in return for coal under a barter agree-
ment. China, on its part, hoped to cultivate relations with the Muslim
countries of the Middle East through Pakistan.
Cjiina' s relations with India and Pakistan up to 1959
. This was the
period of a decade of extremely intimate relationship in Sino-Indian
relations. Some complications arose during that period, but those were
solved with a spirit of good will and friendship. The first major com-
plicating factor in their relations arose over Tibet, whose interna-
tional status was soiriewhat ambivalent. China, viewing Tibet as part of
its own territory, sought to end its autonomy and integrate it with the
rest of the country by force. India was dismayed by China's use of
force in Tibet but lacked the military strength to challenge China.
Nehru could have opposed China by accepting military support from the
Western powers, but at that time he was also interested in establish-
ing his policy of non-alignment.
Sino-Indian relations survived Tibet. The dispute was solved
by their signing the Tibet Agreement on April 24, 1954, on the basis
25
of "Panch Sheel"--five principles of peaceful coexistence. Moreover,
^^Choudhury, pp. 159-164.
24
^Ibid.
,
p. 153.
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Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are as follows: (1)
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2)
mutual non-aggression; (3) noninterference in each other's internal
affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.
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India vigorously championed the cause of China during the Korean War.
This period marks strong expressions of friendship, the most popular
slogan in India during this period being "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai''-the
Indians and Chinese are brothers. Leaders of both countries exchanged
visits and received an enthusiastic welcome from the people of the host
country. India and China worked together in the political sphere.
India and several other countries sponsored the Afro-Asian Conference
in 1955 at Bandug where Chou-en-lai demonstrated his diplomatic skills
and statesmanship in dealing with a large number of Asian and African
26
countries. Towards the end of the 1950s, Sino-Indian friendship ex-
perienced strain. Chinese maps included the territory in the Himalayas
which India claimed as its own.
Meanwhile China's relations with Pakistan remained cool, but
correct. Pakistan's entry into SEATO was regretted by China but it
was not made a special propaganda issue by the Chinese leaders, who
showed considerable restraint in dealing with Pakistan at the height
of its association with the West. Unlike the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries, China refused to regard Kashmir as "an in-
tegral part of India." In 1960, during the meetings of the Chinese
and Indian officials regarding boundary demarcations, when the Indians
tried to include in the talks the border between Pakistan and Indian-
held Kashmir, China refused to discuss this part of the boundary.
Pakistan reacted favorably to China's decision and sent a diplomatic
^^Choudhury, pp. 150-159.
^^See Anwar H. Syed, pp. 54-60.
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note to the Chinese government suggesting a boundary agreement between
the two countries.
Motions ULih^Jg^. The 1960s brought the mistrust and suspicion
in Sino-Indian relations to the surface, and the golden era of their
friendship came to an end in early 1960. Their relations deteriorated
in 1959 when incidents occurred along their Himalayan borders--one in
the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and the other in the Ladakh area
of northeast Kashmir. Other factors, which produced a drift between
these two countries, included President Kennedy's new policy towards
South Asia, which regarded India as a counterpoise to China. As India
turned away from China, Pakistan turned towards it.
In late 1962, India and China had a little war in the Himalaya
mountains. The initiative was taken by India when it attacked China's
28border posts. The massive counterattack launched by the Chinese
overpowered the Indian forces. India suffered its greatest military
setback since independence. China, by announcing a unilateral cease-
fire, left India along with the rest of the world bewildered, but one
thing was then clear: China had proved its superior power.
The Sino-Indian war put an end to the "two thousand years of
29friendship" and had a great impact on the South Asian triangle. It
brought China's differences with the Soviet Union to the surface. Dis-
appointed with the United States' attitude, Pakistan started its policy
28
The grand designs of Indian expansion have been discussed in
detail by Choudhury, chapter 8.
29
For detailed discussions on the factors why China chose con-
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71
of bilateral isrn-which not only resulted in closer links with China,
but also normalized its relations with the U.S.S.R. Another repercus-
sion of the Sino-Indian war was the strengthening of India against Pakis
tan. After the death of Nehru, Prime Minister Shastri found his country
weak, and took steps to consolidate its position in Kashmir and to reno-
vate its armed forces.
The 1960s brought Pakistan and China, two countries with com-
pletely divergent social, economic, and political orders, closer. India
considered these new Chinese diplomatic moves towards Pakistan as anti-
pathy to India. China claimed to base its relationship with Pakistan
in the 1960s on the five principles of coexistence, which guided its
relations with India in the 1950s; while Pakistan's interpretation was
referred to as mutual national interests. As pointed out earlier,
Pakistan in its quest for security turned to new friends and new allies
in the changed circumstances in the 1960s. Of all major powers, China
seemed more sympathetic to Pakistan's anxiety over India, and this pro-
vided the big incentive to Pakistan's inclination towards Peking.
The boundary pact between China and Pakistan was the first major
step in the Si no-Paki stan friendship which has grown steadily for the
last fifteen years. In 1959, President Ayub had already shown his will-
ingness to approach China for a peaceful settlement of the boundary be-
tween the two countries. The ceasefire line in Kashmir in 1948 re-
sulted in entrusting Pakistan the responsibility of defense of the areas
contiguous to China's province of Sinkiang from the Karakoram pass in
^^Ibid., pp. 193-197.
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the northeast to the furthest point in the northwest. The border region
comprises two distinct areas. Baltistan and Hunza, and in this region
lies one of the greatest mountain complexes, the Karakoram range of
high mountains, deep valleys, and turbulent rivers. No boundary line
had ever been shown in the sector west of the Karakoram pass on any
Pakistani map.
On Pakistan's initiative, both countries agreed to have talks
on the matter to demarcate the boundaries. Negotiations started in Sep-
tember 1962 between the foreign ministers and the boundary agreement was
finally signed on March 2, 1963.^^ According to the agreement, China
actually ceded some 750 square miles of territory. In doing so, China's
main objective was to demonstrate its willingness to settle the boun-
daries in a peaceful manner with its neighbors, such as Afghanistan,
Burma, Mongolia, and Nepal. This was a source of embarrassment as well
as annoyance to New Delhi. It was a triumph for China, particularly
among the Afro-Asian countries.
As for international implications, the agreement had worsened
the Indo-Paki Stan i relations. In Washington, the agreement was resented
not so much because of the actual line of demarcation or its contents but
for the new trends in Pakistan's foreign policy leaning towards Peking.
Pakistan's foreign policy began to move more to the pleasure of Peking
resulting in annoyance and displeasure by the Johnson administration in
Washington, worries in New Delhi, and uneasiness in Moscow.
A series of agreements between China and Pakistan followed the
^^See Anwar H. Syed, pp. 81-85.
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signing of the border agreement. More significant, however, were the
political, diplomatic, and military cooperation and dialogues. Between
1963 and 1966 there were a number of exchange visits between top Chinese
and Pakistani leaders culminating in Ayub's state visit in March 1965.
There was a wide range of discussions in a much more relaxed and friend-
lier atmosphere than what Ayub had in Moscow in April 1965. Mao and
other Chinese leaders assured Pakistan of China's full support in the
event of any external aggression.
During the Indo-Paki stan War of 1965, China gave open and un-
equivocal support to Pakistan. Between Septemberl6, when China issued
32an ultimatum to India, and the Chinese troops began to move along the
Sikkim border, and September 22, when Pakistan accepted the ceasefire
resolution, the world remained suspended by the crucial question of
whether the war would escalate into a wider, longer and graver conflict
between India, China and Pakistan with the potential involvement of the
two super powers directly or indirectly.
By this time, due to the pressure both from the U.S. and from
the U.S.S.R., President Ayub agreed to accept the ceasefire. The
Chinese leaders also showed their statesmanship and understanding of
Pakistan's difficulties. They were quite ready to come to Pakistan's
rescue and agreed to provide any assistance Pakistan needed at that
time. While the Chinese appreciated Pakistan's difficulties and seemed
to recognize that Pakistan had no option but to accept the ceasefire,
they were certainly not happy to see the role of the Soviet Union as
32
For factors behind China's ultimatum and the happenings on the
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peacemaker in South Asia at the Tashkent Conference. When Liu Shao-Chi
came to Pakistan in March 1966, Ayub had to make great efforts to re-
assure the Chinese leaders about the Tashkent Declaration.^^
After the War of 1965, Ayub looked toward China for immediate
help in a fast deteriorating situation for Pakistan's security and de-
fense problems. China assured Pakistan of all types of help in the case
of another war with India. In the meantime, China began to give Pakis-
tan the much-needed military supplies. Pakistan received substantial
military aid after 1965; in fact, China proved to be the principal arms
supplier to Pakistan in the years 1965-70.^^
Pakistan's moves in the direction of the Soviet Union during
President Ayub's visit to Moscow in 1967 and Kosygin's visit to Pakis-
tan in early 1968, culminating in the Russian decision to give Pakistan
some military supplies, raised suspicions in Peking. Ayub was also
disturbed by the news of the internal upheaval caused by the Cultural
Revolution in China. He probably thought that a change of leadership
in China might affect his country's special links with it. China's
relations with Pakistan, however, remained unchanged during the Cul-
tural Revolution. There was apparently no sign of a crack in China's
attitude towards Pakistan. But before the fall of Ayub in 1969, China
seemed to have some "second thoughts" on Pakistan.
^^Cited by Choudhury, pp. 189-191.
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^^Russia sold MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighters. The Soviet arms sup-
ply was quite modest in quantity.
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Ch.ina's relations with India and Pakistan in the 1970s
. When Vahya Khan
became President in March 1969, Pakistan was involved in serious inter-
nal problems. During this period Pakistan had hardly any foreign policy
But then came the unexpected but most significant assignment for Vahya,
to act as a "messenger" between Washington and Peking. This gave
Pakistan a good opportunity to further develop better relations with
China and also with the U.S. under Nixon.
In this situation, Yahya Khan visited China in November 1970 and
had lengthy and exclusive talks with Chou En-lai and also a meeting
with Chairman Mao. The discussions were not confined to China-Pakistan
relations but significantly a good part of the dialogue was spent on
Sino-American relations in which Yahya had been playing a role.
During that time, China and Pakistan agreed to build the first
road linking the two countries, an all-weather route, three miles high,
through the Himalayas. It follows the trace of an ancient mule track,
known as the "Silk Road" more than 1,000 years ago.^^ The new road is
regarded as having far more political than military or economic sig-
nificance. India, however, was concerned over its construction. Though
the road has no significant potential of being used as an "invasion
route," this is the only road between the two countries sharing a common
boundary in Kashmir. It runs from remote Kashgar to the Mintaka Pass,
in Sinkiang Province of China, 15,450 feet above the sea level; on the
Pakistani side it runs 80 miles down to Gilgit in Pakistani -held Kash-
^^See Choudhury, pp. 140-145.
^^Syed, pp. 134-139.
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mir. The road was ceremoniously inaugurated in February 1971 and re-
ferred to as the "Highway of Friendship,"
Yahya Khan's visit contributed to a better understanding between
the two countries, China promised substantial economic aid to Pakistan
for her fourth five-year plan. Military assistance from China was also
discussed, Pakistan’s open support at the U,N, for China's entry in
October 1970 was greatly appreciated.
But it was a period of great change and uncertainty in Pakistan.
China, like any other country, could see the impending crisis in Pakis-
tan. The ruling army junta's unwise handling of the situation in the
East wing as well as the uncompromising attitudes of the two principal
leaders of East and West Pakistan, Mujib and Bhutto, had added to that
confused situation. China was watching the situation with concern and
sympathy. In such an uncertain situation, China seemed supportive of
Pakistan's well being. When the tragic happenings over the crisis in
East Pakistan began, China was caught in a dilernma:^^ whether to sup-
port a friendly military regime or a popular movement. As a major
power, China could not watch with equanimity the disintegration of
Pakistan, its closest ally in South Asia, and the birth of a new coun-
try which was destined to be friendly to New Delhi and Moscow, both
having a hostile attitude toward China.
When the trouble finally started in East Pakistan in March
1971, the Chinese press and government did not make any hasty comment.
The first reaction was expressed in the People's Daily on April 11,
OO
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1971. It neither supported Pakistan’s military action nor attacked
the Bengali movement in East Pakistan. Its main attack was against
"open interference in the internal matters of Pakistan by the Indian
Government." The Russian rcle, particularly Podgorny's letter to Yahya,
was also criticized as an "i nterference" in Pakistan's internal affairs.
China, like the United States, was very careful of not getting
involved in the crisis. The Chinese did not relish the prospect of
supporting a military regime of West Pakistan against the elected repre-
sentatives of East Pakistan. China had always supported liberation move-
ments all over the world and it could not suddenly give up that role for
the ruling elite of West Pakistan. At the same time, it could not see
the prospect of a major diplomatic triumph of the Soviet Union and
India in South Asia where she had an important role to play. These
diplomatic realities in South Asia, particularly Sino-Soviet rivalry
in the area, put it in an awkward position.
Under these circumstances, China stood with Pakistan in those
difficult times, but it was unhappy over the military atrocities in
East Pakistan. When Bhutto visited Peking in November 1971 as Yahya's
special emissary, China publically demanded that a "rational solution"
should be found for East Bengal. As regards the Chinese help and co-
operation in the case of war with India, the Chinese left Bhutto with
no doubt that Pakistan should not expect any such help of intervention
as China had promised and provided during the 1965 War. Pakistan got
a "declaration of support" from Peking, but China made no specific
commitments and assurances to Pakistan.
When the war finally broke out as a result of Indian military
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intervention, China supported Pakistan in the Security Council but its
support was confined to words and its real anger was expressed against
Russia and India. China's role during the war revealed the bitter
rivalry between the two communist giants in South Asia. It was bitter
over the success of Russian diplomatic gains in the area but not over
the emergence of a new nation in the subcontinent.
Rej^ti ons in t he 1970s . In the 1970s as in the last 15 years, Pakistan
continues to maintain a special relationship with China. After becom-
ing President, the first great power Bhutto visited was China. Peking
reaffirmed its friendship and support to Pakistan in the joint com-
munique issued after Bhutto's visit--China condemned "India's naked
aggression" and reiterated its "firm support to the Pakistan government
and people in their just struggle to preserve their state sovereignty
and territorial integrity against outside aggression." The close rela-
tions of China and Pakistan are likely to be continued as the relation-
ship is based on mutual advantages and identity of interests in the af-
fairs of the subcontinent. Before Bhutto's ouster by the military re-
gime in July 1977, he visited China a couple of times, and every time
the joint communiques indicated "opening of new vigorous phases" in bi-
lateral ties. China also supplied Pakistan with military equipment.
China's total military aid is said to be equal to the sum of U.S. arms
provided to Pakistan during the period 1954-1965.
After Bangladesh's emergence, Sino-Indian relations have also
taken a new turn. This was confirmed when a deacde after the India-
China War, China offered to reestablish full diplomatic relations with
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India in 1973, as noted by Indian Deputy Foreign Minister S.P. Singh
39in Parliament. This Chinese move was also appreciated by India and
indications were found that India would also respond to these "gestures
of realism." In this regard India has preferred a step by step approach
during the last five years and the atmosphere has been quite favorable
to the normalization of relations between the two countries. In early
February 1978, a non-official good will delegation from China visited
New Delhi. This indicated that China was interested in initiating the
process of Sino-Indian normalization. Before that a Chinese trade team
had already visited India to explore the possibilities of trade between
the two countries. This trip was considered as a positive new sign of
improving Sino-Indian relations.
On the other hand, it is clear also that India is not likely
to move toward friendly relations with Peking if this would endanger
its relationship with Moscow, and Peking will probably not seek New
Delhi's friendship at the expense of that with Islamabad.
Analysis of the Attitude and Interests of the
Big Powers in the Region
The critical factor in the international politics of South Asia
has been the power balance and the general relationship between India
and Pakistan. In 1971, Pakistan broke in half and with that the power
balance in the subcontinent tilted sharply in favor of India, which en-
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joyed comparative political stability and superior national power.
Pakistan's capacity to challenge and attempt to reverse the South Asian
status quo with the military and political support from the United
States and China has been reduced greatly after the events of 1970-71.
The American decision to restore arms aid and other supplies in February
1975 had very little to do with its Indo-Paki stan policy. It is rather
attributed to American approaches towards China and its strategic posi-
tion in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. The effect of such American support
for Pakistan on Indo-Paki stani relations remains a moot question. Ameri-
can policies towards South Asia in the post-1971 period have been of
relatively low profile. Now the American strategies primarily are re-
lated to other regions, e.g., the Middle East, China or the Indian
Ocean
.
Washington has also realized that it cannot curtail Soviet in-
fluence in South Asia by pitting a hostile Pakistan against India. Such
an American strategy would only result, as it had done in the past, in
driving India further towards the Soviet Union in an attempt to restore
any Indo-Pakistani balance upset by American actions.
Therefore, in the final analysis, while American policy towards
Pakistan would in part be shaped by the latter's proximity to the oil-
rich Gulf and its capacity to enhance American interests in that
strategic region, this American interest in Pakistan is bound to be
limited by consideration of the adverse effects it might have on Ameri-
can interests in India and the rest of Asia. In the light of these
events, one can safely assume that the U.S. would not be so committed
on Pakistan's behalf as to encourage that country once again to have
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a confrontationist attitude towards India.
China has been the main supplier of arms to Pakistan after
1971. In addition to that, its political support to Islamabad is not
a secret. But China would also be cautious in encouraging Pakistan's
anti-Indian sentiments beyond a certain limit, because this would only
push India further into the Soviet "orbit." This would be counterpro-
ductive as far as China's own long-term interests are concerned. Soviet
influence in the contiguous state of Afghanistan, which supports Pathan
and Balochi autonomists, continues to be high and China would, there-
fore, be apprehensive of the fact that such a dismemberment of Pakistan
would ensure for the Soviet Union an outlet to the Arabian Sea. This
would result in increasing Soviet naval strategies in the Indian Ocean
region. Therefore, on this count alone, China is bound to have a vital
stake in Pakistan's territorial integrity as well as its political
stability. For this it would seem essential for Peking that Indo-
Pakistani tensions be kept within limits, especially since China's
capacity to come to the aid of Pakistan physically is very much limited.
As far as the third major power, the U.S.S.R., is concerned,
it has, since the mid-1950s, traditionally adopted a pro-Indian stance.
It has no reason to prevent the emergence of good relations between
India and Pakistan. In fact, Moscow would welcome the idea since it
may help to wean away Pakistan from China and the United States.
CHAPTER IV
BEFORE SIMLA
Pakistan People's Party Comes Into Power
Nineteen seventy-one was the worst year in the history of
Pakistan as it not only suffered defeat in a war with India but this
Muslim nation, carved out of the Indian subcontinent under the leader-
ship of Mohammad A1 i Jinnah and his Muslim League, lost its credibil-
ity by the loss of the Eastern wing. In 1971, Pakistan was a shambles.
It lost approximately 54 percent of its population, and economically
it was shattered. Ninety-three thousand of its soldiers, compelled to
surrender, were now in the hands of the enemy, whereas large tracts of
its land were in Indian possession.
The first political effect of losing the 1971 War to India
was the change of government in Pakistan. Being politically dis-
credited by its excesses in East Bengal and its defeat, the Army could
not stay longer in power in that critical situation. Bhutto, the
majority party leader in the West wing, was the only choice and he
assumed power on December 20, 1971. He remained vulnerable to poten-
tial removal by the Army, but the prevailing political climate made
this unlikely (at that time) as long as he did not permit a further
breakup of the country following the loss of the East.^
Hhe military could not keep away from coming into power for
long. Bhutto was ousted through a military coup on July 5, 1977, on
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Bhutto inherited a demoralized and defeated country: a nation
without any sense of direction, purpose, or destiny. He had before
him the immediate task of putting the scattered pieces together, rais-
ing the lost morale, stabilizing the shattered economy, and tackling
the most difficult problems of recovering Pakistan's soldiers and ter-
ritory from India. Being an able and energetic man, he set out to per-
form these tasks in a most remarkable fashion. A word on his political
background and experience should be appropriate.
Formation of Peopl e's Party
. Zulfiqar A1 i Bhutto joined Ayub's regime
as the minister for natural resources, but was later given the portfolio
of foreign minister. He was a prominent member of Ayub's cabinet, and
enjoyed his confidence and favor. He gradually appeared on the politi-
cal scene of Pakistan as a brilliant foreign minister. He is often
credited with having played a major role in refashioning China-Pakistan
relations. This move was a departure from an unpopular pro-Western
orientation in Pakistani foreign policy. A graduate of Berkeley and
Oxford, Bhutto has an unchallenged gift of oration and rhetoric, which
brought him recognition not only at home but abroad as well. As foreign
minister of Pakistan, due to the anti-India sentiments, he became a
symbol of resurgent nationalism. His youth and dynamism helped him
to enhance his charismatic appeal.
During his tenure as foreign minister, Bhutto supported Ayub's
political system whole-heartedly, and strongly supported Ayub's candi-
the pretext of "saving the country" from the chaos resulting after the
alleged rigging of the national elections held in March 1977, by the
ruling party. Mr. Bhutto is facing a death sentence now.
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dacy during the 1965 Presidential elections.^ It is worth mentioning
tnat in spite of that close association with Ayub Khan, he was able to
maintain his own identity. It was due to his personality and flam-
boyance that he was later able to mobilize public opposition so suc-
cessfully against Ayub Khan.
The Tashkent Declaration brought up the disagreement and di-
vergence between Ayub and Bhutto over foreign policy matters. Meeting
under Soviet auspices (opposed by Bhutto) at Tashkent in January 1966,
India and Pakistan agreed in effect to a return to the status quo ante
beljum.
. Pakistan gained neither a plebiscite in Kashmir nor anything
else, far from strengthening his political position, Ayub had impaired
it.
The events which took place after the Tashkent Declaration
demonstrated clearly to Bhutto that the Ayub era was in its last
days. Bhutto let it be known that he had been opposed to the accord
made at Tashkent and this persuaded Ayub Khan to get rid of his foreign
•
• 4
minister. After leaving the government, Bhutto considered whether to
join already established parties or to form a "forward bloc" within the
ruling party (Ayub's Convention Muslim League). But the latter step
could not materialize, as Ayub Khan had a very strong hold on the party,
2
After leaving the government in 1966, Bhutto denounced Ayub's
rule as "a dictatorship under the label of democracy."
3
The Tashkent Declaration is discussed in Chapter IV.
^Bhutto was relieved of his responsibilities as the foreign
minister on November 30, 1966. Bhutto claimed later that he had of-
fered his resignation on three occasions following the Tashkent
Declaration, but was told not to desert Pakistan at the time of a
serious crisis.
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and other members would not cooperate with Bhutto for fear of dis-
pleasing Ayub, who would have considered this move as a revolt against
him. His alignment with other parties did not seem feasible as they
were "reactionaries" in their outlook. They offered very little to
the people in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. "They con-
tinued to cling to abstraction of ideology and persisted in invoking
Islam as the only panacea for all ills."^ In this situation, Bhutto
did not want himself to be identified with any of these political par-
ties. Besides, during his tenure in the cabinet as foreign minister,
he had criticized the opposition parties quite often, which made co-
operation with them difficult. Along with these facts, Bhutto was
aware of a new change which was arising among people, especially the
young generation, in response to exploitation and economic dispari-
ties. He wanted to make this upcoming generation as his power base,
by making himself the champion of their cause. The time was ripe for
any change which could be brought about by a different approach. Un-
der these circumstances, Bhutto decided to form a party of his own.
To judge the people's mood, he traveled all over the country. He got
a positive response especially from students and labor. During his
tour of the different parts of Pakistan he came out with open and
harsh criticism of Ayub Khan. In the meantime, he had found a base
among lower-income groups, and as his followers grew in number, he
5
Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and
Two," in Pakistan: The Long View
,
ed. Ziring, Braibanti and 'Wriggins
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977), p. 76.
^Meenakshi Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition: Political Devel -
opment and the Rise of Pakistan People's Party (Delhi: Manoher, 1975),
p. 22.
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decided to fonn a party of his own.
The announcement was made at Lahore, on December 1, 1967. its
Ideology was described in four slogans---'lslam is our Faith," "Democ-
racy is our Polity," "Socialism is our Economy," and "All Power to the
People."^ In the autumn of 1968, Bhutto began giving effective politi-
cal leadership to an anti-Ayub movement centering on student demon-
strations, strikes, and other forms of disorder in the cities of West
Pakistan. The main purpose of this movement was to prevent Ayub's
re-election as President in 1970.
It all started in October 1968 when students began agitating
for educational reforms, demanding the repeal of the university ordi-
g
nance, the reduction in tuition fees and changes in the examination
system. Their agitation, which began with sporadic strikes at Karachi
University, was at first peaceful but became increasingly violent as
it merged with Bhutto's propaganda campaign against the regime. He
was touring West Pakistan at that time and was delivering many harsh
speeches
.
Mr. Bhutto was arrested under the emergency regulations on
November 13, 1968 on a charge of inciting the students to riot. His
arrest came as a blessing for the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) as it
enhanced the status and popularity of the party. It also helped in
^For the details on the formation of the PPP, see Dilip Muker-
jee, Z.A. Bhutto: The Quest for Power (Delhi: Vikas, 1972); Gopinath,
Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and the Rise of Pakistan
People's Party ; and Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and
Two .
"
g
The university ordinance restricted student political activity
and provided for the forfeiture of their degrees by graduates accused
of subversive activities.
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establishing Bhutto as a dedicated crusader against the General. ^ The
reaction against Mr. Bhutto's arrest was intense, and riots occurred
in many cities of West Pakistan.
Along with West Pakistan, rioting and mass strikes also started
in the East wing, where the demand basically was for regional autonomy.
Strikes in East Pakistan were more violent and more widespread and re-
sulted in a virtual breakdown of all authority.
After his release, Mr. Bhutto speeded the task of the removal
of Ayub Khan by addressing public meetings. Under the PPP's flag vari-
ous rallies and processions were organized. In fact, PPP was the only
party which observed the "Tashkent Day," in all the important cities of
Pakistan.
In comparison to other political parties, the PPP proved to be
more successful as it got popular support in the shortest period of
time. Its leader, Z.A. Bhutto, was more effective and much more popu-
lar with the masses, as he not only had the charisma, but he was able
to communicate with the masses by coming down to their level and by
using their language, the language a common person could easily under-
stand. ^ ^
Several social realities contributed to Ayub's fall. Pakis-
tan's allegedly remarkable economic growth under his political leader-
9
Mr. Bhutto was released on February 17, 1969.
^*Vashkent Day was celebrated on January 11, 1970, by PPP as re-
ported in The Dawn
,
January 12, 1970. It was an opportune move by the
PPP to exploit the anti -Tashkent feelings in the West.
11
Syed, pp. 74-75.
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Ship was based on a capitalist economic system which brought benefits
only to a limited number of families’^ and firms, which grew dispropor-
tionately rich. This obviously created discontent among the poor and
middle classes of Pakistan. After the 1965 War with India, this dis-
content and growing disenchantment was manifested in the form of
student demonstrations which gained momentum when Bhutto's PPP emerged
and presented itself as the champion of their cause.
Under these mounting pressures, Ayub explored the possibili-
ties of his remaining in power, but being discouraged with the exist-
ing uncontrollable situation, he tried to pacify the people by showing
his consent to a restoration of pari iamentary government and announced
that he would not be a candidate for the Presidency in 1970.^^ Despite
this decision, which came on February 21, 1969, violence continued in
East^"^ and West Pakistan.
Faced with this breakdown of law and order in many parts of
the country. President Ayub Khan announced his resignation on March
25, 1969. Martial law was proclaimed and order was restored without
difficulty. General Yahya Khan (the Commander-in-Chief of the Army),
who had been appointed Chief Martial Law Admini strator
,
assumed the
These 22 rich families of Pakistan were frequently mentioned
by Bhutto in speeches during his election campaign; unsuccessful actions
were taken against them when Bhutto came into power in 1971.
1 3
^or the events during these days, see The Dawn, February 1,
17, 21, and 26, and March 13, 1969.
14 . . .
The situation in East Pakistan was more violent. Students in
Dacca got virtual control of the situation. On March 3, they demanded
the resignation of 40,000 Basic Democrats, who formed the electoral col-
lege. Two Basic Democrat members were killed in the process, and
harassment continued during these days.
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Presidency on March 31, with the explanation that it was necessary to
assume the office of Head of State until a new Constitution was
framed
.
15
I!ie elect ion s of 1970 and emergenc e of the PPP as a ma.iority party in
^ West w 1 n9 . Circumstances under which the first general elections
were held on December 7, 1970, brought Mujibur Rahman and Bhutto to the
forefront of Pakistani politics. The Awami League swept 151 seats in
the National Assembly, all from East Pakistan, and the PPP got 81 seats,
62 from the Punjab, 18 from Sind, and 1 from NWFP. The PPP did not con-
test any seats in East Pakistan, and had little success in NWFP and
Baluchistan.^^ Its victory in the Punjab and Sind was attributed to
its combination of economic radicalism, anti-Indian nationalism,^^ and
Mr. Bhutto s dynamic personality that was appealing especially to
1
8
younger voters.
The election returns proved most of the pre-election predic-
1 5
"Yahya Khan's Broadcast on March 31," reported in The Dawn,
April 1, 1969.
1 g
The PPP got one seat from Baluchistan and one from NWFP.
^^In his election campaign, he advocated nationalization of
banking and basic industries, including gas, natural resources, ship-
ping, paper and cement; limitation of land holdings; distribution of
state lands to landless peasants. In foreign policy, he advocated
withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO. His policy differed in two fundamen-
tal respects from that of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: he supported the es-
tablishment of a strong central government, and demanded the intensi-
fication of the confrontation with India over the Kashmir question,
calling for "a 1,000 year war" if necessary.
1
8
Bhutto described himself as "a democratic socialist who be-
lieves in socialism on the Willy Brandt or British pattern." The Dawn
,
December 12, 1970.
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t1ons wrong, ^9
attributed to various
reasons. The PPP obviously benefited from the various factions which
appeared within the rightist elements like the Muslim League and reli-
gious parties during the election campaign. These parties found it
difficult to cooperate with each other, thus their internal conflicts
weakened their positions and strengthened the PPP position. Factions
were found even in the leftist NAP between Mali Khan and Achaktai
groups
.
While these parties were busy confronting their internal prob-
lems, Bhuttos* supporters increased day by day, since the PPP pre-
sented itself as refreshingly different from the rightist parties. Some
of the independent candidates received support from the PPP in consti-
tuencies where it was not strong enough to put up its own candidate.
Such candidates joined the PPP after the election.
Yahya Khan resigns and Bhutto becomes President
. The unconditional
surrender of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan on December 16, 1971
and President Yahya Khan's acceptance on the following day of the
Indian offer of a ceasefire on the Western front aroused intense anger
and bitterness in West Pakistan. The shock caused by the disaster in
19
Werner Adam, writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review
,
Hong
Kong, December 5, 1970, predicted that only 15 to 20 percent of Bhutto's
117 candidates would win in the Western wing.
20
For the detailed discussion on the causes of failure of the
rightist parties and their wrong strategy in the election campaign,
see Gopinath, pp. 103-110, and Mukerjee, pp. 67-98.
21
In Sind, for Sukkur constituency A1 i Hasan Mangi contested
as an Independent candidate, but had full support from the PPP; he an-
nounced to join the PPP right after he won the National Assembly seat.
9 ]
East Pakistan was all the greater because official statements on the
progress of the war had completely concealed the true situation there.
In consequence, when Pakistan's defeat could no longer be concealed.
the press and politicians united in demanding President Yahya Khan's
resignation
Demonstrations against the military regime began in the main
towns on December 18. The most violent one was in Peshawar, where a
crowd attempted to burn down President Yahya Khan's house. In
Lahore, several thousand people took part in a procession, shouting
such slogans as "Quit or be Shot," and in Rawalpindi civil servants
paraded with placards saying, "We demand a full account" and "Give us
civilian government. The demonstrations continued until December
20, when they threatened to degenerate into riots. In Karachi, where
a general strike was declared, demonstrators stormed the Soviet Air-
lines office, and set fire to liquor stores in both Karachi and Islama-
bad as a protest against the alleged drunkenness of the ruling mili-
tary junta.
President Yahya Khan s position during this period remained ob-
scure. He made his last broadcast in the evening of December 16, when
he declared that the war on the Western front would continue, and did
not himself broadcast the statement announcing the ceasefire. He is-
22
A statement issued on December 18 by the United Coalition
Party, and Asghar Khan's statement on December 19. In The Dawn,
December 19 and 20, 1971.
23
The Dawn
,
December 19, 1971.
24
Ibid., December 19 and 20, 1971.
sued a statement in the evening of December 17. outlining the new
constitution which he had promised to publish before December 20, but
it was withdrawn without explanation.^^
It was officially announed on December 18 that Mr. Bhutto
had been asked to return from New York immediately, and that on his
arrival "Power will be transferred to a representative government to
be formed under the new Constitution." On December 19 came the an-
nouncement of President Yahya Khan's "decision" to resign his office
as soon as he had handed over the government to the representatives
of the people.
Mr. Bhutto arrived in Rawalpindi on the morning of December
20 and drove immediately to the President's house amid the cheers of
thousands of his supporters. About two hours later it was announced
that he had been sworn in as President and Chief Martial Law Adminis-
trator. On the same day, December 20, Bhutto addressed the nation.
In a broadcast lasting nearly an hour he promised revenge for Pakis-
tan's "temporary humiliation," and also pledged himself to restore
democracy and to introduce political and social reforms.^^
Zulfiqar A1 i Bhutto became the military establishment's
choice to head a new government. For the time being, at least, the
The Constitution was largely concerned with provisions for
autonomy for East Pakistan and was therefore already out of date.
26
Mr. Bhutto was representing Pakistan in the U.M. General As-
sembly as the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister appointed by
Yahya Khan during the crisis situation in East Pakistan.
27
"President Bhutto's Broadcast to the Nation, in The Dawn,
December 21
,
1 971
.
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military had had its fill of politics. Bhutto had demonstrated that
he was the outstanding politician of West Pakistan and the leader of
its majority party. He had also cultivated strong ties with the
military elite. It was, therefore, no surprise that the military
turned to him to lead the country in the aftermath of its worst defeat
Bhutto had before him the enormous tasks of stabilizing the
internal political situation, salvaging a battered economy, and re-
storing a sense of confidence and purpose to people whose morale had
been severely shaken. In addition, on the Western front Pakistani
territory was under India's possession and 93,000 of her soldiers
were in India as POWs. The security of what remained of the country had
to be safeguarded, and its badly tarnished image renovated. To all
these problems, Bhutto applied himself with enormous personal energy.
By frequent dramatic public appearances, he rallied popular
support for his leadership and programs. The most important political
decision which he took by getting the consent of the people at a pub-
lic meeting was the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
It had been Bhutto's style seemingly to dramatize the demands
and desires of the Pakistani nation. He always wanted it to appear as
President Bhutto announced his decision to release him at a
public meeting in Karachi's Nishter Park on January 3, 1972. Bhutto's
decision was hailed by The Dawn in an editorial entitled "Great Ex-
pectations," January 5, 1972. Mujib's unconditional release was widely
acclaimed by Wali Khan (President, NAP), Ajmal Khetak (NAP Joint
Secretary), Mulani Mufti Mahmuod (General Secretary, J.U.I.), Bizanjo
(Baluchistan NAP), Akbar Bugti, Sardar Shaukat Hayat (President, Punjab
Muslim League). In addition, the Guardian
,
the Daily Telegraph
,
the
Daily Mai 1 wrote editorials, praising Bhutto for his wise move. U.S.
Department of State termed the release of Sheikh Mujib an act of
statesmanship.
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if he was only carrying out the dictates of his people. Some form of
public sanction was sought prior to virtually all delicate negotia-
tions. This had been particularly true in relations with India and
Bangladesh. Bhutto used his intelligence and popularity to good ad-
vantage in dealing with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the summer of
1972.
Xhe Question o f the Pakistani Territories at the Western
Front and the Question of PQWs for Bhutto
After becoming the President of Pakistan, Bhutto's initial
foreign policy moves were designed to revive morale at home as well as
to obtain external acceptance and support before beginning the in-
evitably difficult negotiations with India. He appeared genuinely to
accept the verdict of 1971 and adopted a relatively conciliatory line
toward India and Bangladesh, except for a probably ritualistic revival
of propaganda on the Kashmir question. The Army itself had surren-
dered in East Pakistan, so there was not the question of their not ac-
cepting the verdict. By way of insurance, Bhutto was careful not to
antagonize the Army and public opinion by moving too rapidly toward
reconciliation with India.
Bhutto's past rhetoric and his traditional stand against com-
promising with India, was the biggest handicap in negotiating for
peace in the subcontinent. The changed situation and tragic circum-
stances had compelled him to show some flexibility in his well-known
animosity towards India. After assuming the responsibil ity he had two
major tasks in front of him: return of the POWs and getting back the
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territory in West Pakistan now in Indian possession.
The families of the POWs were getting impatient. Punjab was
the most badly affected area as the great number of the army personnel
came from this province. Feelings were conveyed by arranging demon-
strations, and sending memoranda to the government. That was not
only the most important but very touchy problem because a great many
families in the Punjab were affected by it. The spate of demonstra-
tions by relatives of POWs greeted Bhutto as he went round the country
after taking over as President. It is possible that at that time these
demonstrations were engineered by his political opponents. To under-
mine his popularity, this was a very appropriate and timely move on
their part. But these demonstrations cooled down as time passed, and
also his threat to quit unless the agitation stopped had some effect.
Some newspapers also came out with criticism of these activities and
they wrote editorials about the sensitivity of the matter. The Pakis-
tan T imes said:
Those who are pressing the present regime to secure instant
repatriation of POWs and civilians should not shut their eyes
to the vital issues at stake. No patriotic Pakistani would
want Mr. Bhutto to go cap in hand to New Delhi to secure the
release of prisoners
.
Signing a peace with India was not the only problem facing
Bhutto, but the strings attached to it were worth considering too.
India insisted on Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh before any talks
29
POWs repatriation rally in Pindi; see the report in The Dawn,
February 5, 1972.
30
The Pakistan Times
,
February 10, 1972.
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could start. Even the return of the POWs was based on this condition.
The question of Bangladesh was a highly emotional one in Pakis-
tan. It was the common understanding among the masses that the recog-
nition of Bangladesh meant the repudiation of the "Two Nation Theory."
It was a very hard fact to be accepted, as Pakistan was founded on the
basis of this theory. At the same time, most other countries had al-
ready recognized Bangladesh, thus pressuring Pakistan to do the same.
Bhutto, though very much under internal and external pressure
to seek peace with India in order to get the POWs back, tenaciously
refused to give in. He personally was in favor of recognizing Bangla-
desh but could not do so until he was sure that public opinion would
accept it.
Bhutto made many speeches all over the country making people
understand the reality of the events, but at the same time he pledged
that he would not compromise national honor in the process. The only
course to follow was to seek an accommodation with India on the basis
of a "just and honorable settlement. He prepared people gradually
for the move he was about to make, peace with India. At Lahore, at a
big public rally, he made a plea for peace in order to obtain the
31 M
"India's Terms for Talks," The Dawn
,
January 14, 1972. Mrs.
Gandhi said while addressing a public meeting in New Delhi that Pakis-
tan should hold direct peace negotiations but she indicated they must
be based on recognition of an independent Bangladesh. Indian Foreign
Minister Swaran Singh told a rally in Jullundhar that India was ready
to resume diplomatic relations with Pakistan, provided President Bhutto
adopted a realistic attitude towards the new realities of the subconti-
nent, including the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. The Dawn,
January 3, 1972.
32
The address to the PPP workers at Larkana on January 7, 1972,
and the address to the National Assembly on April 14, 1972.
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peopl e
' s approval
.
But at the same time he also said:
A strong
feated.
day of a
kal . 33
Pakistan will emerge. Our nation has not been de-
I shall not forget the words of Tipu Sultan that nnplion s existence is worth a hundred years of a jac-
While Bhutto was facing the pressure for and against the peace
efforts, Mrs. Gandhi was also under a different sort of pressure. A
decisive military victory had raised expectations that India could at
last settle to its satisfaction all disputes with Pakistan. Both leaders
tried to guide public opinion towards greater realism. In the beginning
little success was seen, as the popular attitudes had so hardened over
years of political confrontation that it was impossible to dampen mutual
hostility in the short run.
A change was felt among the masses in Pakistan as the newspapers
carried editorials and articles in favor of a detente. An article pub-
lished in p^n^ by Mazhar A1 i Khan urged the need for normalization of
relations with India so that "the grim past can be forgotten and we can
learn to live together on the basis of mutual help and trust. An-
other well-known political observer, S.R. Ghouri
,
argued that "even if
the idea of confederation was unacceptable, India and Pakistan could
cooperate in the economic and political fields.
The leftist political leaders, especially of NAP, spoke in favor
of peace with India. Among those, Wali Khan's opinion is worth mention-
^^The Dawn, April 21, 1972.
34
Ibid., March 14, 1972; also, S.R. Ghouri 's article of January
6, 1972: " India-Pakistan Conflict: International Dimensions."
35
Ibid.
,
March 3, 1972.
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ing. He, 1n an Interview with the IndiarLjMress correspondent
B.K. Tiwari, said that "India has a significant role to play in the
subcontinent-U should make a magnanimous and generous contribution
towards peace."36 All these opposition leaders while talking in favor
of the peace talks, asked India to take the initiative because, as they
said, "victory puts it in a position to set the pace."
36
March Tiwari," The Indian Express
chapter V
SHIFT IN POLICY
Mr. Bhutto's Tradi tion a!
after 1971
Stand and His
Towards India
New Stand
When Mr. Bhutto took over as President he described the situa-
tion as a "total crisis." Pakistan itself had been reduced from one-
fifth of the size of India to one-tenth. It had lost 54 percent of its
population. It was no longer the "largest Islamic power" in the world.
It was a smaller Muslim country than Bangladesh. It had fewer Muslims
than India had.
Bhutto had to pass through the hardest experience of his coun-
try's history. He was heir to partition, disintegration, opportunism,
religiously cloistered outlooks of large parts of the community, social
injustice and mounting economic problems. Considering this situation,
it was not without some significance that Mr. Bhutto stated that con-
frontation with India was no longer a viable policy. This statement
by Mr. Bhutto not only marks a change in his policy of confrontation
with India, but also reveals an altered structural change in geopoliti-
cal relationship within the subcontinent.
Bhutto, for many years, had passionately advocated a policy of
vigorous confrontation against India. ^ He fell out with President Ayub
^See Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1969).
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Khan precisely on this point, as he felt that Ayub had thrown away
the initiative at Tashkent by abandoning confrontation in favor of
moderation. He had been very consistent, and argued that he stood for
confrontation because in his judgment that was practical politics in
terms of the military balance. He believed Pakistan could have walked
into Kashmir in 1962 when India was engaged in hostilities with China.
The balance was still in Pakistan's favor in 1965.^ The events of 1971
resulted in a decisive military verdict in India's favor. This com-
pelled Bhutto to bring a change in his past ideas of confrontation
with India, as in the face of superior military strength of India,
Pakistan could no longer hope for a successful military settlement.
He proved himself a realist before the world when he adopted
a realistic attitude with the changing reality of the subcontinent.
By a study of the events, one reaches the conclusions that Bhutto's
policy of abandonment of confrontation was based on a careful con-
sideration of the objective reality. Possession of the large tracts
of land and a big number of soldiers in Indian prison camps did not
allow Pakistan any bargaining leverage. It was obvious that if steps
were not taken in proper directions, and also at proper times, Pakis-
tan might be pushed to the wall and made to sign what it regarded as
an unequal treaty. Bhutto's attitude changed after the secession of
Bangladesh. He not only accepted the reality, but also tried to make
people understand his point of view in this changed situation. His
interviews with the foreign press and especially with the Indian
"Bhutto's Interview with the B.B.C.," published in The Dawn,
February 18, 1972.
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journalists are an example of this marked change.
The strange thing in this whole process was his new stand on
the Kashmir problem. His statements on Kashmir, before signing the
Simla Agreement, and after that, are contrary to what he had been say-
mg in the past. About Jammu and Kashmir he once argued that.
If a Muslim majority area can remain a part of India thenthe raison d’etre of Pakistan collapses Pak s;an
continue unremittingly her struggle for'the'right o^selfdetermination of this subject-people. Pak^sCn is incom^
^og\cciUy^ Kashmir both terri torial ly and ideo-
But after 1971, he came up with new formulations on the subject: he
seemed to delegate the responsibility for determining the right of self
determination to Kashmiris themselves.^ He has even given an indica-
tion about adopting the concept of a "soft-frontier" between India and
Pakistan. "We can make the ceasefire line a line of peace. Let the
people of Kashmir move between the two countries freely. One thing can
lead to another.
.
. .
It doesn't mean that Bhutto is abandoning Pakistan's claim on
Kashmir; he rather seems to try ways other than war. Three wars in the
region and all on Kashmir have proved unsuccessful in solving the dis-
pute, and now especially when the military balance is not in favor of
Pakistan, Bhutto didn't want to continue with the old rhetoric and the
policy of confrontation. It wasn't Bhutto's own choice to change his
^Bhutto, p. 180.
4
See Dilip Mukerjee, p. 215.
5
"Interview with Kuldip Nayyar," cited by B.G. Verghese, in
An End to Confrontation (Bhutto's Pakistan) (Delhi: S. Chand & Co..
1972), p. 78.
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policy. It was the dictate of the events that compelled him to do so.
Indian and Pakistani sUten^nJ^m^^ Inclination was found
in Bhutto's attitude for talks with India soon after he assumed respon-
sibility as President of Pakistan. He showed his willingness to enter
into negotiations with India "on the outstanding India-Pakistan disputes
on the basis of justice and fair play." He emphasized; "If the Indian
government and its people want to live a peaceful and honorable life
we also want to do the same," and "let us work towards the betterment
Of the lot of the common people in both the countries."^
Realizing the need for both countries to enter into negotia-
tions with each other, Bhutto emphasized that India should not insist
on any preconditions.^ He said that the return of POWs to Pakistan
could make a good starting point for negotiations with India. ^ The
Indian response, however, came officially on January 12 when the Indian
delegate, Mr. Samar Sen in a note to the U.N. Secretary General Wald-
heim, stated that India was prepared to hold bilateral negotiations
with Pakistan on mutual troop withdrawals on the Western and Kashmir
fronts. The Indian troops would be withdrawn from Bangladesh only
when the governments of India and Bangladesh thought it desirable.
President Bhutto told a press conference on the same day that
there would be no point in discussing any settlement if India imposed
3, 1972
0
Address to a public meeting at Nishtar Park, Karachi
,
February
^
The Dawn
,
January 14, 1972.
g
Address to the people in Peshawar on January 15, 1972.
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preconditions on the withdrawal of her troops from '’East or West Pakis
tan," or on the repatriation of prisoners of war.^
After the exchange of a few statements from both sides, show-
ing their inclination to hold the negotiations, India delivered an-
other note to the U.N. Secretary General announcing that Indian troops
would leave Bangladesh by March 25, 1972. On February 14, Mr. Sen
said that India was prepared to have direct talks with Pakistan "at any
time, at any level, and without preconditions." Before that, Moscow
had also shown its willingness to "initiate Indo-Pakistan talks if
both countries so desired.
But this time, the two countries did not seem so willing to
involve any third country on the pattern of Tashkent. All India Radio
broadcast a report, with reference to a foreign correspondent, on
February 15, that India would give due consideration to "any request"
from President Bhutto to hold talks with Mrs. Gandhi. But, it said
no request of this nature had been received either directly from
Pakistan or through some third party. Indian officials said also
that India wanted to release the Pakistani POWs, but could not afford
to send home nearly 100,000 trained soldiers unless Pakistan ended the
state of war with India.
The opening of negotiations was delayed by a number of factors.
9
"President Bhutto's Press Conference," The Dawn, January 13,
1972.
^^
The Dawn
,
January 15, 1972.
Report through Reuter, quoted by All India Radio (AIR),
February 15, 1972.
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the most important of which was Pakistan's refusal to recognize Bangla-
desh. The Pakistan government was anxious to secure the release of the
prisoners of war who had surrendered in Bangladesh, but the Indian
government maintained that as they had surrendered jointly to the In-
dian Army and the Mukti Bahini, Bangladesh must take part in any nego-
tiations on this question.
President Bhutto appealed to India to release the POWs without
linking them to the other issues between the two countriesj^ and
showed his consent to negotiations, saying that he was looking forward
to negotiations with the Indian government and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman repeatedly rejected the offer of talks with
Bhutto unless Pakistan first recognized Bangladesh
.
The Indian offer to hold talks came on February 19, when a
formal offer was made by Indian representati ves at the U.N. through
the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Waldheim. India offered to conduct
direct talks with Pakistan, "at any time, at any level, and without
preconditions" to ensure "durable peace and stability in the subconti-
1
5
nent.
"
Simultaneously, the same thing was repeated by Mr. D.P. Dhar,
Chairman of the political planning body of the External Affairs Minis-
Mrs . Gandhi, however, rejected this request on March 19 stating
that the question of the prisoners of war "is linked with our security."
1
3
President Bhutto's broadcast on March 3, 1972.
14 .
Sheikh Mujib's interview to UPI, on February 19, and his
statement on March 19, 1972.
^^See The Dawn
,
February 20, 1972.
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try in Prague and Paris, where he was visitingJ^
Bhutto welcomed the Indian offer of talks but at the same time
he reiterated the need of peace based on justice and mutual respect.
He said, "this country would never accept a dictated peace that would
compromise its honor."'®
Finally, both countries agreed on a summit level meeting
between them. In a letter dated April 7, Mrs. Gandhi suggested an
emissaries level meeting to prepare the ground for the summit level
meeting. Bhutto agreed to the summit meeting in a reply to Mrs. Gandhi
on April 10, 1972. His reply was welcomed in New Delhi with the ex-
pectation of an emissary level meeting by the end of April.
Preliminary mo ve s for Indi a-Paki stan summit meeting
. India and Pakistan
were in direct touch with each other through diplomatic channels. Ex-
change of notes went on through the Swiss Embassy and finally a deci-
sion was reached for the talks between special emissaries of the two
governments to be opened on April 26 at Murree, a hill station about
twenty miles north of Rawalpindi.
Bhutto indicated that the problem Pakistan especially wanted
to take up at the Murree talks was that of the prisoners of war, and
that he was prepared to send back the Indian prisoners "even if India
^^Mr. D.P. Dhar said in Prague that India wanted lasting peace
with Pakistan. In Paris, he said, "The Indian government would welcome
President Bhutto with an open mind and open arms." In The Dawn, Febru-
ary 22 and 23, 1972.
^^"Bhutto's Interview to AFP," in The Dawn
,
February 23, 1972.
^^"Bhutto's Speech in Lahore," in The Dawn, March 20, 1972.
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does not do the same."^^
These talks were carried out successfully without any inter-
ruption or deadlock. India felt the need to consult Bangladesh as
It was embarking on a very important mission of its relations with
Pakistan. Before coming to Pakistan, Mr. D.P. Dhar flew to Dacca for
talks with Mujib with a message from Mrs. Gandhi.
The talks were opened on April 26. The Indian delegation was
led by Mr. Dhar, Chairman of the policy planning committee of the Ex-
ternal Affairs Ministry, and the Pakistani delegation by Mr. Aziz
Ahmed, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Talks
continued until April 27 and the joint statement was issued on April
30. President Bhutto was consulted at one point when Mr. Ahmed, dis-
agreeing with Mr. Dhar, returned to Rawalpindi for consultations. It
was believed that Aziz Ahmed had been unwilling to accept an Indian
proposal that Kashmir should be included in the agenda for the summit
talks, but was overruled by President Bhutto. Mr. Dhar also had a
separate meeting with Mr. Bhutto.
The joint statement announced agreement on the modalities of
a meeting between President Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi which was to be held
in New Delhi towards the end of May or at the beginning of June, and
O 1
defined the subjects to be discussed. To create a better situation
for the coming summit meeting, India and Pakistan decided to stop the
1
9
Bhutto's sworn-in speech as President under the interim con-
stitution on April 21, 1972.
20
The Dawn
,
April 20, 1972.
21
Text of the Joint Statement," in The Dawn
,
May 1, 1972.
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propaganda campaign against each other. India acted on that before
the Murree talks started, and Pakistan was informed about its decision
on May 22. The proposal went into effect on May 25.
By April, Bhutto was in a strong
enough position to respond affirmatively to Mrs. Gandhi's suggestion of
summit talks to settle outstanding problems in the subcontinent. More-
over, he was under heavy pressure to secure the return of border ter-
ritories held by Indian forces and the release of 93,000 Pakistani
prisoners of war. Mrs. Gandhi was reluctant to release these POWs as
she did not want to add to the strength of Pakistan forces until India
had reason to believe that the two countries would live in peace.
After assuming the office. President Bhutto effectively em-
ployed personal diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy and suc-
ceeded in winning an overwhelming political and diplomatic support
from the countries of the Middle East for Pakistan's stand on the
unresolved issues emanating from the War of December 1971. In January
1972, Mr. Bhutto visited eight countries of the region. The support-
ing statements from these countries at that moment of despair not only
helped in raising the morale of the nation, but also indicated the new
trends in Pakistan's foreign policy after the secession of East Pakis-
tan .
After reaching an agreement at Murree for the talks with Mrs.
Gandhi in June, Mr. Bhutto again set off for the whirlwind tour of the
remaining Muslim states of the Middle East and Africa to complete his
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personal mission to the fraternal Muslim states west of Pakistan.
Purpose Of this tour was mainly to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on
India to adopt a reasonable attitude in the matter of Pakistani POWs.
Another objective was to bring a message home that after the tragic
events of the 1971 War, Pakistan was not left alone in the interna-
tional arena. President Bhutto visited fourteen countries from May 29
to June 10.^^
Talks were delayed, as both Mr. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi made a
number of visits to foreign countries. With the consent of both
countries, it was agreed that the talks would open on June 28 in New
Delhi.
In the meantime, most of the joint communiques issued after
President Bhutto's talks with the leaders of the countries he visited
expressed full support for Pakistan's demands for the repatriation of
the POWs and the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops in Kashmir
to the position which they occupied before December 1971. Those is-
sued in Lebanon, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, however, merely expressed the
hope that President Bhutto's meeting with Mrs. Gandhi would prove
22
Bhutto's announcement of May 7, 1972.
23
Countries visited were the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait
(May 29), Iraq (May 30), Lebanon (May 30-31), Jordan (May 31 -June 1),
Saudi Arabia (June 1-3), Somalia and Ethiopia (June 3), Sudan (June 4),
Nigeria (June 4-5), Guinea (June 5), Mauritania (June 6), Turkey (June
6-8), and Iran (June 8-10).
24
Mrs. Gandhi, who was occupied with the pari iamentary session
until the end of May, was due to leave on June 13 for a twelve-day visit
to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Sweden.
25
Venue of the talks was changed later on from Delhi to Simla
because of a heat wave in the Indian capital.
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fruitful. Unlike the communiques issued during President Bhutto's
previous tour, none of them referred to the future relations between
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
On the home front, Bhutto had numerous meetings with people
from all walks of life. By doing so. Bhutto gave them the sense of
participating in decision making in the matter of talks with India.
During these meetings, Bhutto reiterated his pledge to go by the na-
tion's will at the Simla summit. Due to these gestures, Bhutto got
backing from the masses. Opposition parties did not try to under-
mine his efforts, as the atmosphere in the country was one of all-out
support for him. Mali Khan assured his full support to Bhutto on the
forthcoming summit.^®
A few good will gestures were shown for India, to remove the
111 will before entering into a dialogue. Bhutto announced the re-
patriation of those Indians who had been captured during the war.
Anti-India propaganda was completely stopped especially on Pakistan
radio and TV.
On the eve of leaving for Simla, Bhutto addressed the nation
on radio and television. He said Pakistan was prepared to resume
diplomatic relations with India, reopen communications, and resume
air services. He again showed his desire for talks with Sheikh Mujibur
2 6
Bhutto's Address to a gathering of lawyers, in The Dawn,
June 24, 1972.
27
Bhutto's mission backed by the masses, see The Dawn, June
20, 1972.
28
Ibid., June 28, 1972.
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Rahman, explaining that India had no "locus standi" in the matter of
relations between West Pakistan and "Muslim Bengal." and there could
be no talks on that subject on Indian soil. 29 By using the term "Mus-
lim Bengal" instead of "Bangladesh" or "East Pakistan" President
Bhutto avoided either recognizing or denying the independence of
Bangladesh, while emphasizing its Muslim character.
In the same broadcast, Bhutto summarized the thorough prepara-
tions he had made for the summit, a good illustration of his style of
democracy
.
In the last two weeks I have talked to leaders in every fieldto elected representatives, politicians of every shade of
opinion, Ulama, intellectuals, editors and journalists, law-yers, teachers, students, and laborers. I have also met the
comnianders of our armed forces. For the first time in thehistory of Pakistan, representati ves of all sections havebeen involved in matters of vital national concern at thehighest level ... .30
The Simla Meeting: Demands and Expectations of India
and Pakistan in the Simla Summit
Talks with India at Simla were not expected to be easy. Pakis-
tan, being a defeated country, was in a relatively weak position. In
the 1971 War India had decisively demonstrated its military superiority
and had all the important cards in hand, most important being Pakistani
territory and the prisoners of war. From among the big powers, India
had all-out support by the Soviet Union, whereas Pakistan's allies,
China and the U.S., had carefully stopped short of decisive support.
29
"President Bhutto's Broadcast to the Nation on June 28," in
T he Dawn
,
June 29, 1972.
in
United Nations, Pakistan got widespread support during the
crisis, which annoyed India but did not affect its decisions.
Being in a stronger position, India tried to exert pressure
on Pakistan. It was In a position to negotiate as the military victor.
Though Mrs. Gandhi insisted that she would not talk with Pakistan from
a position of strength,^! that did not change the prevailing situation.
India's victory over Pakistan had resulted in the improvement
of Us internal political atmosphere. It brought a sense of confidence
to the Indian nation. Mrs. Gandhi's position was again strengthened
with the Congress' overwhelming success in the state elections in
March. Third, and the most important consideration, was the Soviet
military and diplomatic backing-whose bitter fruit Pakistan had tasted
in the recent past.
Pakistan, on the other hand, was not free from internal dis-
sensions. Though Bhutto enjoyed the support and confidence of the
masses, labor unrest and language tensions threatened domestic peace.
Past experience of wars with India proved that they solved no prob-
lems, especially the Kashmir problem. Besides there wasn't much choice
left for Pakistan in settling the matter. There was some evidence
that the Soviet Union was trying to foment separatism in Pakistani
Baluchistan. Under these circumstances, Pakistan was compelled to come
to terms with India. There is no denying the fact that the task for
President Bhutto in the days before the Simla accord was formidable
31.
I, 1
32,.
'Mrs. Gandhi's Press Conference in Prague," New York Times,
June 21 972.
The Perils of Pakistan," Newsweek
,
April 10, 1972.
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and challenging, as the press, the political parties, and pressure
groups were vocal in their assertion that national honor should not
be compromised at the forthcoming summit.
Considering the strong Indian position at the negotiating table,
it was not beyond expectations that India could come up with the idea
of signing a no-war pact. This concept to outlaw the use of war, while
Indo-Pakistan disputes remained unresolved, had always been opposed in
Pakistan. From the very beginning, Bhutto had been rejecting any move
which suggested the no-war pact, and on many occasions he made it
clear that "In Pakistan, no-war pact means surrender
. But at the
same time, he did not rule out the possibility of considering a pact
if it contained a clause providing for the arbitration of disputes
which remained unresolved in bilateral negotiations.
Reduction in the armed force's size was another suggestion
that India might have brought up. But Bhutto had no intentions of
alienating the armed forces by committing himself to a reduction in
their size. An Indian suggestion along these lines would also be hard
to accept.
Kashmir was expected to be a tough point of discussion at
Simla. Bhutto's stand on Kashmir used to be quite unbending. But after
assuming office as the President, he made different formulations. In
early 1972, he was determined not to talk on Kashmir with India. He
^^"Bhutto Mounts the Plank," The Economist
,
April 15, 1972.
34
President Bhutto's speech at the university campus in Peshawar
on January 15. See Th e Dawn
,
January 16, 1972; and also Bhutto's inter-
view with Kuldip Nayyar, in The Statesman , March 25, 1972.
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said,
We are prepared to resolve all our bilateral differences Butwe cannot bargain state principles for human flesh. The right
nni- ho
of the people of Jammu and Kashmir hasot been bestowed on them either by India or Pakistan It istheir inherent right which no one can take away from them. 35
On another occasion, he said.
We have fought three wars on Kashmir; we cannot forget theKashmir dispute. Even if we forget the Kashmir dispute, the
not forget i t . 36people of Kashmir will
This represented an important change, for he was now saying that it was
up to the Kashmiris themselves to fight for their right of self-deter-
mination if they wanted a different future.
Struggle for self determination cannot be inspired from out-
side. Like revolution it cannot be exported. It has to be
an indigenous struggle. If the people of Kashmir believe
that they have been deprived of the right of self determina-
tion, they will rise. Their struggle will be basically theirs.
Outside support cannot solve their problems. 37
Turning to Indian perceptions regarding the problems of peace
making, the first point to note was the disinclination to deal with
them piecemeal. Pakistan argued for a step-by-step approach to the
many issues in dispute. India, which had favored the approach in the
past but had been rebuffed, now argued for a comprehensive and overall
settlement, covering both the long-standing disputes as well as those
arising out of the 1971 War.
This stand was understandable as India was worried and uncer-
35
President Bhutto's speech to the National Assembly, April 14,
1972.
36
Address to a public meeting in Lahore, see The Dawn, February
15, 1972.
37
Bhutto s interview with Dilip Mukerjee, cited in Mukerjee,
p. 215.
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tain about Pakistan's intentions. At the same time, she wanted to get
advantage of her superior position in the 1971 War. Mrs. Gandhi had
full support from all the parties on this stand. The extremist, Jan
Sangh party, in fact urged that there should be no return to the pre-
war status quo unless all outstanding issues were brought within the
sphere of overall settlement.^** Though other parties did not share
this extreme opinion, all of them wanted a final settlement so that
enduring peace could be established in the subcontinent.
India preferred to talk with Bhutto, who was coining as an
elected representati ve of the people, to talking with a military
39general. It also welcomed the change in Bhutto's attitude towards
India. It shared the view that Bhutto was emerging "as a more chas-
tened and more sober-minded politician than what he was in the old U.N.
days." It was suggested that India would lose nothing by taking
Bhutto at his word. At that time, he was India's best bet and India
did not want to let this opportunity slip from its hands. Another
consideration that might have influenced India was the prevailing un-
favorable international opinion against its intervention in East
Pakistan. Adverse votes in the U.N. General Assembly indicated that
India was fast losing international support and that it must change
its course.
38
"Resolution of the Jan Sangh General Council," The Times of
India
,
May 8, 1972.
39
See Mukerjee, p. 223.
^*^Frank Moraes' editorial in Indian Express
,
cited in Mukerjee,
p. 223.
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It was the first India-Paki stan dialogue at the highest level
since the Tashkent meeting.
The Simla Accord
--text of the aqreement--compari son of the Tashkent and
^_mla agreements. The summit conference between President Bhutto and
Mrs. Gandhi opened on June 28, 1972 in Simla. The talks were due to
end on July 1 , but were extended for one more day as no agreement was
reached until July 1. Bhutto and Gandhi were present in Simla but,
to begin with, the talks were actually conducted by officials; the
two delegations again being headed by Mr. Dhar and Mr. Ahmed. As ex-
pected, disagreement on many issues immediately arose as both countries
were holding opposite positions.
As already discussed, India wanted to settle all the prob-
lems in one package, so it proposed a treaty of friendship pledging the
two countries to abjure the use of force in settling disputes, to re-
frain from interference in each other's internal affairs, to desist
from seeking third-party intervention in the settlement of their dif-
ferences, and to renounce military alliances directed against each
41
other.
Pakistan wished to concentrate on such immediate issues as the
release of prisoners of war, the disengagement of troops, and the re-
sumption of diplomatic relations. It objected to the Indian proposal
on the ground that it would involve permanent acceptance of the divi-
sion of Kashmir and the withdrawal of the Kashmir dispute from the
*^^See the report on the negotiations in The Dawn
,
July 1
,
1972.
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United Nations.
The meeting lasted for five days. At that time it appeared that
the summit would end in failure. However, after much argumentation on
both sides, exchange of numerous drafts, and a last minute private meet-
ing between Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi, an agreement was reached on July 2,
1972. Both sides made eleventh hour concessions to produce a communique
when a declaration of their "agreement to disagree" was already being
drafted.
The agreement contained the main elements of the earlier Indian
drafts, but the wording was considerably modified to make it acceptable
to Pakistan. In particular, the clause referring to the ceasefire line
in Kashmir was rephrased to read: "The line of control resulting from
the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides
without prejudice to the recognized position of either side."
Text of the agreement .
I. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan
are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict
and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations
and work for the promotion of friendly and harmonious relations
and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so
that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and
energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of
thei r people.
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India
and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:
1. That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations shall govern the relations between the
two countries.
^^
The Dawn
,
July 2, 1972.
"^
The Economist
,
July 8, 1972.
^"^The text of the Simla Agreement is in The Dawn , July 3, 1972.
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4.
5.
That the two countries are resolved to settle their dif-
othf '^”<“^''^1 negotiationsor by any her peaceful means mutually agreed upon be-tween them Pending the final settlement of anyTf tUeproblems between the two countries, neither side shall
unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent
e organization, assistance or encouragement of any
acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful andharmonious relations.
reconciliation, good neighbor-liness and durable peace between them is a commitment byboth countries to peaceful coexistence, respect for each0 her s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on thebasis of equality and mutual benefit.
That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have
edeviled the relations between the two countries for
years shall be resolved by peaceful means,
mat they shall always respect each other's national
unity, territorial integrity or political independence.
II. Both Governments will take all steps within their
power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each
other. Both countries will encourage dissemination of such
information as would promote the development of friendly re-
lations between them.
III. In order progressi vely to restore and normalize re-
lations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed
that:
1. Steps shall be taken to resume communications--postal
,
telegraphic, sea, land, including border posts, and air
links including overflights.
2. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facili-
ties for the nationals of the other country.
3. Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields
will be resumed as far as possible.
4. Exchanges in the fields of science and culture will be
promoted in this connection, delegations from the two
countries will meet from time to time to work out the
necessary details.
IV. In order to initiate the process of the establish-
ment of durable peace, both Governments agreed that:
1. In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from
the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected
by both sides without prejudice to the recognized posi-
tion of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it,
unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal
i nterpretations . Both sides further undertake to refrain
from the threat or use of force in violation of this line.
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-
into forrp nf th?I ?
^ commence upon the entryr ce o this agreement and shall be completedwithin a period of 30 days thereafter.
"'Miet a
k
agreement will be subject to ratifir^tirm hwboth countries in accordance with their respective constUu-tional procedures and will come into force with effect from
changed^
instruments of ratification are ex-
VI. Both governments agree that their respective heads
and thaf in^thP^^
^ mutually convenient time in the future
will I
meantime, representatives of the two sides
fnlth
^ further the modalities and arrangementsor the establishment of durable peace and normalization of
relations, including the questions of repatriation ofprisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement
tions"^^*^^
Kashmir, and the resumption of diplomatic rela-
The Simla accord was hailed widely in both countries and also
by the international press. On his return home from Simla, Bhutto got
a warm welcome at the Islamabad and Lahore airports. He addressed the
people at the airports, and explained and defended his policy in the
National Assembly specially convened, to get a verdict from it in
favor of his policy. Bhutto described the Simla agreement as "more
.45than a communique." The Indian spokesman described it as "an agree-
ment of peace and cooperation."^^
In Pakistan, the opposition parties had mixed reactions. Arbab
Sikandar, Mufti Mahmood, Sardar Attaullah Mengal
,
Mahmooddul Haq Usmani
,
S.M. Zaffar (former law minister in the center), Khan Abdul Samad Khan
Achakzai all welcomed the agreement, saying, "though the accord did not
fulfill the aspirations of the people with regard to the repatriation
45
The Dawn
,
July 4, 1972.
46
Ibid.
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of ROWS it was a good beginning to end the continuous confrontation.
Wali Khan welcomed the agreement "on the whole under the existing
circumstances,
The rightists on the opposition benches rejected the accord
outright. Mr. Hamid Sarfraz, chief organizer of the Council Muslim
League criticized the accord, considering it, "a political victory of
India, and adding that Pakistan had lost "everything at the negotiat-
49mg table. Malik Ghularn Jilani, Secretary General of Tahrik
Istaqlal, said: "What Mr. Bhutto has signed in Simla was not a 'peace
document' but a 'surrender document' much worse than the one signed
by General Niazi in Dacca last December.
The same reaction came from India's opposition party, Jan
Sangh. Its leader, Atal Behari Vajpai, called it "an Indian sellout.
But it was welcomed by the Lok Sabha. All parties endorsed the agree-
ment (except Jan Sangh) saying that it set "an example for the other
areas in Asia to follow.
The same sentiments were shared by London, Washington, Moscow,
Peking, and by the U.N. General Secretary Kurt Waldheim. Abdus Samad
Azad, Bangladesh's foreign minister, welcomed the agreement between
47
48
49
50
51
52
Ibid.
Ibid., July 6, 1972.
Ibid.
,
July 4, 1972.
Ibid.
Ibid.
,
July 5, 1972.
Ibid, August 2, 1972.
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India and Pakistan as "a success towards achieving more success."”
Both Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Bhutto were accused by their oppo-
nents Of having entered into a secret agreement. But both of them
denied this al legation.
Analysis of th ej\greement and Its son
with the Tashkent Accord
The Simla agreement was signed under the circumstances when
Pakistan was reduced in its size after losing its East wing. Ninety-
three thousand of its soldiers and 6,139 square miles of its territor-
in the Punjab and Sind were in India's hands. Under these circum-
stances, Pakistan was without any effective bargaining power. India
had full control of the situation. Keeping these things in view, Pakis
tan could not have achieved more than what it got in Simla.
The agreement provided for a return to the status quo along
56the border, which meant that India exchanged for its smaller terri-
tories under Pakistani possession with the extensive Pakistani terri-
tories it had captured. India was more strict regarding the territory
it had captured in Kashmir. Its major gain in the talks was Pakistan's
acceptance of the line of control in Kashmir resulting from the cease-
^^Ibid.
,
July 5, 1972.
54
A.B. Vajpai's speech in Lok Sabha.
55
Mrs. Gandhi's press conference on July 12. Mr. Bhutto's
speech in the National Assembly on July 10. He said there had been
no secret agreement with India, and no compromise on principles; Pakis-
tan had not given up the principle that the right of self determina-
tion belonged to Kashmiris.
56
Clause IV, article 1.
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fire on December 17, 1971
. i„ the matter of settling the disputes
with each other, India also got Pakistan's acceptance to settle the
differences bilateral ly.“ The willingness was shown by both sides
to resume diplomatic relations and also to enter into trade and other
cultural activities.
The Tashkent and Simla agreements were signed in entirely dif-
ferent circumstances. In 1965, the fighting was limited to West Pakis-
tan, whereas in 1971 the war engulfed both the wings and resulted in
the separation of the Eastern wing. Pakistani and Indian positions in
the two meetings were different. Pakistan met India at Tashkent as an
equal. It was not a vanquished country in 1965. Pakistan was holding
1,617 square miles of Indian territory as compared to 446 square miles
of its own territory in Indian occupation. It was a united country.
President Ayub Khan was in a favorable position to talk on equal terms
with his Indian counterpart.
The agreement at Tashkent was made possible because of the
Soviet efforts. By doing so, Russia wanted to offset the growing
Chinese influence in the region. But after Tashkent, there was a sig-
nificant change in the political situation in Asia. The emergence of
Red China as a super power, and Pakistan's inclination towards her,
brought a change in Soviet policy. This was also due to the fact that
Pakistan showed very little interest in the "Asian Security Scheme"
proposed by Russia. This was quite a justification for Soviet Russia
^^Clause IV, article 2.
^^Clause I
,
article 2
.
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to discard its earlier neutral stance and establish close relations
with India. In a brief span of five years it supported India material-
1y as wel 1 as politically.
Despite this reorientation in Soviet policy. Us major objec-
tive remained the same: normalization of Indo-Pak relations, a step
towards its security scheme.
Under these circumstances, the study of the two agreements
becomes much easier. Succeeding paragraphs contain an analysis and
comparison of the similar provisions, which more or less have the same
spirit.
Nprmaljzat^^ If compare the two agreements, the prime
objective in their preambles to be found is the normalization of rela-
tions between the two countries. Both nations must strive hard for the
progress and welfare of their people. The only difference one can make
out is in the organization of the phrases. There was, however, the dif-
ference of approach in pursuance of matters to realize this common pur-
pose. At Tashkent, Pakistan's stand was that since Kashmir was the
basic cause of conflict, it should be settled first and the relations
be normalized subsequently, whereas India wanted normalization of the
relations first. Clauses V and VI of the agreement called for the
restoration of diplomatic, economic, and trade relations whereas the
"matters of direct concern" were to be discussed "at the highest and
other levels" in the future.
The Simla accord was a complete reversal of the attitudes of
both. Because of the changed position, Pakistan gave up its previous
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approach, whereas India, considerinn tho -h-i, g the time opportune, sought a pac-
kage deal on Kashmir. However it wac d.i • •n , was Pakistan's view which gained
ground. One thing common between Tashkent tho iidbnK and the Simla agreement is
that the settlement of basic Issues was left for future negotiations
between the two countries. This accord was described as President
Bhutto's major accomplishment in breaking Mrs. Gandhi's resolve to wrap
up all outstanding issues in package deals.
In short, both the agreements were aimed at normalizing rela-
tions and restoring economic, trade, communications, and cultural ex-
changes
.
BjJ_ateral jsm. Though the Tashkent declaration was signed under the
Soviet Union's guidance, it did not prevent Pakistan from raising the
Kashmir issue in the U.N. Pakistan made no such commitments under the
pact. Clause IX of the agreement calls for the continued meetings of
both countries on "matters of direct concern to both" whereas in Clause
II of the Simla accord, both parties are specifically committed to
settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotia-
tions, or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon by both
parties. This clause of the treaty raised much apprehension in Pakis-
tan regarding the position of the Kashmir dispute in the U.N. Even the
foreign press made comments that "Kashmir will cease to be an interna-
tional question. „61
59,
60
'One Summit that Worked," The Economist
,
July 8, 1972.
61
Ibid.
See The Guardian
,
July 8, 1972
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President Bhutto, while making the speech in the National As-
sembly, defended the accord and explained that it did not prevent Pakis-
tan from bringing the Kashmir dispute to the U.N. However, showing his
disappointment in the capabilities of the U.N. in solving the Kashmir
dispute, he emphasized that it was in the best interests of Pakistan
to have a foreign policy based on bilateralism and that we must give
bilateralism a chance as far as relations between India and Pakistan
r r\
were concerned. ^
Considering that the U.N. had failed to settle the matter, there
was perhaps no harm in exploring other possibilities. But as The
Economi st commented, "The acceptance of the Principle of Bilateralism
was one of the major concessions that Mrs. Gandhi won at Simla.
It may be argued that as long as the Simla accord subsists,
Pakistan is prevented from raising the matter in the world body. But
as Bhutto implied, if bilateral negotiations eventually fail, Pakistan
could declare that India was violating the "spirit" of Simla and take
the matter to the U.N. if that course of action appeared to promise
64
more advantageous results. It should also be noted that the Simla
agreement does not require Pakistan to withdraw the case from the U.N.
It keeps the matter dormant in the U.N. as long as bilateral negotia-
tions continue under the Simla accord.
r?
President Bhutto's speech in the National Assembly on July
14. The text is in The Dawn
,
July 15, 1972.
^^
The Economist
,
July 8, 1972.
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The Dawn, July 15, 1972.
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The principle of non-1 nte rference
. As happens in the world, all bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements and the principles of non-inter-
ference are always a formal expression, unless some particular agree-
ment is studied in the background of the existing conditions and the
prevailing attitudes of the parties concerned. The same is the case
with the Tashkent and Simla agreements. Clause III of the Tashkent
declaration says that, "the relations between India and Pakistan shall
be based on the principles of non-i nterference in the internal affairs
of each other." At Tashkent, India's position on Kashmir was that it
considered it a part of its territory and hence its internal matter.
According to this clause India could interpret Pakistan's acts of as-
sistance to the Kashmiri freedom fighters as interference in its in-
ternal matter. Clause I of the declaration states, "Jammu and Kashmir
were discussed and the two sides put forth their respective positions."
At Simla, India, after having achieved its aim of separating
East Pakistan, could conveniently agree to adhere to the principle of
non-interference and respect for what was left of Pakistan's territory.
As far as the question of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, Pakistan
did better in some ways, and worse in others, at Simla. India recog-
nized that part of Kashmir was under Pakistani control and undertook not
to do anything to change that situation. It also agreed that there was
a dispute regarding Kashmir which needed to be settled. On the other
hand, it took some more of the Pakistan side of Kashmir and kept it;
it did not return to the old ceasfire line. A final settlement of the
dispute was left to future negotiations at both Tashkent and Simla,
though the reference to Kashmir at Tashkent was left somewhat vague.
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In Tashkent, as well as in the Simla agreement,
force as a means of settling disputes was renounced by the signatories.
Clause I of the Tashkent declaration laid down that the parties "re-
affirm their obligation under the charter, not to have recourse to force
and to settle their disputes through peaceful means." In the Simla ac-
cord, Clause VI mentions that in accordance with tlie charter of the
United Nations they will refrain from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.
Both these agreements were described as "no war pacts" and sub-
jected to strong criticism. At Tashkent, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr.
Shastri
,
emphasized that the need for a no-war agreement was urgent.
Later, India gave its own interpretation of the clause, but Pakistan
firmly rejected India's i nterpretation
.
Return of the POWs . At Tashkent, Clause VII of the declaration dealt
with the release of the POWs. In that meeting repatriation of the
prisoners of war was not a problem. Release of the POWs was a side
issue which was resolved by the agreement between the two parties.
About 1,000 POWs held by both sides were released by the end of January
66
1966 .^^
At Simla the situation was different. The return of 93,000
POWs was one of the basic issues, the settlement of which was left to
a future summit.
India clearly violated the Geneva Conventions and the Security
Council Resolution of December 21, 1971 by delaying the repatriation of
66
See the report on the repatriation of the POWs in The Times ,
London, January 24, 1966.
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the POWs. It attached two conditions to their release. First it
insisted that as Pakistan’s forces in the eastern section had surren-
dered to the joint command of Indian and Bangladeshi forces, the
"Bangladeshi" forces must approve before anything could be done. And
to that effect, India reassured Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that it will not
release the POWs until Pakistan had accepted the reality of Bangladesh.
It was generally believed that in addition to securing Pakistan's recog-
nition of Bangladesh, it wanted to use the POWs as a means of pressuring
Pakistan into making a Kashmir settlement on its terms. For this the
world press criticized India.
Repatriation of the POWs proved to be a very hard task for
Pakistan. The view was held that the Simla agreement would soon fade
out and as there was no openness in the talks things would deteriorate.
The situation remained the same until the talks between the high offi-
cials of both countries finally started on July 24, 1973 at Rawalpindi.
"It took 19 days of hard and at times extremely difficult negotiations
at Rawalpindi and New Delhi to work out this settlement," as Mr. Aziz
Ahmed described it later.
This agreement came to be known as the Delhi agreement and had
the concurrence of the governments of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
Its main features were that India agreed to repatriate to Pakistan all
6 7
except 195 POWs. The date was to be fixed mutually by India and
Pakistan, as soon as arrangements for the transportation of these
^^
The Daily Telegraph
,
London, September 5, 1972.
^^The question of 195 POWs is discussed in Chapter VI.
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prisoners were made. Simultaneously, repatriation was also to begin,
of all Bengalis in Pakistan and a substantial number of non-Bengalis
in Bangladesh. The most significant feature of this agreement was "that
Bangladesh agreed in a spirit of reconciliation that the 195 POWs
would not be tried.
How did India agree to the solution of the problem? It was
partly the pressure of world opinion which disapproved the use of
POWs as hostages. There were also "economic liabilities, the non-
aligned conference that was to come (India and Bangladesh wanted to go
to the conference with clean hands), and then the General Assembly's
session which was to take place in October. There were a lot of
elements involved in the situation. They saved the Simla accord from
dying a premature death. Up to this moment Pakistan had resisted the
two pressure points of India and even the POWs were repatriated without
its recognition of Bangladesh. For that, Mr. Bhutto chose a very ap-
propriate moment, which was the Islamic summit held in February 1974 at
Lahore
.
Withdrawal of troops . In both the Tashkent and Simla agreements, there
are provisions for the pull out of the troops, but with certain funda-
mental differences. The Tashkent declaration calls for the withdrawal
of "armed personnel," while the Simla agreement calls for the pull out
of "India-Pakistan" forces. Under Clause II of the Tashkent declara-
tion, withdrawal to the position held prior to August 5, 1965 was to
68
"Aziz Ahmed's Press Conference," The Guardian
,
September 2, 1972.
69
Prime Minister Bhutto's interview with Newsweek, October 21,
1973.
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take place in all sectors including Jammu and Kashmir. The Simla agree
ment limited it to the international borders of India and Pakistan.
The former fixed February 25, 1966 as a deadline for the completion
of that task, whereas the latter sets a limit of 30 days to commence
from the day of its ratification. The reason for this difference lies
in the situation that prevailed at the time of the two agreements. At
Tashkent, India by agreeding to mutual withdrawal, was to move back
from territory across the 1949 ceasefire line in Kashmir, which it had
earlier said it would not give up. Disengagement of the forces mater-
ialized before the set deadline. It can be said to be the major
achievement of the Tashkent declaration for Pakistan.
Under the Simla accord, withdrawal was to take place on the
India-Pakistan border excluding the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir
The reasons are quite clear: Pakistan's relatively weak position at
Simla and the great differences of territorial gain and loss of each
side in the 1965 and 1971 wars. Without denying the possibility of
exaggeration from both sides, the fact remains that, in the 1965 War,
Pakistan successfully resisted an Indian attack and in Kashmir it was
in a fairly advantageous position. At Simla, the positions were re-
versed. It was India that had made significant gains across the inter-
national border and ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir.
One month after the ratification of the agreement the army
commanders of the two countries met in August, 1973, to draw the new
dotted line between them in Kashmir. According to that, each side
would keep what it had won in the December war, some 450 square miles
for the Pakistanis near Chamb. But everywhere else, they will go back
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to the border they crossed in December. The Indians were giving up more
than 5,000 square miles in Punjab and Sind in exchange for some 70
square miles held by Pakistan.
No doubt, by agreeing to withdraw. Mrs. Gandhi made a big con-
cession to Mr. Bhutto, but in return, she won two major concessions,
a promise to respect the new ceasefire line and an agreement to settle
disputes bilaterally.
Mshmir- Kashmir is the pivot to India-Pakistan relations, obvious
from the fact that the war of December 1971 began in East Pakistan but
ended in the West and in Kashmir. Again in the effort to reach a post-
war settlement, it was primarily Kashmir rather than "Bangladesh" which
proved to be the stumbling block.
While making comparison between the Tashkent and the Simla
agreements, Pakistan visibly gained nothing at Tashkent. Clause I of
the Tashkent declaration stated "that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed
and each of the sides put forth its respective positions." This shows
that the discussion took place at Tashkent, that the declaration did
not recognize Jammu and Kashmir as a dispute (for these is no indica-
tion of it), and that the discussion ended without any agreement between
the two sides or any concessions from either side. Pakistan stuck to
its position that Kashmir was a disputed area and India remained firm in
its stand that Kashmir was India's internal problem and, therefore, non-
negoti able.
Despite all inferences and interpretations of the vague clause,
the fact remains that the agreement neither resolved the basic issues.
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nor did it make a start towards its settlement. The non-recognition
of the existence of the Kashmir problem in the clause, consolidated
India's position and enabled it to interpret Pakistan's future assis-
tance to the people of Kashmir as interference in its internal affairs
On the other hand, Pakistan made no commitment under the declaration.
At Simla the customary attitudes of India and Pakistan to a
peace settlement were completely reversed. India, as the stronger
party, sought a settlement of the Kashmir issue once and for all in
its favor. It was Pakistan who now demanded that the peripheral is-
sues be taken up first and the Kashmir problem left in cold storage.
Many questions were raised about the Simla accord. Is there
any undertaking by Pakistan regarding Kashmir? Was there a secret
agreement between President Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi on the fate of
Kashmir? Mr. Bhutto many times clearly explained his position and
repeatedly asserted that he had not entered into any secret deal with
India. Besides, secret agreements in a democratic era seldom create
binding obligations on the parties. Both the leaders must have been
aware of this fact.
The Simla summit nearly ended in a deadlock on the Kashmir
issue. The situation was saved when the two leaders succeeded in
finding a new language and a new outlook which enabled them to reach
an agreement highly abstract in character. It provides that in Jammu
and Kashmir the "line of control" resulting from the ceasefire on
December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice
to the recognized positions of either side.
It clearly emerges that the two sides agreed to disagree on
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Kashmir but resolved to work on a permanent solution for the problem.
By removing the issue from international surveillance, the two parties
agreed to a prolonged freezing of the entire dispute. By ruling out
war in the areas they expressed their willingness to preserve the
status quo, since no other course was really open to Pakistan. How-
ever. neither India nor Pakistan formally abandoned their claims to
Kashmir, which was declared to be a disputed issue.
When It came to actual implementation of the pact, neither
side was prepared to concede much. Hence varying interpretations of
that fact were advanced. India insisted that by agreeing to the bi-
lateral approach, Pakistan had conceded removal of the Kashmir dispute
from the international arena to reach a bilateral settlement without
interference. Pakistan interprets the clause in another manner:
. .
. and when we have agreed to have bilateral negotiations
with India it is on the basis of a principle and of the United
Nations resolutions. Therefore, when we agreed to enter into
1 1 ateral negoti ati ons
,
we did not in any way compromise our
position.
Differences over the role of the United Nations have found prac-
tical expression in the attitude of the two sides to the ceasefire line
and the military observers in Kashmir. In view of the new dispensa-
tion, the Indians claim that the U.N. observers here have no role to
perform, especially when the two parties have agreed to respect the
line of control. But the Indians have made no official request to the
U.N. Secretary General to withdraw the observers. Any move to secure
the removal of the observers would involve Security Council action and
^^President Bhutto's speech in the National Assembly on July 14,
1 972.
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with China a permanent member of the council, supporting Pakistan's
stand on the ceasefire line, the Indian government would prefer not to
raise the issue. India's insistance for the securing of recognition
of the line of control in Kashmir is significant to indicate its mo-
tives. This is that through usage the line should acquire the status
of an international boundary.
Summing up the preceding analysis it can be said that as with
the Tashkent declaration, the Simla accord also puts off the basic
disputes for future negotiations. Insofar as Kashmir is concerned, the
Tashkent agreement was not a step forward, whereas the Simla accord was
a step towards a new direction. Despite certain basic differences
both agreements contain about the same material on peace and harmony
in the relations between the two countries. Both envisage steps to
be taken to normalize relations and, most critical of all, both leave
the Kashmir dispute unsolved.
CHAPTER VI
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SIMLA AGREEMENT
mhdra wal of Forces from Each Other’s Territories
--^^^j^^Cment of the Ceasefire Line in KashmTr
and
Signing of the accord was just a small step towards the comple-
tion of the most difficult task that was yet to be dealt with. The
agreement had no problem in getting approval from the legislative as-
semblies of the two countries; it was approved by the respective as-
semblies immediately by an overwhelming majority.^
Though the formalities involved in its ratification were car-
ried out quickly, some difficulties arose at the time of its implemen-
tation. Provisions regarding the withdrawal of forces, which were to
be carried out within thirty days, could not be implemented because of
a sudden change in India s attitude. Contrary to the Simla agreement,
India made the withdrawal of forces along the international border con-
ditional upon agreement on the line of control in Kashmir.
India's triumphant emergence from the war gave her an upper
hand over Pakistan. Her territorial gains were more than what Pakistan
had occupied during the war. By returning the 5,139 square miles of
the territory occupied in Sind and Punjab, India was doing a favor to
Pakistan, who was giving up only 69 square miles of the Indian terri-
Pakistan's National Assembly gave its approval on July 15,
1972, whereas in India, Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha approved it on August
1 and 3, 1972. Instruments of ratification were exchanged on August 4,
1972.
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tory. Disparity was also greater in the Kashmir sector, where India
was definitely in a better position than Pakistan. It was not unex-
pected that India, due to her superior military position and strong
bargaining power, tried to take advantage of the situation.
This was the appropriate time for India to get the most out
of Pakistan, especially in Kashmir where the question of the delinea-
tion of the ceasefire line was yet to be settled. The indication of
some possible delay came when Swaran Singh articulated India's new
2
stand. His statement was clear enough to convey the real motives
of India, which was not ready to exchange the captured territory along
the rest of the border of India and Pakistan if no agreement could be
reached on delineation of the Kashmir ceasefire line.
India moved further and emphasized the removal of U.N. ob-
servers. According to it, they had no role to play, as the old cease-
fire line was "obliterated" in the December war.^ This wasn't a new
move in Indian policy. Since long, India had been persistent in its
policy of declaring Kashmir an integral part of India: therefore non-
negotiable. Removal of the U.N. observers would not only have
strengthened its position, but also would have thrown the Kashmir ques-
tion into cold storage.
Pakistan refused to accept this condition.^ It seemed that the
Simla agreement was just impossible to carry out. There was no flexi-
2
Swaran Singh's address to the Parliament on August 5, 1972.
3
Swaran Singh's statements on August 26, 29, and September 3,
1972.
^"Mr. Bhutto's Statement," The Dawn
,
September 4, 1972,
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b1l1ty in the attitudes of the two countries on the matter.
Efforts were, however, made to settle the question by negotia-
tions. Commanders from both the countries met to decide on the methods
and procedures for the delineation of the line of control in Kashmir.
^
This was just the beginning of their protracted meetings, which re-
sulted in nothing. Due to the failure of the commanders in reaching
any agreement, the matter was brought to the official level. Talks be-
tween the Indian and Pakistani representatives solved nothing. The
situation remained the same--their joint statement was nothing more
than the reaff i rmation of the Simla agreement.^
When the talks were completely bogged down and it was felt
that the commanders were unable to solve the complicated question of
the delineation, the matter was taken up by the Chiefs of Staff. The
initiative was taken by Pakistan this time and a new series of meetings
took place. ^ Most of the work was completed during these talks, and
when it was expected that the maps and delineation proceedings would
be signed, a dispute over a village called "Thakur Chak" arose unex-
pectedly.
The Pakistani side maintained that as the village was in Jammu
and had been held by the Pakistani forces at the ceasefire they should
retain control in accordance with the provision of the Simla agreement,
5
The first meeting between the two commanders took place on
August 10-12 and August 21-22, 1972.
"The Joint Statement," The Dawn
,
August 30, 1972.
^Pakistani and Indian Chiefs of Staff were General Tikka Khan
and General Manekshaw, respectively, who met from October 14-18, 1972.
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which said that both sides were to respect the line of control result-
ing from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971
India came up with its own interpretation of the clause and
contended that this clause applied only to the line separating Indian-
held from Pakistani-held Kashmir. As Thakur Chak lay on the border of
Jammu and Pakistan, it was covered by the provision of the agreement
that "Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of
the international border.^
Now the matter was more political rather than strategic. Pakis
tan hardened its attitude towards accepting the decision which India
arbitrarily wanted to impose on it. Pakistan, by sensing India's in-
terest in that small tract of land, tried to bargain. Pakistan was
ready to withdraw its claim to Thakur Chak if it was adequately com-
pensated with territory elsewhere along the line of control.^ The work
of the delineation was almost completed by this time. India was will-
ing to carry out the withdrawal of the troops, proposing to settle the
Thakur Chak dispute later on, but Pakistan refused the proposal.
Deadlock had to be broken somehow, as the talks were not lead-
ing anywhere. After a long exchange of correspondence between the
Chiefs of Staff, the decision was taken to meet again. The matter was
settled after long discussions and as later on declared by both the
governments, the dispute was solved by the spirit of "give and take."
Though Pakistan abandoned its claim to Thakur Chak, it was interested
g
General Manekshaw's
The Dawn
,
November 3, 1972.
i nterpretation of the clause is reported in
The foreign office spokesman's statement on November 2, 1972.
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in getting its own two villages back. Two main tactical features
dominating the Jhelum Valley Road-Dhum and Dhirkot-were received
1n exchange. India described this exchange as "a gesture of good
will." whereas Pakistan called it "the victory of principle."”
The agreement which was reached in 122 days constituted an im-
portant milestone in implementing the Simla agreement. The withdrawal
of Indian and Pakistani troops from the territory on either side of
the international border began on December 13 and was completed on
December 20, 1972.
R^urr^ofjhe The most important and at the same time very dif-
ficult problem faced by Pakistan was related to the return of its
prisoners of war. Pakistan as a defeated country had no bargaining
power to bring 93,000^^ of its soldiers back. From the beginning,
Pakistan persuaded India to repatriate the POWs under the terms of the
Geneva Convention. India, however, wished to use the prisoners as
a leverage in persuading Pakistan to formally recognize Bangladesh.
But outwardly, it took the position that it could not release the
prisoners without the consent of Bangladesh.
Pressure was mounting on Bhutto to get the POWs back, as their
families started getting impatient. Many committees were formed inside
^^Swaran Singh's speech in Lok Sabha
,
December 12, 1972.
^^Mr. Aziz Ahmed's press conference on December 12, 1972.
12 .
Indian Defense Minister, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, gave the number of
Pakistan POWs on April 14, 1972, as 75,323 and on May 2, as 91,634. The
latter figure included para-mi 1 i tary personnel and civilian internees.
The number declared by Pakistan was 637, all of them captured at the
Western front.
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the country which organized demonstrations and sent delegations to
see the President and foreign dignataries. Most of these demonstrations
were organized by the opposition parties. But there is little doubt
about the fact that the families of POWs were genuinely worried, as
there wasn't any surety about their early return. India seemed unsym-
pathetic and had a stubborn attitude towards the issue.
To resolve the issue, Pakistan worked on mobilizing world
opinion in its favor to seek the return of the POWs. Bhutto sent mes-
sages to India through the U.N. stressing that the repatriation of
POWs would have “an important bearing on future relationships between
India and Pakistan. The countries which had already recognized
Bangladesh were approached to use their influence for the implementa-
tion of the U.N. resolution calling for withdrawal of the Indian troops
and the exchange of POWs.^^
In this matter, Pakistan got some support from the friendly
Muslim countries which had backed Pakistan's efforts on humanitarian
1
5
grounds. The world really paid attention towards the matter when
the reports of killing of prisoners in the Indian camps reached the
1 5
outside world. These tragic incidents increased the anxiety and con-
1
3
Bhutto's statement is in The Dawn
,
February 17, 1972.
14
The Dawn
,
February 17, 18, and 26, 1972.
15
Assurance to the Pakistani delegation to the Islami Conference
at Jeddah by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, in The Dawn
,
March 1, 1972.
^^The first incident occurred on March 7, when the security
guards opened fire on the POWs killing twelve of them. The action was
repeated in the coming months and up until November 28, 1973, about 38
prisoners were shot dead, in different camps, on each occasion alleged-
ly while attempting to escape.
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cern In Pakistan about their safe return. Delegations comprising of
ROWS' relatives were sent all over the world to appeal to the world news
media to bring this issue to their country's attention so that they
should use their influence "in the name of humanity." President Bhutto
was not willing to submit to Indian pressure in exchange for India's
release of the prisoners. India would have to bear considerable expense
in keeping 93,000 prisoners. Bhutto seemed convinced that the POWs
were a diminishing asset for India and he could therefore afford to
wait. If repatriation did not take place, he expected the interna-
tional agencies to intervene to bring pressure on India.
Qf '^ar crimes
. The question of the release of the POWs was
complicated by three factors: (1) while the Indian Government was pre-
pared to exchange the prisoners taken on the Western front, Pakistan
pressed for the release of all prisoners; (2) as the Pakistani forces
in East Pakistan had surrendered to a “joint" Indian-Bangladesh com-
mand, India contended that the prisoners could not be released without
the concurrence of Bangladesh, and insisted that Pakistan must settle
the question through trilateral negotiations after recognizing the new
state;^^ and (3) the Bangladesh government's intention to try a number
1
R
of the prisoners for alleged war crimes.
Statements regarding the trials of POWs came from the Bangla-
desh Law Minister, Dr. Kamal Hussain, who accused 195 Pakistani
^^Swaran Singh's speech in the U.N. General Assembly, October 7,
1972.
1
8
The number of those guilty of war crimes was initially set
at about 1,500, but later on the number was reduced to 195.
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prisoners of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, murder,
rape and arson during the War of 1971 in Bangladesh.'® Pakistan
promptly expressed its opposition to any trials on both practical and
legal grounds. It was declared that these trials would unleash hostil
forces in Pakistan, bringing possible harm to the Bengalis present in
West Pakistan. There would be demands for the trial of many Bengalis
on charges of passing information to the Indian and Bangladesh forces
on
during the war.
e
Pakistan brought the matter before the International Court of
Justice. On legal grounds, Pakistan tried to convince the court that
whatever happened in 1971 was within the territory of Pakistan, which
gave it exclusive jurisdiction in judging and punishing any law-
21breakers. India objected to this action taken by Pakistan. Accord-
ing to the Simla agreement, issues were to be solved through bilateral
negotiations, without involving any third party. Pakistan later on
requested the court to postpone further consideration, as negotiations
between India and Pakistan were expected to begin shortly.
Up until August 1973, India and Bangladesh showed no flexibil-
ity. The situation, however, changed as the economic burden of caring
for the prisoners began to be more and more irksome. Moreover, Pakis-
19
Dr. Kamal Hussain's press conference, in The Statesman, April
18, 1973.
20
President Bhutto's interview with the New York Times, June 1,
1973.
21
Yahya Bakhtiar's statement before the court, in The Dawn
,
June 6 and 27, 1973.
22
The Pakistan government's letter to the court on July 11, 1973.
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tan gained support from the world community because of India's refusal
to act according to the Geneva Conventions. Pakistan had also demon-
strated that it not only could afford to withhold the Bangladesh recog
nuion, but that with the help of China it could prevent Bangladesh's
entry into the United Nations.
The POWs were rapidly becoming an ineffective bargaining lever
for India. Realizing that India changed its attitude and showed some
flexibility. It asked Mujib to cooperate in settling the problem.
The deadlock was broken after a prolonged correspondence be-
tween Swaran Singh and Aziz Ahmed. Negotiations were started on July
24, 1973, but no decision could be reached, because Bangladesh wanted
to send all of its non-Bengali population away to Pakistan on the
ground that they were disloyal to the new regime. These non-Bengalis
(known as Biharis) numbered about 680,000. Mujib stated that about
260,000 of them had opted for Pakistan as their choice of future
nationality. Pakistan was prepared to accept only West Pakistanis
who had been stranded in Bangladesh in 1971 and about 40,000 others
who were formally employed by the Pakistan government or had strong
family 1 inks in Pakistan.
Hardening of Islamabad's attitude towards accepting Biharis
related to the fact that the Sindhi speaking population already had
grievances against the Urdu speaking Muslims, who had migrated from
India after the partition. Great numbers of those refugees are set-
23
It was the first veto to be cast by the People's Republic of
China since its admission to the United Nations.
24
"Mujib's Statement," in The Statesman, March 9, 1973.
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tied in the province of Sind, heavily concentrated in big cities like
Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur, Nawabshah, and Mirpurkhas. The Sindhis
felt threatened on economic grounds and also found the Urdu-speaking
people's attitude towards the Sindhi language chauvinistic. The fear
was understandable then that these new refugees, who speak Urdu, would
increase the number of unemployed, create new social and linguistic
tensions, and create problems on the national level.
Talks were again held in Mew Delhi on August 18, and after in-
tense negotiations for about ten days an agreement was signed on August
28, 1973.^^ It provided that:
1. The prisoners of war and civilian internees would be re-
patriated as quickly as possible.
2. All Bengalis in Pakistan, including the 203 charged with
subversion, would simultaneously be repatriated.
3. Pakistan would receive "a substantial number" of non-
Bengalis from Bangladesh.
4. The 195 Pakistanis charged with war crimes would remain in
India and would not be brought to trial during the period
of repatriation, on the completion of which discussions
on their future would take place between Bangladesh, India
and Pakistan.
The repatriation of the Bengalis in Pakistan and the non-Bengalis
in Bangladesh began on September 19.^^ By October 2, about 4,500 Ben-
galis and 4,000 non-Bengalis were repatriated. The first batch of 1,680
Pakistani prisoners, most of them civilian internees, women and chil-
dren, were taken to the Pakistani frontier on September 28. This three-
The text of the New Delhi agreement is in The Dawn, August 29,
1973.
26
The cost of transport was provided by the U.S., U.S.S.R.,
Britain, Canada, Australia, France and West Germany. The estimated
cost of the operation was about $14,000,000.
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way repatriation was completed by April 30, 1974.
Under the New Delhi agreement, Pakistan undertook to accept
"a substantial number" of Biharis in Bangladesh. In the process,
Pakistan accepted about 27,000, in addition to 22,000 people who had
fled to Nepal from Bangladesh and 25,000 other "hardship" cases;^^
whereas, 394,000 non-Bengalis (or Biharis), who had never been domiciled
in West Pakistan, wished to emigrate to Pakistan. Dr. Victor Um-
brict, the former head of the U.N. Relief Operation in Dacca, while
visiting Rawalpindi, submitted a plan to the Pakistan government for
the settlement of Biharis on uncultivated land in Sind with inter-
29
national aid. The Pakistan government rejected the proposal, on
the grounds that there was an unpublished understanding with India
that in addition to returning Pakistanis and the members of divided
families, only about 25,000 "hardship cases" among the Biharis should
be admitted. It was also pointed out that the Biharis were not
farmers but artisans, industrial workers and traders, and that the
proposal would meet with opposition from the Sindhis.
The matter was further discussed at a tripartite meeting in
New Delhi. Regarding the Biharis, Pakistan reiterated its past stand,
but promised to be more sympathetic in reviewing the applications. In
the same meeting Bangladesh agreed to abandon the proposed trial of
27
A statement released by the foreign affairs office of Pakistan
on November 1, 1973.
OO
°A survey report conducted by the IRC, in Keesing's Contemporary
Archives
,
London, March 25-31, 1974.
29
^The Dawn
,
October 26, 1973.
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195 prisoners as an "act of clemency.
The repatriation of the 72,795 prisoners of war and 17,186
interned civilians was completed on April 30, 1974. The final group
to return to Pakistan included Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi, the
former Pakistani commander in East Pakistan.
Recognition o f Bangladesh
. The recognition of Bangladesh was a highly
emotional issue for Pakistan. The very basis of Pakistan's existence
was questioned. To many Pakistanis, recognition of Bangladesh was the
repudiation of the "Two Nation Theory" on which the state of Pakistan
had been founded.
India, from the very beginning, pressed Pakistan for the recog-
nition of Bangladesh and made it a precondition for the release of
POWs, but President Bhutto resisted with patience. He was personally
in favor of recognition yet he took time in explaining the pros and
cons of this action to his countrymen. He did not want to take any
action unless public opinion was in its favor. He tried to convince his
people saying that the concept of Muslim nationhood in the Indian sub-
continent had originally envisaged two separate states in the northeast
and the northwest with some confederal link between them. However,
he emphasized that Pakistan's stand on the issue was unchanged. Though
a couple of voices were raised in the beginning for the recognition of
30
The new tripartite agreement was signed at New Delhi on April
9, 1974.
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"Mr. Bhutto's Speech at the National Assembly," in The Dawn ,
August 1972.
Bangladesh, Mr. Bhutto
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was looking for mass support which was still
not forthcoming.
to
__thej:ecoan^^ With a view to having an idea
of public opinion at large about this issue, Mr. Bhutto took a tour
of the country. He addressed public gatherings at various places and
explained the importance of recognition. During this tour he realized
that the mass opinion was still not favoring any action leading to
Bangladesh's recognition. The right-wing opposition parties had organ-
ized a violent campaign against the views of the government. As a re-
sult of this campaign, student demonstrations were held in various
parts of the country. The unrest spread all over the country especi-
ally in Sind and Punjab provinces. Even lawyers participated in such
demonstrations
.
These developments forced Bhutto to change his mind at least
for the time being. He reverted to constitutional measures by seeking
the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. According to
this opinion the National Assembly was legally empowered to adopt a
resolution authorizing the government to grant recognition to Bangla-
desh when any such step would be in the interest of the nation.
32
Mr. Asghar Khan, Chairman Tehri k-e-Istaqlal
,
made the demand
for recognition as early as January 11 and Wal i Khan, Head of National
Awami Party, came up with the argument that Mr. Bhutto's assumption of
the Presidency implied tacit acceptance of Bangladesh because the popu-
lar mandate was given to hitn only by the Western wing of Pakistan.
^^
The Dawn
,
December 12, 1972.
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The Pakistan Supreme Court ruling came on July 7, 1973, that
President Bhutto had the power under the constitution to recognize Ban-
gladesh. A resolution, authorizing the government to accord formal
recognition at an appropriate time, was placed before the National As-
sembly which adopted it unanimously with opposition absent.
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Though Mr. Bhutto got the authorization from the Assembly, he continued
refusal of Bangladesh recognition. Actually he was looking for some
proper time at which the decision would arouse as little opposition as
possible from the general public. The best occasion for such an action
turned out to be the Islamic summit meeting held at Lahore in February
1974.
^
Role of the Islamic summit in recognition of Bangladesh
. The
Islamic summit was arranged by Pakistan and was attended by the heads
of states/governments and foreign ministers of almost all the Muslim
countries. The presence of these important personalities of the Islamic
world created an atmosphere charged with feelings of universal brother-
hood of Islam. Psychologically it was the right time for recognition
of Bangladesh and the government of Pakistan took advantage of it.
The dignitaries from Muslim countries played an important role
in bringing about a reconciliation between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The
Secretary General of the Islamic Secretariat went to Dacca, with
Bhutto's consent, to invite Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to attend the summit.
-3C
It was described as "the first step toward formal recognition."
Sheikh Mujib, however, refused to attend unless Pakistan first accorded
formal recognition.
As the summit date was approaching, the foreign ministers of
the Islamic countries met at Lahore for pre-summit discussions and
preparation of the agenda. At this meeting it was decided to send a
delegation, on behalf of the Islamic world, to persuade the Bangladesh
^^Mr. Bhutto's address; the text is in The Dawn , February 23,
1974.
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government to attend the s»™H meeting. The delegation was comprised
of representatives from Kuwait, Somalia, Lebanon, Algeria, Senegal,
and the P.L.O.
Pakistan, realizing the importance of the issue, did not want
to lose this opportunity. A few hours before the opening session of
the summit, in a nationally televised address, Mr. Bhutto made the
historic announcement of recognition of Bangladesh. To create a
favorable atmosphere he declared that the government had ignored the
pressure from big powers regarding recognition of Bangladesh, but it
could not reject the advice of Muslim brothers who were present in
Lahore 36
After this declaration of formal recognition. Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman attended the Islamic summit meeting. At Lahore, he was given
a warm welcome by a cheering crowd. Before leaving for home. Sheikh
Mujib extended an invitation to Mr. Bhutto to visit Bangladesh de-
scribing him as "an old friend." With this started a new chapter in
the relations of the two countries, originally two parts of one
sovereign state.
The appropriate moment selected by Mr. Bhutto for the recogni-
tion of Bangladesh left those against the decision in a state of con-
fusion. They were not in a position to organize any campaign against
the government because of the strong feelings among the masses that
whatever was done by the government was under the advice of Muslim
36
37
Ibid.
Mr. Bhutto's press conference on February 24, 1974.
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brothers. The address by Col. Gaddafi of Libya to a huge gathering
at Lahore, supporting Bhutto, had a significant impact on public
OO
opinion.
E stablishment of Diplomatic Relations, Resumption
of Trade and Travel Facilities
The accord signed at Simla was not an easy one to implement.
But after resolving the complicated issues of troop withdrawal and re-
turn of the prisoners of war, it was expected that other issues like
diplomatic relations, resumption of trade, and postal and communica-
tion services wouldn't be difficult to tackle. Even the most crucial
and emotional issue of the recognition of Bangladesh had been resolved.
The emphasis on bilateralism in the accord implied further
negotiations on existing problems. Pakistan had actually suggested
the immediate restoration of diplomatic relations at the very opening
session of the Simla talks but, India being reluctant, the proposal
did not go forward.
Trade and communications
. Before talks on resumption of postal and com-
munication services could begin things took a different turn. The In-
dian nuclear test created grave concerns in Pakistan and tension be-
tween the two countries rose once again. After losing her East wing,
38
Col. Muainmar A1 -Gaddafi of Libya addressed at Lahore a huge
public gathering (over 1,000,000). In his address, he declared that
Pakistan's decision to recognize Bangladesh was based on the unity of
Islam brotherhood and the decision was taken under the advice of all
Muslim countries. He further declared that all Muslim countries, es-
pecially Libya, would stand with Pakistan in every circumstance. Say-
ing, "We are brothers. Your friends are our friends and your enemy is
our enemy,
"
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Pakistan was already weak and militarily inferior to India and the
nuclear test was considered a clear threat to Pakistan's security.
Thus progress towards normalization of relations was blocked for the
time being. Although Indian leadership assured others that nuclear
energy was to be used for peaceful purposes, it was not a satisfactory
answer for Pakistan because of her past experience with Indian hos-
tility.
In the meantime, Pakistan successfully mobilized world opinion
against nuclear weapons in India and got assurances against an Indian
nuclear threat. Having done this, Pakistan showed a willingness to
start negotiations on implementation of other phases of the Simla ac-
cord.
Various meetings and discussions were held between the repre-
sentatives of the two countries. After a series of negotiations a
joint communique was issued under which both governemnts agreed to
restore postal and communication services and the traveling facilities
which were suspended during the War of 1971. It was also decided that
telephone mul ti -exchange areas of Bombay and Karachi be linked by
satellite circuits. As far as resumption of trade, delegations of the
two countries were to exchange visits to explore further possibilities
in this regard. The question of resumption of overflights and airlinks
was left for further discussion. Postal and telecommunication links
were restored shortly. It was agreed that trade should be conducted
"on the basis of free convertible currency in accordance with foreign
^^The joint communique by India and Pakistan, in The Dawn ,
September 15, 1974.
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exchange regulations in force from time to time in each country.
Initially, trade was to be handled by government corporations though
there was provision for private sector's participation at some later
stages
.
Resumptions of trade was a major achievement based on the Simla
agreement, as the trade relations had been cut off since the 1965 War.
Though the Tashkent declaration provided for its resumption, it never
happened because of inflexible attitudes by both sides.
Restoration of airlinks and overflights
. Overflights by Pakistan air-
craft across Indian territory were suspended by India in early 1971
when tvjo Kashmiris hijacked an Indian Airlines plan, and forced the
pilot to land at Lahore. They identified themselves as members of a
secret organization operating inside Kashmir called the National
Liberation Front. Pakistan refused to return the hijackers to India on
the plea that the persons, being Kashmiris, were not Indian nationals
and as such there was no legal necessity to hand them over to India.
Surpri si ngly
,
after the judicial inquiry it was alleged that the so-
called hijackers were members of the Indian Intelligence Service and
that the whole drama had been engineered by India for the purpose of
giving it a justification to stop Pakistan overflights across Indian
territory and thus create hurdles in the movement of people and sup-
plies between East and West wings of Pakistan.
"^^The text of the agreement, in The Dawn , December 1 , 1974.
“Pakistan Foreign Secretary's Answer to India," in The Dawn ,
February 5, 1974.
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Pakistan had lodged a complaint against this action on the part
of India, before the Council of International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO). A contention by India that the Council had no jurisdiction
in the matter had been rejected by the Council and by the International
Court of Justice. Under these circumstances the issue of restoration
of these links proved to be tough to handle. India was reluctant to
allow resumption of overflights unless the complaint was withdrawn from
ICAO, whereas Pakistan refused to do so in the beginning. The Indian
view was that Pakistan's complaint to ICAO militated against the Simla
accord to settle differences bi lateral ly-that is. without involving
third parties. The matter could not be resolved until Mr. Bhutto,
in order to give a new impetus to this process of normalization,
showed his willingness to withdraw the case from the ICAO. Subse-
quently, discussions were held and an agreement was reached, which con-
tained the following important points besides restoration of airlinks:^^
1. The two countries would send a joint letter to ICAO with-
drawing their respective complaints. Overflights and air-
links would be restored.
2. Goods and passenger traffic by rail would be resumed through
Wagah-Attari border (Lahore in Pakistan and Amritsar in
India)
.
3. Diplomatic relations would be reestablished at the ambas-
sador's level.
4. Private sectors would be allowed to participate in trade
and commerce between the two countries.
5. The issue of civilian detainees would be resolved expedi-
tiously, and efforts would be made to locate and repatriate
persons still untraced.
42
The text is in The Dawn, May 15, 1976.
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The implementation of this agreement was completed shortly
after that. The overflights were resumed and the rail links between
India and Pakistan, snapped since the 1965 War, were restored in 1976.
Another important step towards the process of normal ization
of relations was the resumption of diplomatic relations. After almost
four years of their suspension the two countries reestablished diplo-
matic relations. The ambassadors of the two countries arrived to re-
sume their responsibilities by the inaugural flights of PIA and Air
India. With this, a foundation of a new phase of cordial relations was
begun.
43
The India Express
, July 17, 1976.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Present State of Relations Between India and Pakistan
Since the return of the POWs
,
the exchange of their respective
citizens between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the recognition of the
latter by Pakistan, Indo-Paki stan relations have been correct. India's
detonation of a nuclear device on May 18, 1974, did not alter the inten-
tion of bettering future relations, nor did Delhi's decision to make
Kashmir an ordinary state within the Indian union. It is true that in
both instances, Bhutto made statements critical of the Indian govern-
ment. But his public declarations were meant primarily for domestic
consumption, intended to pacify his audiences. The Indians were con-
demned and warned that Pakistan could not stand idly by. Pakistan,
too, could build nuclear weapons if it wished to put its resources into
such a program. Bhutto called for a nationwide work stoppage to demon-
strate Pakistan's dissatisfaction with the Indian decision to absorb
Kashmir. But the bellicosity of the past was noticeably subdued.
Pakistan under Bhutto's leadership (1972-77) tried to move with
the times. Realizing that the old militant attitude towards India would
not profit him or his country, he emphasized reducing old enmities while
making new friends. For more than two decades, Pakistan had harbored
the notion that it was the equal of India, despite that country's vast
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numerical superiority. As a result, successive Pakistani governments
assumed an aggressive posture toward India that made any kind of mean-
ingful acco„»,odation difficult. Apparently, a new realism is shown by
the Pakistani leadership after Bangladesh's emergence.
Sicne July 5, 1977, Pakistan is under another spell of martial
law. South Asia saw a brand of populism in the early 1970s. From
Colombo to New Delhi and from Islamabad to Dacca, regimes were swept
into office and stayed in power by arousing the expectations of the
masses through leftist slogans and programs. Unfortunately, they
couldn't translate them into reality, which gave way to discontentment
and resort to unconstitutional methods to contain it. All of those
regimes have coll apsed--through electoral defeat in India and Sri
Lanka, through military takeover in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Armed forces of Pakistan, particularly the army, have played
a dominant role in the country since its existence. They have been en-
gaged in four armed conflicts with India in 30 years. For almost half
of this period, the military of Pakistan, with the army as its vanguard
has wielded the sceptre as well as the sword. Traditionally the domes-
tic interests of the armed forces establishment in Pakistan had been
linked to Pakistan's posture of confrontation with India. An inflated
military establishment could only be justified in terms of a threat
from India. This inflated military machine is considered essential in
order to preserve the political power of the top military elite as the
arbiters of the country's destiny.
But this time, instead of playing up the tune of constant Indian
threat, the military regime of Pakistan under General Ziaul Hag seems to
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follow the foreign policy broadly formulated by Bhutto's government.
In its relationship with India, Pakistan is trying to resolve the
problems and promote relations on the principle of bilateralism.
Normalization of relations is taking place slowly but steadily.
The process has been started by the exchange of visitors. Efforts have
been made by both countries to provide visa facilities to people to
travel easily in both countries. To create good will and to ease ten-
sion, hockey teams of India and Pakistan have exchanged visits.^
On the diplomatic scene, India's External Minister, A.B.
Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan in February 1978 is the most important
development which has taken place recently.^ He is the first Indian
Foreign Minister in the last 14 years to come to Pakistan to negotiate
with his Pakistani counterpart on matters of mutual interest. It is
interesting that Mr. Vajpayee, who as a member of the Jan Sangh party
denounced the Simla agreement as a "stab in the back," came to Pakistan
to discuss matters in the spirit of the Simla agreement. While address-
ing a press conference, he showed his desire to bring relations between
the two countries to normal. He said, "if there are misgivings we will
3
try to remove these."
Besides exploring the possibilities of improving trade, both
sides have shown a keen interest in promoting exchanges in various
Hhe Indian hockey team visited Pakistan in January 1978 and
the Pakistani team went to India in February 1978 to play a series of
matches with each other.
2
Mr. Vajpayee visited Pakistan on February 6, 1978.
^The Hindu, February 18, 1978.
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fields like culture and sports. An important topic which came under
discussion related to the Salal dam project on the Chenab River in
Jammu and Kashmir. The talks resulted in an agreement.^ Pakistan,
under the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, was entitled to examine the
Indian design of the hydroelectric project that country planned to
build. It had originally raised objections on the grounds that the
design did not conform to the criteria laid down in that treaty. Af-
ter the restoration of diplomatic relations under the Simla agreement,
an initiative was taken by both countries to resume bilateral negotia-
tions to resolve this problem. Talks have been continued since 1974.
Two rounds of discussions were held at the foreign secretary's level
in October 1976 at New Delhi and Islatnabad, but no agreement was
reached. Mr. Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan was mostly to solve this
gproblem bilaterally.
The good will generated by the normalization of relations be-
tween the two countries nearly two years ago has not been allowed to
suffer a setback during the past year which witnessed internal changes
in governments in both countries. Settling of disputes through bi-
lateral negotiations shows the intentions of India and Pakistan to
maintain normal relations and to live in peace. It is for the first
time in the last thirty years that the subcontinent is not one of the
troubled areas of the world, at least for the time being and in the
immediate future.
4
The agreement was signed on the Salal Hydroelectric Project
on the Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir on April 14, 1978.
5
The text of the agreement is in India News
,
April 17, 1978.
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Pakistan's Relations with the Muslim Countries
One of the most significant developments in Pakistan's foreign
policy in the post-1971 period has been the renewal of emphasis on her
close ties with the Muslim countries of the Middle East. The strategic
interrelationship between Pakistan and the Middle East has never been
as important as it is today. The world's greatest reservoir of oil,
the center of the vital network of communications between Europe, Asia
and Africa, the Middle East has progress! vely emerged as a powerful
force in international politics.
Located on its periphery, Pakistan enjoys a special position
in this region by virtue of the fact that it occupies the sensitive
transitional zone which links the Middle East with South Asia. Pakis-
tan, stretching from the Arabian Sea to the Hindu Kush, can either
prove to be a useful buffer between the cultural and political zones
which lie to its east and west, or in the event of its failure to forge
a national identity it could turn into an area of great political in-
stability which would threaten the stability of its neighbors as well.
Until 1971, Pakistan with its two wings lying on either ends of the
subcontinent was established as a South Asian power and its policy was
oriented towards the subcontinent. But with the secession of Bangla-
desh, Islamabad has given an increasing emphasis to its "Middle East
option" adding a new dimension to the politics of the region. Pakis-
tan is half inclined just to turn its back to India.
The changes which have come about in the Middle East have also
a profound impact on Pakistan's relations with this region. With the
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British withdrawal from east of Suez in 1971, the Gulf States emerged
as an important area to watch. Previously weak and divided, these
states came together in a new union known as the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) which with its oil wealth and strategic location on the Gulf is
now viewed as an important entity in the area. Concurrently, Iran has
also assumed a new role for itself as a major military power in the
Gulf. Spending over $3 billion annually on arms purchase, Iran hopes
to build up its military potential so as to exclude foreign influence
from the Gulf region altogether. This objective is not too difficult
to achieve since Iran exercises control over the Straits of Hormuz which
constitute the entry to the Gulf and through which 85 percent of the
non-communist world's crude oil passes. Initially, this active role
adopted by Iran led to a confrontation between Iran on the east bank
and the Arabs on the west bank of the Gulf.
If this trend had continued, it would be difficult to say what
course the relationship between Pakistan and the Middle East would have
followed. But fortunately events have helped to smooth out a number
of major differences in the region. The Iranians and the Arabs reached
an understanding on the issues dividing them. Iraq and Iran have come
to terms on their border disputes and the Kurdish problem. Iran and
Saudi Arabia have managed to coordinate their oil policy and the Gulf
States have tacitly accepted Iran's new role in the region.
With the inclination to settle the longstanding disputes among
the Arabs, the overall picture of the Middle East has changed. The
^Saudi Arabia agreed to give up its claim to Bureimi in ex-
change for an additional corridor to the Gulf, where it plans to build
160
Arabs have discovered a potent weapon in the form of oil which has
given them a significant place in the power balance in the area. Now
the pattern of power is determined not simply by the big powers alone
but also by the local governments. The end of their local confronta-
tions, combined with their oil power, have given these states greater
independence in dealings with the great powers, which otherwise would
not have been possible. These factors have enabled Pakistan to forge
an advantageous relationship with the Middle East. This policy has
been determined largely by its own political, economic and strategic
i nte rests
.
Immediately after the fall of Dacca in December 1971, Pakistan
found itself in a diplomatically vulnerable position. The only powers
which had not expressed hostile criticism of Islamabad's efforts to
safeguard its territorial integrity during the 1971 crisis were China
and the Muslim countries of the Middle East. With the secession of
Bangladesh, India claimed to be the predominant power in South Asia.
Faced with a stupendous task especially in view of the limited options
as a result of 1971 events, Pakistan could either accept a subordinate
role in the subcontinent with India acting as the sole power in charge
of the security management in the region or steer itself out of its
diplomatic isolation and then negotiate with New Delhi from a position
of strength.
The Pakistan government decided to explore fully its diplomatic
a new port and a refinery. Kuwait and Iraq have also settled their dif-
ferences by agreeing to give Iraq a wider access to the Gulf. For fur-
ther details, see Zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan and the Middle East,"
Pacific Community: An Asian Quarterly Review , 7:4, July 1976.
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options. Its foreign policy now focused on the Middle East which,
along with China, could be expected to provide the counterweight to the
enhanced Indo-Soviet influence in the subcontinent. This came easily
because Pakistan had always placed great emphasis on the religious
solidarity and the common cultural heritage which linked and identified
it closely with the people of the Middle East7
Pakistan's undivided support to the Arabs in their struggle
against Israel and its non-involvement in the inter-Arab disputes had
generated sufficient good will to enable it to effectively develop its
Middle East option. President Bhutto effectively employed personal
diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy and succeeded in winning
substantial political and diplomatic support from the countries of the
Middle East for Pakistan's stand on the unresolved issues emanating
from the December 1971 war.^
The support extended by the Middle East governments helped
Pakistan in overcoming its isolation. Subsequently, it negotiated suc-
cessfully with India and secured its main objectives without making any
major concessions. The Middle Eastern powers played a more tangible
role in respect of Pakistan's policy towards Bangladesh. A number of
them, such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
,
did not recognize
Bangladesh until after Pakistan had extended recognition. Even the
^For a detailed account of Pakistan's relations with the Middle
East until 1965, see Khalida Oureshi, "Pakistan and the Middle East," in
Pakistan Horizon (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs,
second quarter 1966), pp. 156-166.
g
Support and the role played by Muslim countries in solving
Pakistan's problems has already been discussed in the previous chapters.
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other Arab states did not grant precipitate recognition «hich could
have jeopardized Pakistan's interests.
Since then the Pakistan government has consolidated its ties
with the Middle East through frequent exchange of visits at the highest
level. Pakistan's close links with this region have been demonstrated
on many occasions. In October 1973, when the fourth Arab-Israel war
broke out, the Pakistan government extended full diplomatic support to
the Arabs and showed greater involvement than it had in previous crises.
In 1974, at the suggestion of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan played host to the
Islamic summit conference. Though essentially an organization of Mus-
lims from all over the world, the Islamic conference is oriented to-
wards the Middle East whose problems it mainly projects. Hence Pakis-
tan's close involvement with this organization represented a positive
shift in its policy from South Asia to the Middle East.
There has been a phenomenal expansion of economic ties between
Pakistan and its Middle East neighbors. Previously, economic contacts
betvyeen Pakistan and the Arab countries of the Middle East were scanty.
However, Islamabad did enjoy a reasonable degree of economic coopera-
tion with Iran and Turkey under the Regional Cooperation for Develop-
ment (RCD).
By 1972-73, the economic picture of the Middle East had changed
drastically. The energy crisis and the rise in oil prices provided the
oil-producing states with an abundance of petrodollars which they wished
to invest for their own economic development. But lacking in trained
manpower, they had to turn to others for help in their development plan-
ning efforts. A great many skilled and unskilled Pakistanis work in
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the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. They send close to $500
million in remittances to relatives in Pakistan.^ The Arab states
are also extending financial assistance for Pakistan in the form of
soft loans. As a result, Pakistan's overwhelming dependence on
Western economic aid is giving way to a diversified policy in which
economic assistance from the Middle East is coming to occupy a sig-
nificant role. Pakistan has been able to secure a special position
because it has manpower, expertise and technical knowhow to offer to
the Middle East.
Muslim countries of the Middle East have a stake in Pakistan's
national integrity. This is especially true of the nations who are
geographically contiguous to Pakistan. Were Pakistan to be beset with
instability, it would threaten the national security and stability of
the enti re region
.
Indi an and Pakistani Relations with Iran
Pakistan's link with the Middle East is also enhanced by the
special strategic requirements of the countries in this region. Other
than the Arab countries, Iran falls in the category of the countries
who have strategic interests in Pakistan's stability and solidarity.
Iran has extended considerable political and military support to Pakis-
tan in order to ensure stability in the region, which would serve
9
There are estimated to be 20,000 Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia,
30,000 in the UAE, 25,000 in Kuwait and 10,000 in Behrein.
^*^For the economic assistance given by the Muslim countries to
Pakistan, see Mustafa, "Pakistan and the Middle East."
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Iranian strategic interests.’' Since the secession of Bangladesh u,
1971. Iran has found its security interests even more closely linked
with Pakistan. It feared that if the events of 1971 were to generate
forces and pressures which would lead to further dismemberment of the
country, it would have a profound impact on Iran. The Shah of Iran
moved swiftly to intensify his ties with Islamabad to provide it with
counterpoise it needed to check centrifugal tendencies. Since January
1972, an exchange of many visits has taken place at the highest level.
The Shah of Iran attaches great importance to Pakistan's territorial
integrity; he has declared on many occasions that his country would
be seriously affected if another separatist movement broke out in
Paki Stan.
12
Iran has never displayed much interest either in the Pakhtoonis
tan issue or in Pakistan's problems with India, including Kashmir. On
the other hand, it has been deeply concerned about unrest in Baluchis-
tan. When Soviet arms were found hidden in the Iraqi Embassy in Islama
bad, and were alleged to have been earmarked for subversive elements in
both Pakistani and Iranian Baluchistan, the Iranian government could
not pretend indifference. Since then the two governments have been in
almost continuous contact. Pakistan is receiving considerable economic
assistance from Iran, and the two countries are entering into joint
projects in Baluchistan. The hope is that economic development will
Iran's western and northern flanks have been subjected to in-
stability arising from the tensions in Iran's relations with Iraq, Af-
ghanistan and the Soviet Union.
1
2
The Shah's statement, in The Dawn
,
October 26, 1973; also see
the Shah's interview with the International Herald Tribune, April 23,
1 973.
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break down traditional tribal loyalties and generate greater national
consciousness. Iran’s concern with Pakistan’s territorial integrity
arises also from its own need to safeguard its lines of communications
through the Hormuz Straits which lie close to the Pakistan coast.
Despite its close historic ties with Pakistan, Iran made a
calculated move in late 1973 to improve its relations with India. Pre-
viously concerned about the adverse fallout effects of Pakistan’s fur-
ther dismemberment, the Shah’s opinion seemed to change when he visited
New Delhi in October 1974.
transfer from Iran to Pakistan was ’’not really relevant” any longer be-
cause of Iran's "firm friendship with India,” and his ’’unvarying policy
of promoting peace and friendship between India and Pakistan.
This turnabout in the Iranian perception was the result of a
series of high level visits and exchange of views between Indian and
Iranian leaders beginning in July 1973 and culminating in the Shah’s
trip to New Delhi in October 1974. As a result of these meetings. New
Delhi was able to convince Teheran that India had as much at stake in
the territorial integrity of Pakistan as did Iran and that on this is-
sue their interests coincided rather than diverged. The relaxation
in tensions in the subcontinent following Pakistan’s recognition of
Bangladesh in February 1974 and the tripartite accord among India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh in April 1974, further strengthened Iran’s
conviction that Indo-Paki stani tensions were not likely to escalate in
1
3
The Shah’s interview with the International Herald Tribune,
April 23, 1973.
14
The Times of India, October 4, 1974.
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the near future to a point where the dismemberment of Pakistan would
become a possibility for which Iran would have to make contingency
plans.
After the Shah's visit to India in 1974, a new pattern of re-
lations between the two countries was inaugurated. They signed an
economic agreement providing for a $37 million Iranian loan for Indian
economic development and the sale of Iranian oil to India at a con-
siderably discounted price. This process of improving relations con-
tinues and today relations between India and Iran are closer than they
have been ever before. This has helped to broaden Iran's power base in
the region and diversify its links with the subcontinent.
Iranian interest in the region coincides with Pakistan's own
interest to maintain stability on its western and southern flanks.
Pakistan's strategic requirements were best demonstrated in its atti-
tude towards the military pacts. While it withdrew from SEATO in
November 1973, Pakistan revived its interest in CENTO. It has been
said that Iran had promised Pakistan to supply 50 F-5 jet fighters to
replace the outdated F-86 saber jets.^^
The Pakistan and Afghanistan Border Conflict
Afghanistan lies along the northwestern border region of the
subcontinent. It is a landlocked territory but forms a bridge between
the subcontinent on the one hand and Soviet-central Asia on the other.
After the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the Afghanistan government at-
^^
Washington Post
,
March 8, 1975.
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tempted to raise a border issue and claimed the NWFP (and occasionally
Baluchistan too). Since Pushtu speaking people live on both sides
of the border, Afghan nationalists raised a demand for the establish-
ment of Pakhtoonistan, a country which had not existed in the past.
Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's
admission to the United Nations in 1947 on the ground that it could
not recognize the NWFP as part of Pakistan until that province had been
given an opportunity to opt for independence. Relations of Pakistan
with Afghanistan have seldom been good, in spite of repeated Pakistani
efforts to resolve outstanding differences between them.^^ The 1973
coup that ousted Zahir Shah from his throne and returned Mohammad Daud
to power did not augur well for Pakistan. Since the stability of the
Daud regime in Afghanistan rested considerably on its appeal to Pan-
Pakhtoon nationalism, there was bound to be an escalation, at least a
verbal escalation, in the project of detaching the Pushtu-speaking
areas of Pakistan and their establishment as an Afghan dominated state.
Islamabad could, of course, easily handle the Afghan "danger"
if there were not the impression that "behind every Afghan there stands
a Russian. Within days of consolidating his authority, Daud reasserted
his support for Pakhtoonistan. Bhutto reacted skillfully and refrained
from violent attacks; he said: "we have nothing but the most fraternal
For the Afghan claim and dispute on the Durand Line, see
Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers (Studies in a Contemporary Problem)
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp. 89, 92; and also Vali, pp. 92-116.
^^For an account of Afghanistan and Pakistan relations, see
Zubeida Mustafa, "Afghanistan and the Asian Power Balance," in Paci fic
Community: An Asian Quarterly Review
,
6:2 (January 1975).
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sentiments towards Afghanistan. While there is no question of our com-
promising our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we will spare no
effort in establishing cordial relations with Afghanistan."'®
Although Daud did not attend the Lahore Muslim summit, he did
send a representative. The Afghan ambassador seized the opportunity to
propagandize the cause of "oppressed minorities." Afghanistan appar-
ently wanted the Muslim world to know the depth of its animosity to-
wards Pakistan, and this bitterness led Kabul to look with greater
friendship to the Soviet Union and India. The Muslim summit brought
Bhutto and Mujib together, but it could not play the same role as far
as Daud was concerned. Certainly Pakistanis are convinced of Afghanis-
tan's continuing enmity.
A united Pakistan should be able to defend itself against
provocations from Afghanistan. But the situation is complicated by a
number of factors. Pakistan's frontiers are a turbulent region; and
Afghans can, and have, supplied arms to a variety of dissidents. It
is obvious that Pakistan fears a joint action by Afghanistan and
1
9
India. Kabul's support for the dissident elements in NWFP and
Baluchistan and the timing of the Daud coup could not have been more
inopportune from Islamabad's point of view. It gave the Pathan and the
Baluchi counter-elite the moment they needed to embark upon a course
of open defiance of centra! authority.
1
8
New York Times
,
August 4, 1973.
19
In the summer of 1974, Bhutto publically aired his concern
that the troops of both India and Afghanistan were concentrating on
Pakistan's frontiers.
169
Although from the Pakistan government's point of view the
threat was manageable and not at all comparable to the East Pakistani
situation in 1970-71, it did create additional headaches. Daud's re-
assertion of the Pakhtoonistan question in a rather militant fashion
overshadowed India's role as enemy number one in Pakistan's eyes. It
is interesting to note that, since 1972, Pakistan has been looking west-
ward not only in its search of friends (Iran, the Arab Emirates, Saudi
Arabia, Libya) but also for adversaries (Afghanistan). Anyhow, this
does not mean that Indo-Pakistan tensions will disappear overnight.
It does mean that they are likely to be reduced if for no other reason
than that Pakistan's limited decision-making capabilities would now be
more involved in its relations with its western neighbors.
Prospects of Relations Between India and Pakistan
The events of 1971 culminating in the separation of East Pakis-
tan from West Pakistan radically transformed the very character of the
Pakistani state. As a result of the loss of the East wing, Pakistan
for the first time in its history is on the threshold of evolving a
viable national identity for itself based on territorial terms. As
long as East and West Pakistan were kept together in an uneasy mar-
riage, Pakistan was forced to project itself as an "ideological state."
The new situation that emerged after 1971 not only demonstrated the
power realities on the subcontinent, but also created the possibility
for Pakistan to attempt a redefinition of its own national identity
in viable territorial terms. Today's Pakistan is not only geographical
-
ly whole but it is relatively homogeneous in cultural terms.
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The Signing of the Sin, la agreement has ushered ,n a ne« era of
peace through bilateral negotiations in this troubled subcontinent.
The optimism regarding Indo-Pakistani relations is also due to the es-
tablishment of a new power equilibrium in South Asia. This means that
Pakistan understands that it is not possible to change the status quo
in the subcontinent by force. There is a need, therefore, for both
countries to agree to build a structure of peace in South Asia based
on the acceptance of the status quo.
The prospects of an Indo-Pakistani detente, which emerged from
the Simla agreement in 1972, are reasonably good. Its progress depends
primarily on the development of political trust in each other by the
ruling elite of India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, this has always
been lacking in the Indo-Pakistan relationship. This, however, does not
rule out the prospect for such trust emerging in the future as a result
of a changed domestic and i nternational context.
With Pakistan reduced in size and in military power--even
less of a match for India than before--Indians and Indian policy makers
need not see Pakistan as a threat to their security. For the first
time since 1947, and particularly since 1954 when Pakistan's military
capabilities were augmented by its military alliance with the United
States, the Indian decision makers can take a relatively relaxed view
of Indo-Pakistani relations. This assessment means a return to normal-
ity in Indian reflexes towards Pakistani moves.
As for the presumption still present in certain Pakistani cir-
cles that India is interested in the further dismemberment of Pakistan,
it would be enough to say that such a policy goal on India's part is
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not probable. The cost of such an operation, in human and material
terms, to India would be almost prohibitive. If Pakistan were to be
broken up again, parts of it may go to Iran and Afghanistan. It is not
to be assumed that India would wish or permit such a development. Any
parts of Pakistan that India might want to swallow would be extremely
difficult to absorb. The reintroduction of large Muslim populations
into the Indian polity would tend to tear apart the fabric of its domes
tic peace, unity, and cohesion.
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